Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China EZRA F. VOGEL THE BELKNAP PRESS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 2011 Copyright o 201l by Ezra F. Vogel All rights reserved Printed in the united states of america Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Vogel, Ezra F. Deng Xiaoping and the transformation of China/Ezra F. Vogel. p. cl. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN978-0-674-05544-5 1. Deng, Xiaoping, 1904-1997. 2. Heads of state-China--Biography 3. China-Politics and government-1976-2002. I. Titl DS778.T39V642011 ISBN 978-0-674-06283-2(electronic
1 Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China EZRA F. VOGEL THE BELKNAP PRESS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 2011 Copyright © 2011 by Ezra F. Vogel All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Vogel, Ezra F. Deng Xiaoping and the transformation of China / Ezra F. Vogel. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 1. Deng, Xiaoping, 1904–1997. 2. Heads of state—China—Biography. 3. China—Politics and government—1976–2002. I. Title. DS778.T39V64 2011 951.05092—dc22 [B] 2011006925 ISBN 978-0-674-06283-2 (electronic)
Contents Map: China in the 1980s Preface: In Search of Deng Introduction The man and his mission Dengs Background 1. From Revolutionary to Builder to Reformer, 1904-1969 Deng's Tortuous Road to the Top 1969-1977 2. Banishment and Return. 1969-1974 3. Bringing Order under Mao 1974-1975 4. Looking Forward under Mao. 1975 5. Sidelined as the mao Era Ends. 1976 6. Return under Hua. 1977-1978 Creating the Deng era, 1978-1980 7. Three Turning Points, 1978 8. Setting the Limits of Freedom, 1978-1979 9. The Soviet-Vietnamese Threat. 1978-1979 10. Opening to Japan, 1978 11. Opening to the United States, 1978-1979 12. Launching the deng administration. 1979-1980 The Deng era, 1978-1989 13. Deng's art of governing Experiments in Guangdong and Fujian, 1979-1984 15. Economic Readjustment and Rural Reform, 1978-1982 16. Accelerating Economic Growth and Opening, 1982-1989 17. One Country, Two Systems: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Tibet 18. The Military: Preparing for Modernization 19. The Ebb and Flow of politics Challenges to the deng era, 1989-1992
2 Contents Map: China in the 1980s Preface: In Search of Deng Introduction: The Man and His Mission Deng's Background 1. From Revolutionary to Builder to Reformer, 1904–1969 Deng's Tortuous Road to the Top, 1969–1977 2. Banishment and Return, 1969–1974 3. Bringing Order under Mao, 1974–1975 4. Looking Forward under Mao, 1975 5. Sidelined as the Mao Era Ends, 1976 6. Return under Hua, 1977–1978 Creating the Deng Era, 1978–1980 7. Three Turning Points, 1978 8. Setting the Limits of Freedom, 1978–1979 9. The Soviet-Vietnamese Threat, 1978–1979 10. Opening to Japan, 1978 11. Opening to the United States, 1978–1979 12. Launching the Deng Administration, 1979–1980 The Deng Era, 1978–1989 13. Deng's Art of Governing 14. Experiments in Guangdong and Fujian, 1979–1984 15. Economic Readjustment and Rural Reform, 1978–1982 16. Accelerating Economic Growth and Opening, 1982–1989 17. One Country, Two Systems: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Tibet 18. The Military: Preparing for Modernization 19. The Ebb and Flow of Politics Challenges to the Deng Era, 1989–1992
20. Beijing Spring, April 15-May 17, 1989 21. The Tiananmen Tragedy, May 17-June 4, 1989 22. Standing Firm 1989-1992 23 Dengs Finale: The Southern Journey, 1992 Dengs Place in History 24 China Transformed Key People in the Deng era Chinese Communist Party Congresses and Plenums, 1956-1992 Abbreviations Index China Transformed When Deng stepped aside in 1992 he had fulfilled the mission that had eluded China,s people and strengthen the country. But in the process of ay to enrich the leaders for 150 years: he and his colleagues had found a way to enrich the Chinese presided over a fundamental transformation of China itself-the nature of its relation with the outside world, its governance system, and its society. After Deng stepped down, China continued to change rapidly, but the basic structural changes developed under Deng's leadership have already continued for two decades, and with some adaptations, they may extend long into the future. Indeed, the structural changes that took place under Deng,s leadership rank among the most basic changes since the Chinese empire took shape during the han dynasty over two millennia ago The transformation that took place in the Deng era was shaped by the highly developed Chinese tradition, by the scale and diversity of Chinese society, by the nature of world institutions at the time, by the openness of the global system to sharing its technology and management skills, by the nature of the Chinese Communist Party, and by the contributions of large numbers of creative and hard-working people. But it occurred at a time of transition, in which the top leader was granted considerable freedom by others to guide the political process and make final decisions. And it was shaped by the role that leader, Deng Xiaoping, personally played. To be sure, the ideas underlying this sea change came from many people, and
3 20. Beijing Spring, April 15–May 17, 1989 21. The Tiananmen Tragedy, May 17–June 4, 1989 22. Standing Firm, 1989–1992 23. Deng's Finale: The Southern Journey, 1992 Deng's Place in History 24. China Transformed Key People in the Deng Era Chinese Communist Party Congresses and Plenums, 1956–1992 Abbreviations Notes Index China Transformed When Deng stepped aside in 1992 he had fulfilled the mission that had eluded China's leaders for 150 years: he and his colleagues had found a way to enrich the Chinese people and strengthen the country. But in the process of achieving this goal, Deng presided over a fundamental transformation of China itself—the nature of its relation with the outside world, its governance system, and its society. After Deng stepped down, China continued to change rapidly, but the basic structural changes developed under Deng's leadership have already continued for two decades, and with some adaptations, they may extend long into the future. Indeed, the structural changes that took place under Deng's leadership rank among the most basic changes since the Chinese empire took shape during the Han dynasty over two millennia ago. The transformation that took place in the Deng era was shaped by the highly developed Chinese tradition, by the scale and diversity of Chinese society, by the nature of world institutions at the time, by the openness of the global system to sharing its technology and management skills, by the nature of the Chinese Communist Party, and by the contributions of large numbers of creative and hard-working people. But it occurred at a time of transition, in which the top leader was granted considerable freedom by others to guide the political process and make final decisions. And it was shaped by the role that leader, Deng Xiaoping, personally played. To be sure, the ideas underlying this sea change came from many people, and
