LLECTURE 12 Modularity of Mind 心灵的模块性
LECTURE 12 Modularity of Mind 心灵的模块性
INTRODUCTION o The concept of modularity has loomed large in philosophy and psychology since the early 1980s following the publication of Fodor's ground-breaking book The Modularity of Mind(1983). In the twenty-five years since the term 'module' and its cognates first entered the lexicon of cognitive science, the conceptual and theoretical landscape in this area has changed dramatically. Especially note worthy in this regard has been the development of evolutionary psychology, whose proponents argue that the architecture of the mind is more pervasively modular than the Fodorian perspective allows. Where Fodor(1983, 2000) draws th line of modularity at the low-level systems underlying perception and language, post-Fodorian theorists such as Carruthers(2006)contend that the mind is modular through and through, that is, up to and including the high-level systems responsible for thought. The concept of modularity has also played a role in recent debates in epistemology philosophy of language, and other core areas of philosophy--further evidence of its utility as a tool for thinking about the mind
INTRODUCTION The concept of modularity has loomed large in philosophy and psychology since the early 1980s, following the publication of Fodor's ground-breaking book The Modularity of Mind (1983). In the twenty-five years since the term ‘module’ and its cognates first entered the lexicon of cognitive science, the conceptual and theoretical landscape in this area has changed dramatically. Especially noteworthy in this regard has been the development of evolutionary psychology, whose proponents argue that the architecture of the mind is more pervasively modular than the Fodorian perspective allows. Where Fodor (1983, 2000) draws the line of modularity at the low-level systems underlying perception and language, post-Fodorian theorists such as Carruthers (2006) contend that the mind is modular through and through, that is, up to and including the high-level systems responsible for thought. The concept of modularity has also played a role in recent debates in epistemology, philosophy of language, and other core areas of philosophy—further evidence of its utility as a tool for thinking about the mind
THE MOST RELATED PHILOSOPHERS TO THIS TOPIC o Jerry Alan Fodor(born 1935) is an American philosopher and cognitive scientist. He holds the position of State of New Jersey Professor of philosophy at rutgers University and is the author of many works in the fields ofphilosophy of mind and cognitive science, in which he has laid the groundwork for the modularity of mind and the language of thoughthypotheses, among other ideas. He is known for his provocative and sometimes polemical style of argumentation
THE MOST RELATED PHILOSOPHERS TO THIS TOPIC Jerry Alan Fodor (born 1935) is an American philosopher and cognitive scientist. He holds the position of State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and is the author of many works in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, in which he has laid the groundwork for the modularity of mind and the language of thoughthypotheses, among other ideas. He is known for his provocative and sometimes polemical style of argumentation
THE MOST RELATED PHILOSOPHERS TO THIS TOPIC o Peter Carruthers(born 16 June 1952)is a philosopher in the area ofphilosophy of mind. He is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland associate member of Neuroscience and Cognitive Science Programand member of the committee for Philosophy and the Sciences
THE MOST RELATED PHILOSOPHERS TO THIS TOPIC Peter Carruthers (born 16 June 1952) is a philosopher in the area ofphilosophy of mind. He is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland, associate member of Neuroscience and Cognitive Science Programand member of the Committee for Philosophy and the Sciences
FODORIAN MODULES福多式模块 o In his classic introduction to modularity, Fodor(1983) lists nine features that collectively characterize the type of system that interests him. In original order of presentation, they are o Domain specificity领域特异性 o Mandatory operation强制性操作 o Limited central accessibility有限的中央可通达性 o fast processing高速的处理 o Informational encapsulation信息封装性 o Shallow’ outputs“浅输出” o Fixed neural architecture固定的神经架构 o Characteristic and specific breakdown patterns o特别的崩解模式 o Characteristic ontogenetic pace and sequencing o特定的个体发育步调和次序
FODORIAN MODULES 福多式模块 In his classic introduction to modularity, Fodor (1983) lists nine features that collectively characterize the type of system that interests him. In original order of presentation, they are: Domain specificity 领域特异性 Mandatory operation 强制性操作 Limited central accessibility 有限的中央可通达性 Fast processing 高速的处理 Informational encapsulation 信息封装性 ‘Shallow’ outputs “浅输出” Fixed neural architecture 固定的神经架构 Characteristic and specific breakdown patterns 特别的崩解模式 Characteristic ontogenetic pace and sequencing 特定的个体发育步调和次序
ENCAPSULATION AND INACCESSIBILITY o Informational encapsulation and limited central accessibility are two sides of the same coin. Both features pertain to the character of information flow across computational mechanisms, albeit in opposite directions. Encapsulation involves restriction on the flow of information into a mechanism, whereas inaccessibility involves restriction on the flow of information out of it o A cognitive system is informationally encapsulated to the extent that in the course of processing a given set of inputs it cannot access information stored elsewhere; all it has to go on is the information contained in those inputs plus whatever information might be stored within the system itself
ENCAPSULATION AND INACCESSIBILITY. Informational encapsulation and limited central accessibility are two sides of the same coin. Both features pertain to the character of information flow across computational mechanisms, albeit in opposite directions. Encapsulation involves restriction on the flow of information into a mechanism, whereas inaccessibility involves restriction on the flow of information out of it. A cognitive system is informationally encapsulated to the extent that in the course of processing a given set of inputs it cannot access information stored elsewhere; all it has to go on is the information contained in those inputs plus whatever information might be stored within the system itself
