海南大学2007-08学年度第1学期试卷 科目：《微观经济学》试题(A卷) 姓名： 学号： 学院： 专业班级： 成绩登记表（由阅卷教师用红色笔填写） 大题 二三 四 六 八九 十 总分 得分 阅卷教师： 20年月日 考试说明：本课程为闭卷考试，可携带计算器一。 得分阅卷教师 、 Please explain the following glossary: (每题5分，共50分) 1 Absolute advantage 2 Bertrand model 3 Coase theorem 4 Cobb-Douglas production function
海南大学 2007-08 学年度第 1 学期试卷 科目：《微观经济学》试题(A 卷) 姓名： 学 号： 学院： 专业班级： 成绩登记表（由阅卷教师用红色笔填写） 大题 号 一 二 三 四 五 六 七 八 九 十 总分 得分 阅卷教师： 20 年 月 日 考试说明：本课程为闭卷考试，可携带 计算器 。 一、 Please explain the following glossary： （每题 5 分，共 50 分） 1 Absolute advantage 2 Bertrand model 3 Coase theorem 4 Cobb-Douglas production function 得分 阅卷教师
5 Comparative advantage 6 Completely inelastic demand 7Consumer surplus 8 Cooperative game 9Coumot model 10 Cross-price elasticity of demand 得分阅卷教师 二、简答题：（共10分） 1.Price discrimination requires the ability to sort customers and the ability to prevent arbitrage. Explain how the following can function as price
5 Comparative advantage 6 Completely inelastic demand 7 Consumer surplus 8 Cooperative game 9 Coumot model 10 Cross-price elasticity of demand 二、简答题：（共 10 分） 1. Price discrimination requires the ability to sort customers and the ability to prevent arbitrage. Explain how the following can function as price 得分 阅卷教师
discrimination schemes and discuss both sorting and arbitrage a.Requiring airline travelers to spend at least one Saturday night away from home to qualify for a low fare b.Insisting on delivering cement to buyers and basing prices on buyers'locations. c.Selling food processors along with coupons that can be sent to the manufacture to obtain aS10 rebate d.Offering temporary price cuts on bathroom tissue e.Charging high-income patients more than low-income patients for plasti surgery. 得分阅卷教师 三、Calculation:(每题20分，共40分) 1.Suppose the airline industry consisted ofonly two firms:American and Texas Air Corp.Let the two firms have identical cost functions,C(q)=40q.Assume the demand curve for the industry is given by P=100-Q and that each firm expeets the other to behave as a Cournot competitor a.Calculate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for each firm,assuming that each chooses the output level that maximizes its profits when taking its rival's output as given.What are the profits ofeach firm? b.What would be the equilibrium quantity if Texas Air had constant marginal and average costs of $25,and American had constant marginal and average costs of$40? e.Assuming that both firms have the original cost function,C(q=40q,how much should Texas Air be willing to invest to lower its marginal cost from $40 to $25,assuming that American will not follow suit?How much should American
discrimination schemes and discuss both sorting and arbitrage: a. Requiring airline travelers to spend at least one Saturday night away from home to qualify for a low fare. b. Insisting on delivering cement to buyers and basing prices on buyers’ locations. c. Selling food processors along with coupons that can be sent to the manufacturer to obtain a $10 rebate. d. Offering temporary price cuts on bathroom tissue. e. Charging high-income patients more than low-income patients for plastic surgery. 三、Calculation：（每题 20 分，共 40 分） 1. Suppose the airline industry consisted of only two firms: American and Texas Air Corp. Let the two firms have identical cost functions, C(q) = 40q. Assume the demand curve for the industry is given by P = 100 - Q and that each firm expects the other to behave as a Cournot competitor. a. Calculate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for each firm, assuming that each chooses the output level that maximizes its profits when taking its rival’s output as given. What are the profits of each firm? b. What would be the equilibrium quantity if Texas Air had constant marginal and average costs of $25, and American had constant marginal and average costs of $40? c. Assuming that both firms have the original cost function, C(q) = 40q, how much should Texas Air be willing to invest to lower its marginal cost from $40 to $25, assuming that American will not follow suit? How much should American 得分 阅卷教师
be willing to spend to reduce its marginal cost to $25,assuming that Te xas Air will have marginal costs of $25 regardless of american's actions? 2 Two competing firms are each planning to introduce a new product.Each will decide whether to produce Product A,Product B,or Product C.They will make their choices at the same time.The resulting payoffs are shown below.We are given the following payoff matrix,which describes a product introduction game: Firm 2 A B 0 -10-10 0,1010,20 Firm I B 100 20.20.5.15 C 20.1015.-5 -30.-30 a.Are there any Nash equilibria in pure strategies?If so,what are they? b.If both firms use maximin strategies,what outcome will result? c.If Firm I uses a maximin strategy and Firm 2 knows,what will Firm 2 do?
be willing to spend to reduce its marginal cost to $25, assuming that Texas Air will have marginal costs of $25 regardless of American’s actions? 2 Two competing firms are each planning to introduce a new product. Each will decide whether to produce Product A, Product B, or Product C. They will make their choices at the same time. The resulting payoffs are shown below. We are given the following payoff matrix, which describes a product introduction game: Firm 2 A B C A -10,-10 0,10 10,20 Firm 1 B 10,0 -20,-20 -5,15 C 20,10 15,-5 -30,-30 a. Are there any Nash equilibria in pure strategies? If so, what are they? b. If both firms use maximin strategies, what outcome will result? c. If Firm 1 uses a maximin strategy and Firm 2 knows, what will Firm 2 do?