《全球化视角下的国际经济分析》课程教学资源（参考资料）西方衰落.docx_大学文库

What is happening to the world economy?Here are some answers,in seven charts.They reveal a world undergoing profound changes. The most important transformation of recent decades has been the declining weight of the high-income countries in global economic activity.The "great divergence"of the 19th and early 20th centuries,when today's high-income economies leapt ahead of the rest of the world in terms of wealth and power,has gone into remarkably rapid reverse.Where once there was divergence,we now see a "great convergence".Yet it is also a limited convergence.The change is all about the rise of Asia and,most importantly.of China. Nothing better illustrates China's advance than its huge savings.These are so large.partly because the economy has become so big and partly because Chinese households and businesses save so much.It is likely that Chinese capital,capital markets and financial institutions will become as influential in the world economy in the 21st century,as US capital. capital markets and financial institutions were in the 20th century. Emerging and developing countries have not only become increasingly important inworld output,they are becoming increasingly important in world population.The declining weight of the high-income countries is dramatic.By 2050,the share of sub-Saharan Africa in the global population is forecast by the UN to be almost as large as that of all the high-income countries in 1950.The challenges created by this shift in the world's population towards its poorest countries are evident. Economic convergence and shifts in population are central elements in the big economic picture.A third is technological change.The convergence of data processing with communication has brought us the internet,the most important technology of our era.The collapse in the relative cost of semiconductors underpins this technological revolution. Intriguingly (and worryingly),it seems to have slowed. The US has driven the global technological frontier outwards ever since the late 19th century. Robert Gordon,a professor of social sciences at Northwestern University.has shown that the US economy has not matched the outstanding productivity it achieved between 1920 and 1970.He also shows that the burst of productivity growth between 1994 and 2014,often attributed to the internet,has ended in a period of extremely low productivity growth. Mismeasurement appears to explain at most only a small part of this disturbing slowdown. Weak investment since the financial crisis is another partial explanation. The world economy is not deglobalising.But the rapid growth of both trade and cross-border financial assets and liabilities and trade,relative to global output,has come to a halt.In the case of finance,plausible explanations are risk-aversion and re-regulation.In terms of trade,the last significant act of trade liberalisation was China's accession to the World Trade Organisation,which happened as long ago as 2001.Many of the opportunities afforded by the cross-border integration of supply chains may also by now have been exhausted. Rapid change in relative economic power and huge shifts in the relative size of populations shape our world.At the same time,the sources of dynamism -technological change, productivity growth and globalisation-are slowing.to a worrying degree.One result, powerfully reinforced by the crisis,has been real income stagnation in many high-income countries. Rising populist pressure across the high-income economies makes managing these shifts far

What is happening to the world economy? Here are some answers, in seven charts. They reveal a world undergoing profound changes. The most important transformation of recent decades has been the declining weight of the high-income countries in global economic activity. The “great divergence” of the 19th and early 20th centuries, when today’s high-income economies leapt ahead of the rest of the world in terms of wealth and power, has gone into remarkably rapid reverse. Where once there was divergence, we now see a “great convergence”. Yet it is also a limited convergence. The change is all about the rise of Asia and, most importantly, of China. Nothing better illustrates China’s advance than its huge savings. These are so large, partly because the economy has become so big and partly because Chinese households and businesses save so much. It is likely that Chinese capital, capital markets and financial institutions will become as influential in the world economy in the 21st century, as US capital, capital markets and financial institutions were in the 20th century. Emerging and developing countries have not only become increasingly important inworld output, they are becoming increasingly important in world population. The declining weight of the high-income countries is dramatic. By 2050, the share of sub-Saharan Africa in the global population is forecast by the UN to be almost as large as that of all the high-income countries in 1950. The challenges created by this shift in the world’s population towards its poorest countries are evident. Economic convergence and shifts in population are central elements in the big economic picture. A third is technological change. The convergence of data processing with communication has brought us the internet, the most important technology of our era. The collapse in the relative cost of semiconductors underpins this technological revolution. Intriguingly (and worryingly), it seems to have slowed. The US has driven the global technological frontier outwards ever since the late 19th century. Robert Gordon, a professor of social sciences at Northwestern University, has shown that the US economy has not matched the outstanding productivity it achieved between 1920 and 1970. He also shows that the burst of productivity growth between 1994 and 2014, often attributed to the internet, has ended in a period of extremely low productivity growth. Mismeasurement appears to explain at most only a small part of this disturbing slowdown. Weak investment since the financial crisis is another partial explanation. The world economy is not deglobalising. But the rapid growth of both trade and cross-border financial assets and liabilities and trade, relative to global output, has come to a halt. In the case of finance, plausible explanations are risk-aversion and re-regulation. In terms of trade, the last significant act of trade liberalisation was China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation, which happened as long ago as 2001. Many of the opportunities afforded by the cross-border integration of supply chains may also by now have been exhausted. Rapid change in relative economic power and huge shifts in the relative size of populations shape our world. At the same time, the sources of dynamism — technological change, productivity growth and globalisation — are slowing, to a worrying degree. One result, powerfully reinforced by the crisis, has been real income stagnation in many high-income countries. Rising populist pressure across the high-income economies makes managing these shifts far