no one fully anticipated how events would play out. Deng did not start reform and opening; they began under Hua Guofeng before Deng came to power. Nor was Deng the architect with a grand design for the changes that would take place under his rule there was in fact no clear overall design in place during this era Rather, Deng was the general manager who provided overall leadership during the transformation. He helped package the ideas and present them to his team of colleagues and to the public at a pace and in a way they could accept. He provided a steady hand at the top that gave people confidence as they underwent dramatic changes. He played a role in selecting and guiding the team that worked together to create and implement the reforms. He was a problem-solver who tried to devise solutions that would work for the various parties involved both within China and in foreign countries. He helped foster a strong governing structure that could stay in control even as the Chinese people struggled to adapt to the new and rapidly evolving situation on the ground. He played a leading part in guiding the process of setting priorities and creating strategies to realize the most important goals. He explained the policies to the public in a straightforward way by describing the overall situation they faced and then what concrete measures were needed to respond when controversies arose, he played a major role in making the final decisions and managed the pre so as to minimize cleavages that would tear the country apart. He supported the effort to provide incentives and to offer hope based on realistic enough goals that people were not later sorely disappointed. He supported the effort to give enough freedom to specialists-scientists, economists, managers, and intellectuals--so they could do their work, but placed limits on their freedom when he feared that the fragile social order might be undone. And he played a central role in improving relations with other major countries and in forming workable relationships with their leaders. In all of his work, Deng was guided by his deep conviction that employing the worlds most modern practices in science and technology, and most effective management techniques, would lead to the greatest progress for China-and that the disruptions that occurred from grafting these practices and techniques onto a Chinese system were manageable and worth it for the Chinese people as a whole It is difficult for those in China and abroad who became adults after Deng stepped down to realize the enormity of the problems deng faced as he began this journey:a country closed to fundamentally new ways of thinking; deep rifts between those who had been attacked during the Cultural Revolution and their attackers; proud military leaders who were resistant to downsizing and budget reductions; public animosity toward imperialists and foreign capitalists; an entrenched, conservative socialist structure in both the countryside and the cities, a reluctance by urban residents to accept over 200 million migrants from the countryside; and dissension as some people continued to live in poverty while others became rich But Deng also had enormous advantages as he assumed responsibility for the overall management of China's transformation. He took over a functioning national arty and government in a country that Mao had unified. He had many experienced senior officials who shared his view that deep changes were needed. He came to
4 no one fully anticipated how events would play out. Deng did not start reform and opening; they began under Hua Guofeng before Deng came to power. Nor was Deng the architect with a grand design for the changes that would take place under his rule; there was in fact no clear overall design in place during this era. Rather, Deng was the general manager who provided overall leadership during the transformation. He helped package the ideas and present them to his team of colleagues and to the public at a pace and in a way they could accept. He provided a steady hand at the top that gave people confidence as they underwent dramatic changes. He played a role in selecting and guiding the team that worked together to create and implement the reforms. He was a problem-solver who tried to devise solutions that would work for the various parties involved both within China and in foreign countries. He helped foster a strong governing structure that could stay in control even as the Chinese people struggled to adapt to the new and rapidly evolving situation on the ground. He played a leading part in guiding the process of setting priorities and creating strategies to realize the most important goals. He explained the policies to the public in a straightforward way by describing the overall situation they faced and then what concrete measures were needed to respond. When controversies arose, he played a major role in making the final decisions and managed the process so as to minimize cleavages that would tear the country apart. He supported the effort to provide incentives and to offer hope based on realistic enough goals that people were not later sorely disappointed. He supported the effort to give enough freedom to specialists—scientists, economists, managers, and intellectuals—so they could do their work, but placed limits on their freedom when he feared that the fragile social order might be undone. And he played a central role in improving relations with other major countries and in forming workable relationships with their leaders. In all of his work, Deng was guided by his deep conviction that employing the world's most modern practices in science and technology, and most effective management techniques, would lead to the greatest progress for China—and that the disruptions that occurred from grafting these practices and techniques onto a Chinese system were manageable and worth it for the Chinese people as a whole. It is difficult for those in China and abroad who became adults after Deng stepped down to realize the enormity of the problems Deng faced as he began this journey: a country closed to fundamentally new ways of thinking; deep rifts between those who had been attacked during the Cultural Revolution and their attackers; proud military leaders who were resistant to downsizing and budget reductions; public animosity toward imperialists and foreign capitalists; an entrenched, conservative socialist structure in both the countryside and the cities; a reluctance by urban residents to accept over 200 million migrants from the countryside; and dissension as some people continued to live in poverty while others became rich. But Deng also had enormous advantages as he assumed responsibility for the overall management of China's transformation. He took over a functioning national party and government in a country that Mao had unified. He had many experienced senior officials who shared his view that deep changes were needed. He came to
