Task Team of FUNDAMENTAL ACCOUNTING School of Business, Sun Yat-sen University Lesson 13 Managerial Accounting I: Concepts and Principles Exercise 1. Sunny Brockman has developed a new device that is so exciting he is considering quitting his job in order to produce and market it on a large-scale basis. Sunny will rent a garage for $1000 per

2.1列写图P2.1所示中i(t)、i2(t)、u(t)的微分方程

Acknowledge I expresses thanks to Assoc. Prof. rob Reid of Adelaide university of Australia, Dr Jeff Gale, foreign teacher of northwest A&F University of China, and Prof. Zhang Fusuo, Prof. Li Xiaolin of China Agriculture University, Prof Liu Yuanyin of Northeast agriculture Unversity and other authors who provide materials for me, or whose materials, such as photographs and figures etc, I used in the lectures

一、已知无源二端网络ab端电压u=50√2cos(103t+10°)V 电流i=5√2cos(103t-26.9°)A a i 则网络的输入阻抗Z=8+j6 输入导纳y=0.08j0.06S

运动的机制: 地球作为一个旋转球体,应服从角动量守 恒定律,即: C=Io I为转动惯量;a为自转角速度;C为角动 量,为常数 I=MR2 R为地球半径;M为地球质量,M不变 V=RV为线速度 C=MVR

Marciano Siniscalchi October 28, 1999 Introduction [Again, by and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so will keep these notes to a minimum.] Review of key definitions Recall our three payoff aggregation criteria: discounting, i.e

Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and\sequential equilibrium lite\, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium The main focus is the \reputation\result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer to OR for details and definitions: I am following the textbook quite closely We have already mentioned the Entry Deterrence game. Now consider a K-fold repetition

Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\to thethe- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e behavioral) characterization of rationalizability a review of the basic definitions For your convenience, I summarize the essential definitions pertaining to models of interactive

Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and \sequential equilibrium lite, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main focus is the \reputation\ result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer to OR for details and definitions: I am following the textbook quite closely. of the game in which an incumbent faces a sequence of K (potential) entrants. It is clear that, in the subgame in which the last entrant gets a chance to play, the incumbent will

Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 1l and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. J Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made for payoff uncertainty