《影视艺术审美 AESTHETICS OF FILM》参考书目：德勒兹：电影与哲学 Cinema and Philosophy.pdf_大学文库

Preface to the English-language Edition Preface to the Englisb-language Edition overview of its influence. Further, such an enterprise, no matter how favor of different forms of montage that undo the primacy of action important and useful it might be, ngs to the field of intellectual and present other links among perceptions, affections, and agency. history and is therefore a task I am not prepared to undertake. Nor Such a modern cinema is the explicit object of Cinema 3, which ex- is this preface meant to be a description of the content of the book plores the upsurge of films that no longer subordinate time to move the introduction fulfills that necessary function. My aim is rather to ment or action but rather aim at making time, as such, perceptible. advance a claim that, as such, is not explicitly made in the book for If this is the most recognizable, and recognized, move of th the compelling reason that it was not one of the guiding hypotheses books, some of its implications have not been sufficiently spelled of my study but, rather, imposed itself upon me while I was writing, ut--namely what the analyses of the action-image form has to say cncc of the analyses undertaken. about both liberal and Marxist-inspired political theories and what The claim is this Cinema I and 2 are the key texts in which the analysis of the time-image regimes have to say about the political Deleuze develops his political philosophy. This is not to deny the im- consequences of the prima [Imc ov portance of the more openly political books such as Anti-Oedipus or to argue that the action form, as Deleuze describes rrespond A Thousand Plateaus, nor is it to deny the significance of dcleuzc's liberal and historicist notions of subjectivity and agency, while the elaboration with Felix guattari. It is even less to argue that cinema rise of cs to not the real object of the books but only a pretext to write about not be understood as the simple, and easy, claim that there is no fu litics. As I hope to show, Deleuze takes absolutely seriously the ure for(political)action but, on the contrary, as an cffort to think Bergsonian injunction that philosophy needs and has to gency anew, along different lines than those prescribed by liberalism elaborate singular concepts that fit singular objects, and them alone, and historicism. Such a Delcuzian approach to agency is grounded if it wants to avoid building general systems of explanation that can on an understanding of modernity that, for not bcing mainstream, be,indeed, applied to everything but only because of their empti- deserves attention if one wants to fully grasp it ness. My hypothesis is a different one: it is that precisely becaus The insistence with which Deleuze highlights the similarity be- Deleuze aims to grasp the specificity of cinema, its novelty, as well tween Griffiths and Eisenstcin's concept and practice of montage is the novelty of its different instances, that he is led to analyze in detail significant in this regard. Certainly, Eisenstein has a very different forms of action and agency and their transformations. It is such a close notion of the laws that govern the life of a human socicty than grif- alysis of agency that constitutes, to my mind, the political cor fith has, but they both understand it as an organic unity whose cle- bution of cinema r and 2 ments are held together by necessary, and coherent, ties. Eisenstcin's While the regime of m Images, as Deleuze understands criticism of Griffiths"bourgeois "form of montage is grounded pre it, is not reducible to the action-image form, it is undeniable that cisely on such a shared assumption. Griffith does not grasp the dia Cinema r dwells extensively on films that make of the action-image lactic nature of the laws that govern the life of the social organism,its heir organizing center. Affection-images and pcrception-images are growth, tensions, and crises; he wrongly assumes that the clements always present, but they rare principle of of the organism are naturally given instcad of bcing historically pro film. This is why classic cinema mostly privileges the action form duced. and he fails to see that what threatens its and the active montage-be it organic, as in Griffith, or dialectic, a it at a higher level is not of the order of individual pa in Eisenstein The rise of modern cinema in the aftermath of World or betrayals. In both cases, however, what sets in motion the life of War Il, in Deleuzc's analyses, marks the demise of the action form in the organism are actions. What gives significance to affects, ideas

