Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and chooses response r E R. Players'payoffs depend on 0, m and r. What could be simpler? Yet, there is a huge number of economically interesting games that fit nicely within this framework: Spence's job market signaling model is the leading example, but applications abound in IO (limit pricing, disclosure...) finance (security design) and political economics
习题讨论 题目: 1,计算I dx ta 2,计算lm=r(mndt,其中Bm为自然数 8,计算J=(11 xax,其中x是x的整数部分 sIn x sIn x 4,一研究l1= dx, dx,p>O的敛散性 x +sinx 5,设f:(-∞+∞)→R,在任何有限区间可积,且有limf(x)=A, 明,Ⅵt,()=「((x+0-f(x)=0 第七章定积分