power when there was an open world trading system and other countries were willing to share their capital, technology, and management skills and to welcome China into international institutions Deng also had an impressive array of personal qualities that enabled him to guide China's transformation It is doubtful that anyone else then had the combination of authority, depth and breadth of experience, strategic sense, assurance, personal relationships, and political judgment needed to manage China s transformation with comparable success. What, then, is the nature of the transformation that Deng helped guide? From the Center of Asian Civilization to a single nation of the world During imperial times, China was never a global power or even an active participant in global affairs. It was a regional Asian power. In the"Chinese world order"that guided China's relations with other countries before the Opium War, the smaller political entities around China's periphery paid ceremonial tribute to the emperor of the"Central Kingdom, " China. These other political entities thereby acknowledged the superiority of Chinese civilization over the surrounding areas. In exchange, China agreed that these political entities outside China could remain autonomous and live in Rarely did a Chinese emperor take any interest in extending China s reach beyond the Asian mainland. For a brief time during the fifteenth century, Chinese emperors did allow the construction of oceangoing vessels, and Admiral Zheng He led seven voyages overseas that stretched as far as the middle east and the east coast of Africa But subsequent emperors not only prohibited such lengthy voyages; they also prevented the building of oceangoing vessels. For them it was difficult enough to manage affairs within China's long borders without linking China to lands beyond its shores. In 1793, when the British envoy Lord McCartney arrived in China and proposed the opening of trade, Emperor Qianlong famously replied, "We possess all thingsI.have no use for your manufactures. 2 Later, after the Opium Wars of 1839-1842 and 1856-1860, European powers forced China to grant them access to a number of ports along the coast, but the Chinese government took virtually no initiative to extend its reach beyond its land borders in Asia. China as a nation did not adapt effectively to the challenge as the Industrial Revolution brought new power to Western nations. Because of China's weak response, stronger imperialist powers from the West dominated relations with China and even dominated industry and trade along the china coast Mao, at the time of the Korean War, ended the role of imperialists by closing the country to contact with the West. After that time, China began to play a role in the Communist world and for a brief time in the 1950s and 1060s played a part in the affairs of the third world. Its role in the Communist world greatly declined after it broke off relations with the soviet Union in 1960. Before 1978 the Chinese
5 power when there was an open world trading system and other countries were willing to share their capital, technology, and management skills and to welcome China into international institutions. Deng also had an impressive array of personal qualities that enabled him to guide China's transformation. It is doubtful that anyone else then had the combination of authority, depth and breadth of experience, strategic sense, assurance, personal relationships, and political judgment needed to manage China's transformation with comparable success. What, then, is the nature of the transformation that Deng helped guide? From the Center of Asian Civilization to a Single Nation of the World During imperial times, China was never a global power or even an active participant in global affairs. It was a regional Asian power. In the ―Chinese world order‖ that guided China's relations with other countries before the Opium War, the smaller political entities around China's periphery paid ceremonial tribute to the emperor of the ―Central Kingdom,‖ China. These other political entities thereby acknowledged the superiority of Chinese civilization over the surrounding areas. In exchange, China agreed that these political entities outside China could remain autonomous and live in peace.1 Rarely did a Chinese emperor take any interest in extending China's reach beyond the Asian mainland. For a brief time during the fifteenth century, Chinese emperors did allow the construction of oceangoing vessels, and Admiral Zheng He led seven voyages overseas that stretched as far as the Middle East and the east coast of Africa. But subsequent emperors not only prohibited such lengthy voyages; they also prevented the building of oceangoing vessels. For them it was difficult enough to manage affairs within China's long borders without linking China to lands beyond its shores. In 1793, when the British envoy Lord McCartney arrived in China and proposed the opening of trade, Emperor Qianlong famously replied, ―We possess all things. I . . . have no use for your manufactures.‖2 Later, after the Opium Wars of 1839–1842 and 1856–1860, European powers forced China to grant them access to a number of ports along the coast, but the Chinese government took virtually no initiative to extend its reach beyond its land borders in Asia. China as a nation did not adapt effectively to the challenge as the Industrial Revolution brought new power to Western nations. Because of China's weak response, stronger imperialist powers from the West dominated relations with China and even dominated industry and trade along the China coast. Mao, at the time of the Korean War, ended the role of imperialists by closing the country to contact with the West. After that time, China began to play a role in the Communist world and for a brief time in the 1950s and 1060s played a part in the affairs of the third world. Its role in the Communist world greatly declined after it broke off relations with the Soviet Union in 1960. Before 1978 the Chinese
