LECTURE EIGHT SOME FURTHER REFLECTION UPON CHINESE ROOM ARGUMENT 对于汉字屋论证的一些 反思
LECTURE EIGHT SOME FURTHER REFLECTION UPON CHINESE ROOM ARGUMENT 对于汉字屋论证的一些 反思
SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS(语形学和语义学之分) Searle believes the Chinese Room argument supports a larger point, which explains the failure of the Chinese Room to produce understanding. Searle argued that programs implemented by y computers are Just syntactical. Computer operations are"formal in that they respond only to the explicit form of the strings of symbols, not to the meaning of the symbols. Minds on the other hand have states with meaning, mental contents. We associate meanings with the words or signs in language. We respond to signs because of their meaning, not just their physical appearance. In short, we understand. But, and according to Searle this is the key point,"Syntax is not by itself sufficient for, nor constitutive of, semantics. So although computers may be able to manipulate syntax to produce appropriate responses to natural language input, they do not understand the sentences they receive or output, for they cannot associate meanings with the words
SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS（语形学和语义学之分） Searle believes the Chinese Room argument supports a larger point, which explains the failure of the Chinese Room to produce understanding. Searle argued that programs implemented by computers are just syntactical. Computer operations are “formal” in that they respond only to the explicit form of the strings of symbols, not to the meaning of the symbols. Minds on the other hand have states with meaning, mental contents. We associate meanings with the words or signs in language. We respond to signs because of their meaning, not just their physical appearance. In short, we understand. But, and according to Searle this is the key point, “Syntax is not by itself sufficient for, nor constitutive of, semantics.” So although computers may be able to manipulate syntax to produce appropriate responses to natural language input, they do not understand the sentences they receive or output, for they cannot associate meanings with the words
WHAT IS SYNTAX? WHAT IS SEMANTICS? o In linguistics, syntax(from Ancient Greek ouvtasis"arrangement!" from ouv syn together", and tasis taxis, "an ordering")is"the study of the principles and processes by which sentences are constructed in particularlanguages o Semantics(from Greek: semantika, neuter plural of semantikos) 2 is the study of meaning It focuses on the relation between signifiers, such aswords, phrases, signs and symbols, and what they stand for, their dentata
WHAT IS SYNTAX? WHAT IS SEMANTICS? In linguistics, syntax (from Ancient Greek σύνταξις "arrangement" from σύν syn, "together", and τάξις táxis, "an ordering") is "the study of the principles and processes by which sentences are constructed in particularlanguages.“ Semantics (from Greek: sēmantiká, neuter plural of sēmantikós) [1][2] is the study of meaning. It focuses on the relation between signifiers, such aswords, phrases, signs and symbols, and what they stand for, their denotata
A THREE PREMISE ARGUMENT BY SEARLE o 1. Programs are purely formal(syntactic) o 2. Human minds have mental contents (semantics) o 3. Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of, nor sufficient for semantic content o 4. Therefore, programs by themselves are not constitutive of nor sufficient for minds
A THREE PREMISE ARGUMENT BY SEARLE 1. Programs are purely formal (syntactic). 2. Human minds have mental contents (semantics). 3. Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of, nor sufficient for, semantic content. 4. Therefore, programs by themselves are not constitutive of nor sufficient for minds
THE ROLE THAT CRA PLAYS o The Chinese room thought experiment itself is the support for the third premise The claim that syntactic manipulation is not sufficient for meaning or thought is a significant issue, with wider implications than Al, or attributions of understanding. Prominent theories of mind hold that human cognition generally is computational In one form, it is held that thought involves operations on symbols in virtue of their physical properties On an alternative connectionist account, the computations are on "subsymbolic states. If Searle is right, not only Strong al but also these main approaches to understanding human cognition are misguided
THE ROLE THAT CRA PLAYS The Chinese Room thought experiment itself is the support for the third premise. The claim that syntactic manipulation is not sufficient for meaning or thought is a significant issue, with wider implications than AI, or attributions of understanding. Prominent theories of mind hold that human cognition generally is computational. In one form, it is held that thought involves operations on symbols in virtue of their physical properties. On an alternative connectionist account, the computations are on “subsymbolic” states. If Searle is right, not only Strong AI but also these main approaches to understanding human cognition are misguided
WHAT SEARLE SAID IS TRUE OF LOGICAL SYSTEMS o As we have seen Searle holds that the chinese room scenario shows that one cannot get semantics from syntax alone. In formal systems, rules are given for syntax, and this procedure appears to be quite independent of semantics One specifies the basic symbol set and some rules for manipulating strings to produce new ones. These rules are purely formal or syntactic--they are applied to strings of symbols solely in virtue of their syntax or form. A semantics, if any, for the symbol system must be provided separately. And if one wishes to show that interesting additional relationships hold between the syntactic operations and semantics, such as that the symbol manipulations preserve truth, one must provide sometimes complex meta-proofs to show this. So on the face of it, semantics is quite independent of syntax for artificial languages, and one cannot get semantics from syntax alone Formal symbols by themselves can never be enough for mental contents, because the symbols, by definition, have no meaning (or interpretation, or semantics)except insofar as someone outside the system gives it to them"( Searle 1989, 45)