AN EXAMPLE o In the case of perception --understood as a kind of non-demonstrative (i.e, defeasible, or non monotonic)inference from sensory premises' to perceptual 'conclusions-the claim that perceptual systems are informationally encapsulated is equivalent to the claim that "the data that can bear on the confirmation of perceptual hypotheses includes, in the general case, considerably less than the organism may know(Fodor, 1983, p. 69). The classic illustration of this property comes from the study of visual illusions, which typically persist even after the viewer is explicitly informed about the character of the stimulus In the Muller-Lyerillusion, for example, the two lines continue to look as if they were of unequal length even after one has convinced oneself otherwise, e. g, by measuring em with a ruler
AN EXAMPLE In the case of perception—understood as a kind of non-demonstrative (i.e., defeasible, or nonmonotonic) inference from sensory ‘premises’ to perceptual ‘conclusions’—the claim that perceptual systems are informationally encapsulated is equivalent to the claim that “the data that can bear on the confirmation of perceptual hypotheses includes, in the general case, considerably less than the organism may know” (Fodor, 1983, p. 69). The classic illustration of this property comes from the study of visual illusions, which typically persist even after the viewer is explicitly informed about the character of the stimulus. In the Müller-Lyer illusion, for example, the two lines continue to look as if they were of unequal length even after one has convinced oneself otherwise, e.g., by measuring them with a ruler
MANDATORINESS SPEED AND SUPERFICIALITY o The operation of a cognitive system is mandatory just in case it is automatic, that is, not under conscious control(cf Bargh Chartrand, 1999) This means that, like it or not, the systems operations are switched on by presentation of the relevant stimuli and those operations run to completion. For example, native speakers of English cannot hear the sounds of English being spoken as mere noise: if they hear those sounds at all, they hear them as English. Likewise, it's impossible to see a 3d array of objects in space as 2D patches of color, however hard one may try ( despite claims to the contrary by painters and other visual artists influenced by impressionism
MANDATORINESS, SPEED, AND SUPERFICIALITY. The operation of a cognitive system is mandatory just in case it is automatic, that is, not under conscious control (cf. Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). This means that, like it or not, the system's operations are switched on by presentation of the relevant stimuli and those operations run to completion. For example, native speakers of English cannot hear the sounds of English being spoken as mere noise: if they hear those sounds at all, they hear them as English. Likewise, it's impossible to see a 3D array of objects in space as 2D patches of color, however hard one may try (despite claims to the contrary by painters and other visual artists influenced by Impressionism)
SHALLOW' OUTPUTS o a further feature of modular systems is that their outputs are relatively ' shallow. Exactly what this means is unclear. But the depth of an output seems to be a function ofat least two properties: first, how much computation is required to produce it(i.e, shallow means computationally cheap); second, how constrained or specific its informational content is(i.e, shallow means informationally general(Fodor, 1983, p. 87 These two properties are correlated in that outputs with more specific content are typically more expensive for a system to produce, and vice versa. Some writers have interpreted shallowness to require non-conceptual character(e.g. Carruthers, 2006, p. 4). But this conflicts with Fodor's own gloss on the term, in which he suggests that the output of a plausibly modular system such as visual object recognition might be encoded at the level of basic-level concepts, like DOG and ChAiR(Rosch al 1976). What's ruled out here is not concepts, then, but highly theoretical concepts like PROTON, which are too specific and too expensive to meet the shallowness criterion
‘SHALLOW’ OUTPUTS A further feature of modular systems is that their outputs are relatively ‘shallow’. Exactly what this means is unclear. But the depth of an output seems to be a function of at least two properties: first, how much computation is required to produce it (i.e., shallow means computationally cheap); second, how constrained or specific its informational content is (i.e., shallow means informationally general) (Fodor, 1983, p. 87). These two properties are correlated, in that outputs with more specific content are typically more expensive for a system to produce, and vice versa. Some writers have interpreted shallowness to require non-conceptual character (e.g., Carruthers, 2006, p. 4). But this conflicts with Fodor's own gloss on the term, in which he suggests that the output of a plausibly modular system such as visual object recognition might be encoded at the level of ‘basic-level’ concepts, like DOG and CHAIR (Rosch et al., 1976). What's ruled out here is not concepts, then, but highly theoretical concepts like PROTON, which are too specific and too expensive to meet the shallowness criterion
DISSOCIABILITY AND LOCALIZABILITY.可分 离性和局域性 o To say that a system is functionally dissociable is to say that it can be selectively impaired, that is, damagedor disabled with little or no effect on the operation ofother systems. As the neuropsychological record indicates selective impairments of this sort have frequently been observed as a consequence of circumscribed brain lesions a 限性脑病变. Standard examples from the study of vision include prosopagnosia(impaired face recognition) achromatopsia(total color blindness), and akinetopsia (motion blindness); examples from the study oflanguage include agrammatism (loss of complex syntax), jargon aphasia (loss of complex semantics), alexia (loss ofobject words), and dyslexia (impaired reading and writing). Each of these disorders have been found in otherwise cognitively normalindividuals, suggesting that the lost capacities are subserved by functionally dissociable mechanisms
DISSOCIABILITY AND LOCALIZABILITY.可分 离性和局域性 To say that a system is functionally dissociable is to say that it can be selectively impaired, that is, damaged or disabled with little or no effect on the operation of other systems. As the neuropsychological record indicates, selective impairments of this sort have frequently been observed as a consequence of circumscribed brain lesions局 限性脑病变. Standard examples from the study of vision include prosopagnosia (impaired face recognition), achromatopsia (total color blindness), and akinetopsia (motion blindness); examples from the study of language include agrammatism (loss of complex syntax), jargon aphasia (loss of complex semantics), alexia (loss of object words), and dyslexia (impaired reading and writing). Each of these disorders have been found in otherwise cognitively normal individuals, suggesting that the lost capacities are subserved by functionally dissociable mechanisms