Prefoce to the English-language Edition overview of its influence. Further, such an enterprise, no matter how important and useful it might be, belongs to the field of intellectual history and is therefore a task I am not prepared to undertake. Nor is this preface meant to be a description of the content of the book; the introduction fulfills that necessary function. My aim is rather to advance a claim that, as such, is not explicitly made in the book for the compelling reason that it was not one of the guiding hypotheses of my study but, rather, imposed itself upon me while I was writing, as a consequence of the analyses undertaken. The claim is this: Cinema I and 2 are the key texts in which Deleuze develops his political philosophy. This is not to deny the importance of the more openly political books such as Anti-Oedipus or A Thousand Plateaus, nor is it to deny the significance of Deleuze's collaboration with Felix Guattari. It is even less to argue that cinema is not the real object of the books but only a pretext to write about politics. As I h ope to show, Deleuze takes absolutely seriously the Bergsonian injunction that philosophy needs precision and has to elaborate singular concepts that fit singular objects, and them alone, if it wants to avoid building general systems of explanation that can be, indeed, applied to everything but only because of their emptiness. My hypothesis is a different one: it is that precisely because Deleuze aims to grasp the specificity of cinema, its novelty, as well as the novelty of its different instances, that he is led to analyze in detail forms of action and agency and their transformations. It is such a close analysis of agency that constitutes, to my mind, the political contribution of Cinema I and 2. While the regime of movement-images, as Deleuze understands it, is not reducible to the action-image form, it is undeniable that Cinema I dwells extensively on films that make of the action-image their organizing center. Affection-images and perception-images are always present, but they rarely constitute the organizing principle of a film. This is why classic cinema mostly privileges the action form and the active montage-be it organic, as in Griffith, or dialectic, as in Eisenstein. The rise of modern cinema in the aftermath of World War II, in Deleuze's analyses, marks the demise of the action form in x Prefoce to the English-language Edition favor of different forms of montage that undo the primacy of action and present other links among perceptions, affections, and agency. Such a modern cinema is the explicit object of Cinema 2, which explores the upsurge of films that no longer subordinate time to movement or action but rather aim at making time, as such, perceptible. If this is the most recognizable, and recognized, move of the books, some of its implications have not been sufficiently spelled out-namely what the analyses of the action-image form has to say about both liberal and Marxist-inspired political theories and what the analysis of the time-image regimes have to say about the political consequences of the primacy of "time" over "movement." I would like to argue that the action form, as Deleuze describes it, corresponds to liberal and historicist notions of subjectivity and agency, while the rise of time-images, in the sense Deleuze gives to the term, should not be understood as the simple, and easy, claim that there is no future for (political) action but, on the contrary, as an effort to think agency anew, along different lines than those prescribed by liberalism and historicism. Such a Deleuzian approach to agency is grounded on an understanding of modernity that, for not being mainstream, deserves attention if one wants to fully grasp it. The insistence with which Deleuze highlights the similarity between Griffith's and Eisenstein's concept and practice of montage is significant in this regard. Certainly, Eisenstein has a very different notion of the laws that govern the life of a human society than Griffith has, but they both understand it as an organic unity whose elements are held together by necessary, and coherent, ties. Eisenstein's criticism of Griffith's "bourgeois" form of montage is grounded precisely on such a shared assumption. Griffith does not grasp the dialectic nature of the laws that govern the life of the social organism, its growth, tensions, and crises; he wrongly assumes that the elements of the organism are naturally given instead of being historically produced, and he fails to see that what threatens its unity or recomposes it at a higher level is not of the order of individual passions, desires, or betrayals. In both cases, however, what sets in motion the life of the organism are actions. What gives significance to affects, ideas, Xl