WHAT SEARLE SAID IS TRUE OF LOGICAL SYSTEMS As we have seen, Searle holds that the Chinese Room scenario shows that one cannot get semantics from syntax alone. In formal systems, rules are given for syntax, and this procedure appears to be quite independent of semantics. One specifies the basic symbol set and some rules for manipulating strings to produce new ones. These rules are purely formal or syntactic—they are applied to strings of symbols solely in virtue of their syntax or form. A semantics, if any, for the symbol system must be provided separately. And if one wishes to show that interesting additional relationships hold between the syntactic operations and semantics, such as that the symbol manipulations preserve truth, one must provide sometimes complex meta-proofs to show this. So on the face of it, semantics is quite independent of syntax for artificial languages, and one cannot get semantics from syntax alone. “Formal symbols by themselves can never be enough for mental contents, because the symbols, by definition, have no meaning (or interpretation, or semantics) except insofar as someone outside the system gives it to them” (Searle 1989, 45)
BUT IS WHAT SEARLE SAID TRUE OF COMPUTERS? o As many of searle's critics(e.g. Cole 1984, Dennett 1987, Boden 1988, and Chalmers 1996) have noted, a computer running a program is not the same as syntax alone". A computer is a causal system that changes state in accord with a program. The states are syntactically specified by programmers, but they are fundamentally states of a complex causal system embedded in the real world. This is quite different from the abstract formal systems that logicians study. Dennett notes that no "computer program by itself (Searle,s language)e.g. a program lying on a shelf- can cause anything, even simple addition, let alone mental states. The program must be running
BUT IS WHAT SEARLE SAID TRUE OF COMPUTERS? As many of Searle‘s critics (e.g. Cole 1984, Dennett 1987, Boden 1988, and Chalmers 1996) have noted, a computer running a program is not the same as “syntax alone”. A computer is a causal system that changes state in accord with a program. The states are syntactically specified by programmers, but they are fundamentally states of a complex causal system embedded in the real world. This is quite different from the abstract formal systems that logicians study. Dennett notes that no “computer program by itself” (Searle’s language)—e.g. a program lying on a shelf— can cause anything, even simple addition, let alone mental states. The program must be running
CHALMERS(1996)OFFERS A PARODY (s 笑模仿) o 1. Programs are purely o 1. Recipes are syntactic formal (syntactic) o 2. Human minds have o 2. Cakes are crumbly mental contents (semantics) o 3. Syntax by itself is o 3. Syntax is not neither constitutive of sufficient for nor sufficient for crumbliness semantic content o 4. Therefore, programs by themselves are not o 4. Implementation of a constitutive of nor recipe is not sufficient sufficient for minds for making a cake
CHALMERS (1996) OFFERS A PARODY （搞 笑模仿）： 1. Programs are purely formal (syntactic). 2. Human minds have mental contents (semantics). 3. Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of, nor sufficient for, semantic content. 4. Therefore, programs by themselves are not constitutive of nor sufficient for minds. 1.Recipes are syntactic. 2.Cakes are crumbly. 3. Syntax is not sufficient for crumbliness. 4. Implementation of a recipe is not sufficient for making a cake
DENNETT'S COMMENTS o Dennett (1987)sums up the issue: Searle's view then, comes to this: take a material object(any material object) that does not have the power of causing mental phenomena; you cannot turn it in to an object that does have the power of producing mental phenomena simply by programming it--reorganizing the conditiona dependencies of transitions between its states Dennett' s view is the opposite: programming " is precisely what could give something a mind. But Dennett claims that in fact it is " empirically unlikely that the right sorts of programs can be run on anything but organic, human brains (325-6)
DENNETT’S COMMENTS Dennett (1987) sums up the issue: “Searle's view, then, comes to this: take a material object (any material object) that does not have the power of causing mental phenomena; you cannot turn it in to an object that does have the power of producing mental phenomena simply by programming it—reorganizing the conditional dependencies of transitions between its states.” Dennett's view is the opposite: programming “is precisely what could give something a mind”. But Dennett claims that in fact it is “empirically unlikely that the right sorts of programs can be run on anything but organic, human brains” (325–6)
INTENTIONALITY o Intentionality is the property of being about something, having content. In the 19th Century psychologist franz Brentano re-introduced this term from Medieval philosophy and held that intentionality was the mark of the mental Beliefs and desires are intentional states: they have propositional content(one believes that p one desires that p
INTENTIONALITY Intentionality is the property of being about something, having content. In the 19th Century, psychologist Franz Brentano re-introduced this term from Medieval philosophy and held that intentionality was the “mark of the mental”. Beliefs and desires are intentional states: they have propositional content (one believes that p, one desires that p)
