第17章 信息不对称的市场
第 17 章 信息不对称的市场
本章要讨论的问题 质量不确定性与柠檬市场 市场信号 道德风险 委托代理问题 Chapter 17 Slide 2
Chapter 17 Slide 2 本章要讨论的问题 质量不确定性与柠檬市场 市场信号 道德风险 委托代理问题
本章要讨论的问题 体化企业的管理激励问题 劳动力市场的信息不对称:效率工资理论 Chapter 17 Slide 3
Chapter 17 Slide 3 本章要讨论的问题 一体化企业的管理激励问题 劳动力市场的信息不对称: 效率工资理论
引言 我们将研究不完全信息对资源配置和价格机制 所产生的影响。 Chapter 17 Slide 4
Chapter 17 Slide 4 引言 我们将研究不完全信息对资源配置和价格机制 所产生的影响
质量不确定与柠檬市场 在购买一辆二手车时,由于信息不完全,将增 加购买的风险并降低消费者的效用 Chapter 17 Slide 5
Chapter 17 Slide 5 质量不确定与柠檬市场 在购买一辆二手车时，由于信息不完全，将增 加购买的风险并降低消费者的效用；
质量不确定与柠檬市场 二手车市场 ●假定 ◆买卖双方都能鉴别高质量和低质量的车; ◆将会出现两个市场; Chapter 17 Slide 6
Chapter 17 Slide 6 二手车市场 ⚫ 假定 ◆买卖双方都能鉴别高质量和低质量的车； ◆将会出现两个市场； 质量不确定与柠檬市场
柠檬问题 买卖双方能鉴别车的质量时 由于信息不对称,消费者无法确定车的质量,他们将降低 将出现高质量和低质量两个市场 对二手车质量的期望。 Demand for low and high qual used cars shifts to DM P The increase in Q reduces expectations and 10000 demand to DLM. The adjustment process continues until demand= DL. D H 5.000 D 25.000 50.000 50.000 75.000 Q
柠檬问题 PH PL QH QL SH SL DH DL 5,000 50,000 50,000 买卖双方能鉴别车的质量时， 将出现高质量和低质量两个市场 10,000 DL DM DM 25,000 75,000 由于信息不对称，消费者无法确定车的质量，他们将降低 对二手车质量的期望 。 Demand for low and high quality used cars shifts to DM . DLM DLM The increase in QL reduces expectations and demand to DLM. The adjustment process continues until demand = DL
Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons The market for Used cars o With asymmetric information Low quality goods drive high quality goods out of the market The market has failed to produce mutually beneficial trade Too many low and too few high quality cars are on the market Adverse selection occurs; the only cars on the market will be low quality cars Chapter 17 Slide 8
Chapter 17 Slide 8 The Market for Used Cars ⚫ With asymmetric information: ◆ Low quality goods drive high quality goods out of the market. ◆ The market has failed to produce mutually beneficial trade. ◆ Too many low and too few high quality cars are on the market. ◆ Adverse selection occurs; the only cars on the market will be low quality cars. Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons
Implications of Asymmetric Information The Market for Insurance Medical Insurance Question Is it possible for insurance companies to separate high and low risk policy holders? o If not, only high risk people will purchase Insurance Adverse selection would make medical insurance unprofitable Chapter 17 Slide 9
Chapter 17 Slide 9 Implications of Asymmetric Information Medical Insurance ⚫ Question ◆Is it possible for insurance companies to separate high and low risk policy holders? ⚫ If not, only high risk people will purchase insurance. ⚫ Adverse selection would make medical insurance unprofitable. The Market for Insurance
Implications of Asymmetric Information The Market for Insurance Automobile Insurance e Questions What impact does asymmetric information and adverse selection have on insurance rates and the delivery of automobile accident Insurance ? How can the government reduce the impact of adverse selection in the insurance industry? Chapter 17 Slide 10
Chapter 17 Slide 10 Implications of Asymmetric Information Automobile Insurance ⚫ Questions ◆ What impact does asymmetric information and adverse selection have on insurance rates and the delivery of automobile accident insurance? ◆ How can the government reduce the impact of adverse selection in the insurance industry? The Market for Insurance