Preface to the English-language Edition Preface to the English-language Edition desires, and val ues is the realm of possible actions. As Bergson writes: hink of politics, at least progressive politics, no longer shaped by hu- perception is master of space in the exact measure in which action is nan agency and oriented toward a(better)future? Deleuze's analyses of time.”1 of modern cinema dwell extensiv mplex, layered Time itself, personal or historical, becomes significant only as the f time, on the different forms of time-images; he remains silent, frame in which actions unfold. The dcfinition of time as"measure of though, on new possibilities of agency, as if we would have to forgo movement"goes back to Aristotle, but if Deleuze repeatedly recalls action, as if we could forgo action. His famous descriptions of Italian it in his Cinema books, it is because it also applies to more recent neorealism as a cinema of the seer, where the characters are no longer notions of subjectivity and history structured around the primacy of ble to act in response to the situation and are more spectators than action. Such a primacy curves the universe rason writes, giving agents, would seem to confirm the idea that, for Deleuze, not only a o it an organizing center, and in doing so, action shapes both space specific form of agency is lost for us but agency itself. and time. Time takes on the form of the lincar sequence of the past, This reading, however, misses a crucial point of Deleuze's analy- present, and future of the action: it measures the movements of ses. It is not out of passivity, powerlessness, or resignation that one acting subject. is no longer capable of immediately and"appropriately"responding For Deleuze, such a logic of action presents a powerful and ce a given situation or event. It is quite the opposite: the response sistent way of understanding the bonds that humans create between suspended because one has become aware that certain actions are them, their social and natural milieu, their individual and collective powerless. Habits of conduct, patterns of behavior, are deemed to ex history. Such a logic of action is, for Deleuze, what sustains a specific press weakness or strength, love or contempt, indignation or revolt. form of subjectivity, as well as dominant conceptions of politics. Lib ot to engage in the appropriate response, not to express the appro- cral theories of democracy-be they Rawlsian or Habermasian-rcly priate affect may seem to imply passivity, or worse. Deleuze's point, on,explicitly or implicitly, the notion of an individual subject whos though, is that sometimes, perhaps even often, " acting in the ap tionality is primarily understood as a capacity for action. But polit- propriate way" is precisely the lack of response and the refusal to ac- ical theories. Marxist or otherwise oriented. that focus on a collective knowledge our helplessness. The display of military power may not subjectivity also define it mainly in terms of action. The individual be the solution to new, or old, dangers, but it certainly conveys, for or historical political subject is the subject of action(in the sense a time, the illusion of being in control, of knowing what the situ Deleuze gives to the term). The action-image is a cinematographic ation is about and knowing what to do about it. Following the logic device, but it spells out the continuity of individual and collective of Delcuze's argument, one could say that these actions are likely to ways of understanding social and historical life as oriented by and to- be acts of denial, hiding in "need for action"both the inability to ward action. I would further argue that recent theories of sovereignty truly respond to the challenge and the awareness of inadequacy. do not question the primacy of action but only displace its actor: the Deleuze insisted on the importance of learning to perceive in or decisive action is no longer carried out by an individual or collective der to perceive and not just to react, on the power of contemplation, subject but by an almighty and unfathomable"sovereign power. and the need for time and thought is perfectly pertinent for poli As is well known, classic cinema, for Deleuze, lost for us its power ics. Deleuze describes modern cinema as a cinema in search of more conviction long ago, and, arguably, the same holds true of pe thought. This is not to say that classic cinema was stupid; it is to say, litical projects grounded on the primacy of action and the specific rather, that ne forms because the temporality it expresses. But can politics forgo action? Can we even old ones have lost their power of conviction for us. The same holds

Preface to the English-language Edition desires, and values is the realm of possible actions. As Bergson writes: "perception is master of space in the exact measure in which action is master of time."