government still had only limited involvement in affairs beyond its borders. For a long period during the Cultural Revolution, for example, China had only one ambassador abroad, stationed in Egypt Although Mao had begun to open China to the West after the clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969, and the People's Republic did take over the China seat in the United Nations in 1971, during Mao's lifetime China was open barely a crack. After Mao died, Hua Guofeng was receptive to efforts to open the country, but it was left to Deng Xiaoping to open the country and lead China to take an active part in international affairs. It was not until Dengs era that government leaders had both the vision and the political strength to overcome the sour memories of the imperialist era and develop a lasting and positive new pattern of relations with other nations whereby China was a part of the new world order that had emerged after World War II Under Dengs leadership, China truly joined the world community, becoming an active part of international organizations and of the global system of trade, finance, and relations among citizens of all walks of life. China became a member of the World Bank and of the International Monetary Fund(IMF). China began to play an active role in World Health Organization activities, as well as the endeavors of all important international organizations in every sphere. And although it would take nearly a decade after Deng stepped down before China was admitted to the World Trade Organization, preparations for China s entry began under Deng During the early years of China's participation in international organiza China was learning how these organizations actually functioned, China was still a very poor nation, and China's efforts first focused on defending its own interests. It was left for Dengs successors, who realized the benefits of the international system for China, to begin to think about what China could do as a stakeholder in the international system and global institutions to strengthen those organizations. Before China joined institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, some participants worried participation would be so disruptive that they woule functioning. In fact China's participation has strengthened those organizations even as it has represented its own interests; it has abided by the rules of the organizations When Deng became preeminent leader in 1978, China's trade with the world totaled less than $10 billion, within three decades, it had expanded a hundredfold. At the same time, China was encouraging the United States to accept a few hundred Chinese students; by a decade after Deng s death, an estimated 1. 4 million students had studied abroad and some 390,000 had already returned to China.By 1992 the nation had already come a long way toward playing an active role in global intellectual conversations as well as in the global trading system. The basic breakthrough was achieved during Deng s period as paramount leader During Dengs era, to adjust to its new global role, China went through wrenching internal changes that Chinese leaders called "jiegu, or linking tracks, drawing on the term used in the 1930s for the linking together of Chinese railways of different
6 government still had only limited involvement in affairs beyond its borders. For a long period during the Cultural Revolution, for example, China had only one ambassador abroad, stationed in Egypt. Although Mao had begun to open China to the West after the clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969, and the People's Republic did take over the China seat in the United Nations in 1971, during Mao's lifetime China was open barely a crack. After Mao died, Hua Guofeng was receptive to efforts to open the country, but it was left to Deng Xiaoping to open the country and lead China to take an active part in international affairs. It was not until Deng's era that government leaders had both the vision and the political strength to overcome the sour memories of the imperialist era and develop a lasting and positive new pattern of relations with other nations whereby China was a part of the new world order that had emerged after World War II. Under Deng's leadership, China truly joined the world community, becoming an active part of international organizations and of the global system of trade, finance, and relations among citizens of all walks of life. China became a member of the World Bank and of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). China began to play an active role in World Health Organization activities, as well as the endeavors of all important international organizations in every sphere. And although it would take nearly a decade after Deng stepped down before China was admitted to the World Trade Organization, preparations for China's entry began under Deng. During the early years of China's participation in international organizations, as China was learning how these organizations actually functioned, China was still a very poor nation, and China's efforts first focused on defending its own interests. It was left for Deng's successors, who realized the benefits of the international system for China, to begin to think about what China could do as a stakeholder in the international system and global institutions to strengthen those organizations. Before China joined institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, some participants worried that China's participation would be so disruptive that they would have trouble functioning. In fact China's participation has strengthened those organizations even as it has represented its own interests; it has abided by the rules of the organizations. When Deng became preeminent leader in 1978, China's trade with the world totaled less than $10 billion; within three decades, it had expanded a hundredfold. At the same time, China was encouraging the United States to accept a few hundred Chinese students; by a decade after Deng's death, an estimated 1.4 million students had studied abroad and some 390,000 had already returned to China.3 By 1992 the nation had already come a long way toward playing an active role in global intellectual conversations as well as in the global trading system. The basic breakthrough was achieved during Deng's period as paramount leader. During Deng's era, to adjust to its new global role, China went through wrenching internal changes that Chinese leaders called “jiegui,” or linking tracks, drawing on the term used in the 1930s for the linking together of Chinese railways of different
