海南大学2009-2010学年度第1学期试卷 科目：《微观经济学》试题(B卷) 姓名： 学号： 学院： 专业班级： 成绩登记表（由阅卷教师用红色笔填写） 大题 三 四 五 六 八 九 十 总分 得分 阅卷教师： 20年月日 考试说明：本课程为闭卷考试，可携带计算器一。 得分阅卷教师 一、Please explain the following terms: (每题5分，共50分) I Accounting cost 2 Accounting profi 3Adverse selection 4 Completely inelastic demand
海南大学 2009-2010 学年度第 1 学期试卷 科目：《微观经济学》试题(B 卷) 姓名： 学 号： 学院： 专业班级： 成绩登记表（由阅卷教师用红色笔填写） 大题 号 一 二 三 四 五 六 七 八 九 十 总分 得分 阅卷教师： 20 年 月 日 考试说明：本课程为闭卷考试，可携带 计算器 。 一、 Please explain the following terms： （每题 5 分，共 50 分） 1 Accounting cost 2 Accounting profit 3 Adverse selection 4 Completely inelastic demand 得分 阅卷教师
5 Cost-of-living index 6 Dominant firm 7 Edgeworth box 8 Efficiency wage theory 9Second-degree price discrimination 10 Shirking model 得分阅卷教师 二、简答题：（共10分） 4.Four firms located at different points on a river dump various quantities of effuent into it.The effluent advers sely affects the quality of swimming for homeowners who live downstream.These people can build swimming pools to avoid swimming in the river,and firms can purchase filters that eliminate harmful chemicals in the material dumped in the river.As a policy advisor fora regional planning organization.how would you compare and contrast the following options for dealing with the harmful effect of the effluent: a.An equal-rate effluent fee on firms located on the river b.An equal standard per firm on the level of effluent that each can dump. c.A transferable effluent permit system in which the aggregate level of effluent is fixed and all firms receive identical permits
5 Cost-of-living index 6 Dominant firm 7 Edgeworth box 8 Efficiency wage theory 9 Second-degree price discrimination 10 Shirking model 二、简答题：（共 10 分） 4. Four firms located at different points on a river dump various quantities of effluent into it. The effluent adversely affects the quality of swimming for homeowners who live downstream. These people can build swimming pools to avoid swimming in the river, and firms can purchase filters that eliminate harmful chemicals in the material dumped in the river. As a policy advisor for a regional planning organization, how would you compare and contrast the following options for dealing with the harmful effect of the effluent: a. An equal-rate effluent fee on firms located on the river. b. An equal standard per firm on the level of effluent that each can dump. c. A transferable effluent permit system in which the aggregate level of effluent is fixed and all firms receive identical permits. 得分 阅卷教师
得分阅卷教师 三、Calculation:(每题20分，共40分) roduce at a constant average (and marginal)cost of AC- MC=5.It faces a market demand curve given by Q=53-P a.Calculate the profit-maximizing price and quantity for this monopolist.Also calculate its profits. b.Suppose a second firm enters the market.Let Q be the output of the first firm and Q:be the output ofthe second.Market demand is now given by Q1+Qa=53-P. Assuming that this second firm has the same costs as the first,write the profits ofeach firm as functions ofQ and Q. e.Suppose (as in the Cournot model)that each firm chooses its profit-maximizing level of output on the assumption that its competitor's output is fixed.Find each firm's"reaction curve"(ie.the rule that gives its desired output in terms ofits competitor's output). d.Caleulate the Cournot equilibrium (i.e.,the values ofQ and Q for which both firms are doing as well as they can given their competitors'output).What are the resulting market price and profits ofeach firm? 2 Two firms are in the chocolate market.Each can choose to go for the highend of the market (high quality)or the low end (ow quality).Resulting profits are given by the following pavoffmatrix: Firm2 Low High Low -20,-30 900,600 Firml High 100,800 50.50 a.What outcomes,ifany,are Nash equilibria? b.If the managerof each firm is conservative and each follows a maximin strategy, what will be the outcome? c.What is the cooperative outcome?
三、Calculation：（每题 20 分，共 40 分） 1 A monopolist can produce at a constant average (and marginal) cost of AC = MC = 5. It faces a market demand curve given by Q = 53 - P. a. Calculate the profit-maximizing price and quantity for this monopolist. Also calculate its profits. b. Suppose a second firm enters the market. Let Q1 be the output of the first firm and Q2 be the output of the second. Market demand is now given by Q1 + Q2 = 53 - P. Assuming that this second firm has the same costs as the first, write the profits of each firm as functions of Q1 and Q2 . c.Suppose (as in the Cournot model) that each firm chooses its profit -maximizing level of output on the assumption that its competitor’s output is fixed. Find each firm’s “reaction curve” (i.e., the rule that gives its desired output in terms of its competitor’s output). d. Calculate the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., the values of Q1 and Q2 for which both firms are doing as well as they can given their competitors’ output). What are the resulting market price and profits of each firm? 2 Two firms are in the chocolate market. Each can choose to go for the high end of the market (high quality) or the low end (low quality). Resulting profits are given by the following payoff matrix: Firm 2 Low High a. What outcomes, if any, are Nash equilibria? b. If the managerof each firm is conservative and each follows a maximin strategy, what will be the outcome? c. What is the cooperative outcome? -20, -30 900, 600 100, 800 50, 50 得分 阅卷教师 Firm 1 Low High
d.Which firm benefits most from the cooperative outcome?How much would that firm need to offer the other to persuade it to collude?
d. Which firm benefits most from the cooperative outcome? How much would that firm need to offer the other to persuade it to collude?