! Time itself, personal or historical, becomes significant only as the frame in which actions unfold. The definition of time as "measure of movement" goes back to Aristotle, but if Deleuze repeatedly recalls it in his Cinema books, it is because it also applies to more recent notions of subjectivity and history structured around the primacy of action. Such a primacy curves the universe, as Bergson writes, giving to it an organizing center, and in doing so, action shapes both space and time. Time takes on the form of the linear sequence of the past, present, and future of the action: it measures the movements of an acting subject. For Deleuze, such a logic of action presents a powerful and consistent way of understanding the bonds that humans create between them, their social and natural milieu, their individual and collective history. Such a logic of action is, for Deleuze, what sustains a specific form of subjectivity, as well as dominant conceptions of politics. Liberal theories of democracy-be they Rawlsian or Habermasian-rely on, explicitly or implicitly, the notion of an individual subject whose rationality is primarily understood as a capacity for action. But political theories, Marxist or otherwise oriented, that focus on a collective subjectivity also define it mainly in terms of action. The individual or historical political subject is the subject of action (in the sense Deleuze gives to the term). The action-image is a cinematographic device, but it spells out the continuity of individual and collective ways of understanding social and hisrorical life as oriented by and toward action. I would further argue that recent theories of sovereignty do not question the primacy of action but only displace its actor: the decisive action is no longer carried out by an individual or collective subject but by an almighty and unfathomable "sovereign power." As is well known, classic cinema, for Deleuze, lost for us its power of conviction long ago, and, arguably, the same holds true of political projects grounded on the primacy of action and the specific temporality it expresses. But can politics forgo action? Can we even Xli Prefoce to the English-language Edition think of politics, at least progressive politics, no longer shaped by human agency and oriented toward a (better) future? Deleuze's analyses of modern cinema dwell extensively on the complex, layered nature of time, on the different forms of time-images; he remains silent, though, on new possibilities of agency, as if we would have to forgo action, as if we could forgo action. His famous descriptions of Italian neorealism as a cinema of the seer, where the characters are no longer able to act in response to the situation and are more spectators than agents, would seem to confirm the idea that, for Deleuze, not only a specific form of agency is lost for us but agency itself. This reading, however, misses a crucial point of Deleuze's analyses. It is not out of passivity, powerlessness, or resignation that one is no longer capable of immediately and "appropriately" responding to a given situation or event. It is quite the opposite: the response is suspended because one has become aware that certain actions are powerless. Habits of conduct, patterns of behavior, are deemed to express weakness or strength, love or contempt, indignation or revolt. Not to engage in the appropriate response, not to express the appropriate affect may seem to imply passivity, or worse. Deleuze's point, though, is that sometimes, perhaps even often, "acting in the appropriate way" is precisely the lack of response and the refosal to acknowledge our helplessness. The display of military power may not be the solution to new, or old, dangers, but it certainly conveys, for a time, the illusion of being in control, of lmowing what the situation is about and knowing what to do about it. Following the logic of Deleuze's argument, one could say that these actions are likely to be acts of denial, hiding in "need for action" both the inability to truly respond to the challenge and the awareness of inadequacy. Deleuze insisted on the importance of learning to perceive in order to perceive and not just to react, on the power of contemplation, and the need for time and thought is perfectly pertinent for politics. Deleuze describes modern cinema as a cinema in search of more thought. This is not to say that classic cinema was stupid; it is to say, rather, that new situations require new cinematic forms because the old ones have lost their power of conviction for us. The same holds XUl

Preface to the english-language edition Preface to the English-language Edition true for politics: politics need more thought (and creativity)instead both nostalgia and denial in order to be creative. Cinema appeared of empty mimicries of the past. Along the same lines, certainly there to Deleuze to be highly innovative in all regards(bad films notwith is no politics without agency, but agency requires more than the fc- anding), and modern cinema was tion of a self-transparent and almighty subject. new forms of agency folded in time, linked in more complex ways to Deleuze's claim that modern cinema sets time free from its subor perceptions, affects, and thoughts. It had lost a certain"realism"and dination to movement does not say that movements and actions are he simplicity of the classic form, but in doing frozen in a still time; it does not say that films become "slow"(even if layers of reality and subjectivity. In this regard, one may say that cin ome may). It says that movements and actions no longer shape both ema, for Deleuze, was in advance