gauges In the 1980s Chinese used the term to describe the adjustments that China was making to take part in international organizations and in global systems of all kinds In the early years after 1978, when China was beginning to link up with international organizations, it greatly expanded the specialized organizations that were in effect a buffer in dealing with the outside world. Foreign enterprises in China were located in special areas like the special economic zones (SEZs), and the overall system for dealing with foreign enterprises erected artificial walls that kept foreigners from close contact with China as a whole. Foreigners in China worked with special foreign affairs offices located in local governments, in universities, and in large companies. Foreign affairs service bureaus, for example, handled domestic employees who worked for foreigners. To capture more foreign currency, which China was desperately short of, foreigners were encouraged to spend "foreign-exchange certificates"(which they received in exchange for their homelands currency )at special"friendship stores"where they could buy goods made abroad that ordinary Chinese were not allowed to purchase. State trading firms handled much of the buying and selling of goods with foreigners, and a large proportion of foreigners who bought Chinese did so at the semi-annual Canton trade fair. The Chinese Foreign Ministry z plaved a large role in supervising Chinese government activities dealing with foreigners at these specialized"go-between"institutions, which were staffed by Chinese officials trained in foreign languages and familiar with foreign practices In the late 1980s, however, China's relations with the outside world had already begun to expand rapidly beyond these specialized institutions. Foreigners' travel was no longer restricted to certain areas and more Chinese firms could deal with foreign firms directly. The practices that began with the SEzs and spread to fourteen coastal areas in 1984 had started to spread to the entire country. So many foreigners were coming to China that the specialized"foreign affairs offices" could no longer manage all their affairs, the specialized institutions for dealing with foreigners mostly remained. but their activities were more often limited to routine official data collecting Before Deng stepped down, Chinese institutions of all kinds began to link their tracks, to adapt to foreign practices. Firms that were involved in international trade had to learn foreign legal, accounting, and organizational methods. Universities and high schools that sent their graduates abroad began to create training programs to prepare their students for the entrance examinations and other procedures required to gain admittance at foreign institutions. Chinese athletic coaches began to focus on preparing the best athletes for competition in international sports contests. Tourist facilities built to meet international standards spilled over to handle both domestic and foreign travelers. Products initially produced for export were increasingly made available to domestic consumers. And just as the United States after World War II expanded its academic and research institutions to underpin its role as a global power, so too under Deng did China,s academic and research institutions expand greatly deepening Chinese understanding of world affairs
7 gauges. In the 1980s Chinese used the term to describe the adjustments that China was making to take part in international organizations and in global systems of all kinds. In the early years after 1978, when China was beginning to link up with international organizations, it greatly expanded the specialized organizations that were in effect a buffer in dealing with the outside world. Foreign enterprises in China were located in special areas like the special economic zones (SEZs), and the overall system for dealing with foreign enterprises erected artificial walls that kept foreigners from close contact with China as a whole. Foreigners in China worked with special foreign affairs offices located in local governments, in universities, and in large companies. Foreign affairs service bureaus, for example, handled domestic employees who worked for foreigners. To capture more foreign currency, which China was desperately short of, foreigners were encouraged to spend ―foreign-exchange certificates‖ (which they received in exchange for their homeland's currency) at special ―friendship stores‖ where they could buy goods made abroad that ordinary Chinese were not allowed to purchase. State trading firms handled much of the buying and selling of goods with foreigners, and a large proportion of foreigners who bought Chinese goods did so at the semi-annual Canton trade fair. The Chinese Foreign Ministry played a large role in supervising Chinese government activities dealing with foreigners at these specialized ―go-between‖ institutions, which were staffed by Chinese officials trained in foreign languages and familiar with foreign practices. In the late 1980s, however, China's relations with the outside world had already begun to expand rapidly beyond these specialized institutions. Foreigners' travel was no longer restricted to certain areas, and more Chinese firms could deal with foreign firms directly. The practices that began with the SEZs and spread to fourteen coastal areas in 1984 had started to spread to the entire country. So many foreigners were coming to China that the specialized ―foreign affairs offices‖ could no longer manage all their affairs; the specialized institutions for dealing with foreigners mostly remained, but their activities were more often limited to routine official data collecting. Before Deng stepped down, Chinese institutions of all kinds began to link their tracks, to adapt to foreign practices. Firms that were involved in international trade had to learn foreign legal, accounting, and organizational methods.4 Universities and high schools that sent their graduates abroad began to create training programs to prepare their students for the entrance examinations and other procedures required to gain admittance at foreign institutions. Chinese athletic coaches began to focus on preparing the best athletes for competition in international sports contests. Tourist facilities built to meet international standards spilled over to handle both domestic and foreign travelers. Products initially produced for export were increasingly made available to domestic consumers. And just as the United States after World War II expanded its academic and research institutions to underpin its role as a global power, so too under Deng did China's academic and research institutions expand greatly, deepening Chinese understanding of world affairs
Deng advanced China s globalization far more boldly and thoroughly than did leaders of other large countries like India, Russia, and Brazil. The process has continued after the Deng era, but the basic breakthroughs were achieved by the time Deng stepped down Rule by Party Leadership Teams Although the Chinese Communist Party had begun the transition from a revolutionary party to a ruling party in 1956, Mao soon led it once again into revolution. By contrast, after 1978. with the return of senior officials the dismissal of revolutionaries not suited for governing, and the recruitment of new leaders, Deng guided the transition to a party that focused on governing the country The U.S. system of separating the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government was devised by leaders concerned about an excess concentration of power The system devised by Mao, but fundamentally revised by Deng and his colleagues, was created to deal with the opposite problem--providing unified leadership in the midst of chaos, confusion, deadlocks, inaction, and widely varied local areas. Den and his colleagues also believed, unlike the Americans, that basing final decisions on the overall political judgments of top leaders would serve the interests of the country better than basing them on the evaluations of an independent judiciary in which laws determine what actions are permitted. They believed that a system that allows a legislative body to make laws without having the responsibility for implementing hem is not as effective as concentrating law-making and implementation in one body The United States was formed by independent states that retained independent powers. China for centuries had been a centralized government with control over regional governments. Mao had further centralized these powers so that they extended deeply throughout the country. But Deng pulled back on the governing structure that tried to penetrate everywhere. Instead of setting tight rules that local areas had to follow, he established a system in which governing teams, selected by the next higher level, were given considerable independence as long as they managed to bring rapid growth The core governing structure in Beijing that Deng established is, as under mao centered around the Politburo and the Secretariat It is linked to local areas through a network of party leadership teams (ingdao banzi)that is present in every locality and at every level of every major office of government. Each leadership team is responsible not only for directing the work of the Communist Party at its level, but also for overseeing the government office(or economic or cultural unit)under it. The team is expected to make judgments about broad overall issues and see to it that work within its jurisdiction makes an overall contribution to the four modernizations The higher levels of the party pass down rules for how the leadership teams should conduct their work and they send down endless numbers of directives to each level They also hold meetings with lower levels, sometimes by inviting the lower-level
8 Deng advanced China's globalization far more boldly and thoroughly than did leaders of other large countries like India, Russia, and Brazil. The process has continued after the Deng era, but the basic breakthroughs were achieved by the time Deng stepped down. Rule by Party Leadership Teams Although the Chinese Communist Party had begun the transition from a revolutionary party to a ruling party in 1956, Mao soon led it once again into revolution. By contrast, after 1978, with the return of senior officials, the dismissal of revolutionaries not suited for governing, and the recruitment of new leaders, Deng guided the transition to a party that focused on governing the country. The U.S. system of separating the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government was devised by leaders concerned about an excess concentration of power. The system devised by Mao, but fundamentally revised by Deng and his colleagues, was created to deal with the opposite problem—providing unified leadership in the midst of chaos, confusion, deadlocks, inaction, and widely varied local areas. Deng and his colleagues also believed, unlike the Americans, that basing final decisions on the overall political judgments of top leaders would serve the interests of the country better than basing them on the evaluations of an independent judiciary in which laws determine what actions are permitted. They believed that a system that allows a legislative body to make laws without having the responsibility for implementing them is not as effective as concentrating law-making and implementation in one body. The United States was formed by independent states that retained independent powers. China for centuries had been a centralized government with control over regional governments. Mao had further centralized these powers so that they extended deeply throughout the country. But Deng pulled back on the governing structure that tried to penetrate everywhere. Instead of setting tight rules that local areas had to follow, he established a system in which governing teams, selected by the next higher level, were given considerable independence as long as they managed to bring rapid growth. The core governing structure in Beijing that Deng established is, as under Mao, centered around the Politburo and the Secretariat. It is linked to local areas through a network of party leadership teams (lingdao banzi) that is present in every locality and at every level of every major office of government. Each leadership team is responsible not only for directing the work of the Communist Party at its level, but also for overseeing the government office (or economic or cultural unit) under it. The team is expected to make judgments about broad overall issues and see to it that work within its jurisdiction makes an overall contribution to the four modernizations. The higher levels of the party pass down rules for how the leadership teams should conduct their work and they send down endless numbers of directives to each level. They also hold meetings with lower levels, sometimes by inviting the lower-level