of philosophy and politics, which, time and space but rather that they time and space, which nost of the time, overplay the sovereignty of the action. And it ex- is a very different statement. The line of the universe is no longer plains, I believe, why the best political philosophy of Gilles Deleuze described by, or centered on, our possible actions; actions-along can be found in his Cinema books with affects, perceptions, and thoughts-take place, respond, or fail to each other. t. In short: not only"actions"have agency, and the agency they do have does not go straight from one action to another one. In Deleuze's view,we cer- tainly need more thought to follow the tracks of multiple agencies, certainly need more thought to create "new forms of life"; but we also need, maybe in the first place, to acknowledge the power of tght. Such an insistence on of thinking may seem trivial, especially coming from a philosopher. And it would be so if Deleuze, following Heidegger, did not constantly remind us how difficult it hink, and that in fact. most of the time, we do Certainly, Deleuze's analyses of modern cinema do not produce a new model of agency endowed with the consistency and simplicity of the organic and/or dialectic form of the action-image. It may be difficult to renounce the image's power and the belief in the redemp- tive(and transcendent)function of the future that underlies it, but he fact is there is nothing we have to renounce: we no longer believe in organic ties or dialectical laws. We can act"as if" we still believe those ties or laws to avoid the complexities of the present; we can deny that they no longer carry any power of conviction for us, but these are only reactive moves. And it is reactive, although in a dif- ferent way, to turn back, in a nostalgic mood, toward a(mythical) better past. The critical task of thinking, for Deleuze, must avoid

Preface to the English-language Edition true for politics: politics need more thought (and creativity) instead of empty mimicries of the past. Along the same lines, certainly there is no politics without agency, but agency requires more than the fiction of a self-transparent and almighty subject. Deleuze's claim that modern cinema sets time free from its subordination to movement does not say that movements and actions are frozen in a still time; it does not say that films become "slow" (even if some may). It says that movements and actions no longer shape both time and space but rather that they occur in time and space, which is a very different statement. The line of the universe is no longer described by, or centered on, our possible actions; actions-along with affects, perceptions, and thoughts-take place, respond, or fail to respond, to each other, react to each other, or not. In short: not only "actions" have agency, and the agency they do have does not go straight from one action to another one. In Deleuze's view, we certainly need more thought to follow the tracks of multiple agencies; we certainly need more thought to create "new forms of life"; but we also need, maybe in the first place, to acknowledge the power of thought. Such an insistence on the importance of thinking may seem trivial, especially coming from a philosopher. And it would be so if Deleuze, following Heidegger, did not constantly remind us how difficult it is to think, and that in fact, most of the time, we do not think. 2 Certainly, Deleuze's analyses of modern cinema do not produce a new model of agency endowed with the consistency and simplicity of the organic and/or dialectic form of the action-image. It may be difficult to renounce the image's power and the belief in the redemptive (and transcendent) function of the future that underlies it, but the fact is there is nothing we have to renounce: we no longer believe in organic ties or dialectical laws. We can act "as if" we still believe in those ties or laws to avoid the complexities of the present; we can deny that they no longer carry any power of conviction for us, but these are only reactive moves. And it is reactive, although in a different way, to turn back, in a nostalgic mood, toward a (mythical) better past. The critical task of thinking, for Deleuze, must avoid XIV Preface to the English-language Edition both nostalgia and denial in order to be creative. Cinema appeared to Deleuze to be highly innovative in all regards (bad films notwithstanding), and modern cinema was particularly capable of exploring new forms of agency folded in time, linked in more complex ways to perceptions, affects, and thoughts. It had lost a certain "realism" and the simplicity of the classic form, but in doing so, it gained deeper layers of reality and subjectivity. In this regard, one may say that cinema, for Deleuze, was in advance of philosophy and politics, which, most of the time, overplay the sovereignty of the action. And it explains, I believe, why the best political philosophy of Gilles Deleuze can be found in his Cinema books. xv