leaders to attend higher-level meetings, but also by sending higher-level officials on inspection tours of the lower levels. When officials at the higher level consider ar issue very important, they can and do intervene. But it is difficult for them to monitor all developments at the lower levels, so the team ordinarily has considerable freedom in guiding the work at its level The key leverage that Beijing has over the provinces is the power to appoint and dismiss the members of the leadership team. Team members commonly serve a term of several years, but they can be dismissed at any time by leaders at the next higher level. The several members of a party leadership team are given responsibility for different sectors and are judged not only by how well they manage their respective sectors, but also by how well the entire team and the unit it supervises perform. In Dengs era and in the decades after Deng, those judgments were based overwhelmingly on how much the team contributed to China's overall economic growth. Over the years, secondary criteria have become more important for judging the performance of the teams, criteria that include the training of the next generation of officials, environmental protection, managing disturbances, and responding to emergencies Like Deng, Dengs successors believe that a sense of commitment to the overall goals of the nation can be achieved by the proper selection, training, and supervision of officials. Because officials at the next level down have a great deal of freedom over how they do their work, the selection and training of the members of a team are done with considerable care. At each level, younger officials judged likely to excel because of their overall intellectual ability, reliability under stress, mature judgment, ability to work well with colleagues, and dedication to serving the party and the country are picked for special training, mentoring, and testing Indeed, considerable time is spent mentoring officials at every level. A mentor's role is to suggest to younger, lower- level officials how they should enhance their performance and skills. The most promising young officials are allowed to accompany their superiors to various high-level meetings and to take part in informal gatherings at party retreats. They are also permitted to attend classes at the party schools, with those judged with the most potential for national leadership positions taking courses at the Central Party School in Beijing, and those considered likely nominees for provincial or urban official positions taking leadership courses at the arty schools in their respective regions. Not all party members, who numbered 37 million when Deng ascended the stage, shared the camaraderie that developed among those selected to attend retreats with higher officials and to become students at the party schools. Those who attended party schools not only got to know each other as well as those who attended the party school before and after, but also became acquainted with those higher-level officials who would visit the party schools and with the help of evaluations by party school officials, make recommendations about their future positions. Although officials in the Organization Department kept ersonnel files and could make recommendations, the members of the party
9 leaders to attend higher-level meetings, but also by sending higher-level officials on inspection tours of the lower levels. When officials at the higher level consider an issue very important, they can and do intervene. But it is difficult for them to monitor all developments at the lower levels, so the team ordinarily has considerable freedom in guiding the work at its level. The key leverage that Beijing has over the provinces is the power to appoint and dismiss the members of the leadership team. Team members commonly serve a term of several years, but they can be dismissed at any time by leaders at the next higher level. The several members of a party leadership team are given responsibility for different sectors and are judged not only by how well they manage their respective sectors, but also by how well the entire team and the unit it supervises perform. In Deng's era and in the decades after Deng, those judgments were based overwhelmingly on how much the team contributed to China's overall economic growth. Over the years, secondary criteria have become more important for judging the performance of the teams, criteria that include the training of the next generation of officials, environmental protection, managing disturbances, and responding to emergencies.5 Like Deng, Deng's successors believe that a sense of commitment to the overall goals of the nation can be achieved by the proper selection, training, and supervision of officials. Because officials at the next level down have a great deal of freedom over how they do their work, the selection and training of the members of a team are done with considerable care. At each level, younger officials judged likely to excel because of their overall intellectual ability, reliability under stress, mature judgment, ability to work well with colleagues, and dedication to serving the party and the country are picked for special training, mentoring, and testing. Indeed, considerable time is spent mentoring officials at every level. A mentor's role is to suggest to younger, lower-level officials how they should enhance their performance and skills. The most promising young officials are allowed to accompany their superiors to various high-level meetings and to take part in informal gatherings at party retreats. They are also permitted to attend classes at the party schools, with those judged with the most potential for national leadership positions taking courses at the Central Party School in Beijing, and those considered likely nominees for provincial or urban official positions taking leadership courses at the party schools in their respective regions. Not all party members, who numbered 37 million when Deng ascended the stage, shared the camaraderie that developed among those selected to attend retreats with higher officials and to become students at the party schools. Those who attended party schools not only got to know each other as well as those who attended the party school before and after, but also became acquainted with those higher-level officials who would visit the party schools and, with the help of evaluations by party school officials, make recommendations about their future positions. Although officials in the Organization Department kept personnel files and could make recommendations, the members of the party
leadership team at each level made the final decisions about who should be promoted in their jurisdiction o There is a danger in allowing local leaders so much freedom. The system that eng founded, which endures today, emphasizes results more than following rules and helps nurture officials who have a broad vision in evaluating issues, who are entrepreneurial, and who support rapid growth. Without tight supervision from above, however, many of these officials have found ways not only to enrich China, but also to enrich themselves and their friends while alienating others in their locality Deng Xiaoping did not introduce the system of party leadership teams, but he stabilized it, professionalized the work the teams did, and changed the key criteria for judging officials from contributions to political campaigns to contributions to economic growth. This basic structure has been continued by his successors The modern meritocracy e time Deng stepped down, young party officials had to prove their ability by first passing examinations to the better high schools and better universities. Dengs focus on meritocracy has deep roots in China, which was the first country in the world to select officials on the basis of their performance on examinations. Beginning in 605 c.e., during the Sui dynasty, China had used written examinations as the chief criterion for determining which aspiring candidates were qualified to become government officials. But from the time when the imperial examinations ended, in the year after Deng was born, until Deng ascended the stage, China had not had the combination of stability and leaders' political determination to reestablish a national meritocratic basis for selecting officials. When Mao was alive it was impossible to use educational achievement as the major criterion for selecting officials. Many of those who had made contributions to the Communist cause and emerged in high positions simply had not had any opportunity for university training during the chaotic war and revolution years of the 1930s and 1940s. Furthermore, Mao considered political commitment ("redness")a more important qualification than expertise, and he favored peasants and workers over candidates from the"bad classes"(landlord and capitalist families), who were generally better educated. For this reason, examinations were not the main criterion for selecting and promoting officials. Indeed, many of the offi after 1949 were veterans from the Communist armies or guerrilla forces who barely literate. If examinations had been held, they and their children would not have outperformed the children from the"wrong social classes"who had received better formal training. After Mao's death, Deng boldly dismissed a"good class background as a criterion for selecting officials, instead he strictly relied on qualifications as measured by entrance examinations. Under new guidelines that Deng introduced in 1977, many children and grandchildren of those once labeled as belonging to the"bad classes" passed examinations, gained admission to the best universities, and became officials
10 leadership team at each level made the final decisions about who should be promoted in their jurisdiction. There is a danger in allowing local leaders so much freedom. The system that Deng founded, which endures today, emphasizes results more than following rules and helps nurture officials who have a broad vision in evaluating issues, who are entrepreneurial, and who support rapid growth. Without tight supervision from above, however, many of these officials have found ways not only to enrich China, but also to enrich themselves and their friends while alienating others in their locality. Deng Xiaoping did not introduce the system of party leadership teams, but he stabilized it, professionalized the work the teams did, and changed the key criteria for judging officials from contributions to political campaigns to contributions to economic growth. This basic structure has been continued by his successors. The Modern Meritocracy By the time Deng stepped down, young party officials had to prove their ability by first passing examinations to the better high schools and better universities. Deng's focus on meritocracy has deep roots in China, which was the first country in the world to select officials on the basis of their performance on examinations. Beginning in 605 c.e., during the Sui dynasty, China had used written examinations as the chief criterion for determining which aspiring candidates were qualified to become government officials. But from the time when the imperial examinations ended, in the year after Deng was born, until Deng ascended the stage, China had not had the combination of stability and leaders' political determination to reestablish a national meritocratic basis for selecting officials. When Mao was alive it was impossible to use educational achievement as the major criterion for selecting officials. Many of those who had made contributions to the Communist cause and emerged in high positions simply had not had any opportunity for university training during the chaotic war and revolution years of the 1930s and 1940s. Furthermore, Mao considered political commitment (―redness‖) a more important qualification than expertise, and he favored peasants and workers over candidates from the ―bad classes‖ (landlord and capitalist families), who were generally better educated. For this reason, examinations were not the main criterion for selecting and promoting officials. Indeed, many of the officials after 1949 were veterans from the Communist armies or guerrilla forces who were barely literate. If examinations had been held, they and their children would not have outperformed the children from the ―wrong social classes‖ who had received better formal training. After Mao's death, Deng boldly dismissed a ―good class background‖ as a criterion for selecting officials; instead he strictly relied on qualifications as measured by entrance examinations. Under new guidelines that Deng introduced in 1977, many children and grandchildren of those once labeled as belonging to the ―bad classes‖ passed examinations, gained admission to the best universities, and became officials
