《性别、亲密关系与社会》课程教学资源（相亲角文献）The gender divide in urban China：Singlehood and assortative mating by age and education.pdf_大学文库

Qian and Oian:The gender divide in urban China:Singlehood and assortative mating by age and education 1.Introduction In China,college education has expanded rapidly since 1999.Women have since then surpassed men in college enrollment and graduation (Yeung 2013).More young women with college education are seen to have challenged mate selection patterns in urban China.College-educated women who have not yet married by their late 20s are portrayed as having extreme difficulties finding a marital partner(e.g,Fincher 2012; Magistad 2013;Subramanian and Lee 2011).Chinese media uses a derogative term, "shengnu"("leftover ladies"),to describe these urban,highly educated,single women. While stigmatizing these single women,this term reveals public and family anxiety about their marriage prospects.There was a similar unease in the 1980s in the United States for college-educated white women who were single by age 30(Cherlin 1990). The unease was later found unwarranted because marriage rates in fact increased among college-educated women during that time,despite a decline in availability of marriageable partners (Qian and Preston 1993).This parallel raises the question of whether the concerns about marriage prospects of older,well-educated women in urban China are even valid. In this paper,we examine gender differentials in entry into marriage by age and educational attainment.We explore whether education and age pairings of spouses contribute to such gender differences.In the United States,advances in women's education do not diminish the likelihood of marriage because highly educated women increasingly marry similarly educated men,or men with less education than themselves (Schwartz and Mare 2005).In other words,changes in educational assortative mating in American society respond to structural changes in men's and women's educational attainment.The question is whether mate selection patterns in China would maintain the traditional practice of hypergamy,i.e.,men marry women younger and less educated than they are,or follow the U.S.pattern in response to rapid improvement in education,especially among women.The patterns of marriage formation and assortative mating in China shed light on whether traditional gender roles continue to constrain individual choice,even when society is experiencing rapid social and economic transformations. Using nationally representative data from the Chinese General Social Surveys in the 2000s,we extend the previous studies by providing an update on recent trends in age and educational assortative mating in urban China(Han 2010;Smits and Park 2009; Raymo and Xie 2000;Song 2009;Xu,Ji,and Tung 2000).We pay particular attention to gender differences in light of changes related to the reversal of college gender gap (Yeung 2013)and greater endorsement of traditional gender roles (Attane 2012). Specifically,drawing on the framework that emphasizes both individual choice and structural constraints (England and Farkas 1986),we examine how men and women 1338 http://www.demographic-research.org

Qian and Qian: The gender divide in urban China: Singlehood and assortative mating by age and education 1338 http://www.demographic-research.org 1. Introduction In China, college education has expanded rapidly since 1999. Women have since then surpassed men in college enrollment and graduation (Yeung 2013). More young women with college education are seen to have challenged mate selection patterns in urban China. College-educated women who have not yet married by their late 20s are portrayed as having extreme difficulties finding a marital partner (e.g., Fincher 2012; Magistad 2013; Subramanian and Lee 2011). Chinese media uses a derogative term, “shengnü” (“leftover ladies”), to describe these urban, highly educated, single women. While stigmatizing these single women, this term reveals public and family anxiety about their marriage prospects. There was a similar unease in the 1980s in the United States for college-educated white women who were single by age 30 (Cherlin 1990). The unease was later found unwarranted because marriage rates in fact increased among college-educated women during that time, despite a decline in availability of marriageable partners (Qian and Preston 1993). This parallel raises the question of whether the concerns about marriage prospects of older, well-educated women in urban China are even valid. In this paper, we examine gender differentials in entry into marriage by age and educational attainment. We explore whether education and age pairings of spouses contribute to such gender differences. In the United States, advances in women‟s education do not diminish the likelihood of marriage because highly educated women increasingly marry similarly educated men, or men with less education than themselves (Schwartz and Mare 2005). In other words, changes in educational assortative mating in American society respond to structural changes in men‟s and women‟s educational attainment. The question is whether mate selection patterns in China would maintain the traditional practice of hypergamy, i.e., men marry women younger and less educated than they are, or follow the U.S. pattern in response to rapid improvement in education, especially among women. The patterns of marriage formation and assortative mating in China shed light on whether traditional gender roles continue to constrain individual choice, even when society is experiencing rapid social and economic transformations. Using nationally representative data from the Chinese General Social Surveys in the 2000s, we extend the previous studies by providing an update on recent trends in age and educational assortative mating in urban China (Han 2010; Smits and Park 2009; Raymo and Xie 2000; Song 2009; Xu, Ji, and Tung 2000). We pay particular attention to gender differences in light of changes related to the reversal of college gender gap (Yeung 2013) and greater endorsement of traditional gender roles (Attané 2012). Specifically, drawing on the framework that emphasizes both individual choice and structural constraints (England and Farkas 1986), we examine how men and women

Demographic Research:Volume 31,Article 45 vary in marriage formation by age and education and in patterns of age and educational assortative marriage in urban China. 2.Background 2.1 Theoretical framework England and Farkas (1986)develop a framework stressing both individual choice and structural constraints to explain the relationships of household,employment,and gender in the United States.We apply this framework to help understand gendered patterns of marriage in contemporary urban China. Individual choice is based on Becker's (1981)classic economic theory of marriage:In marriage markets,an individual makes rational choice and marries only if the utility from marriage exceeds the utility from remaining single.Becker posits that the gains to marriage can be greater when women exchange their non-market traits with men's earning power,because men tend to have a comparative advantage in labor markets and women often have a comparative advantage in domestic work.This argument supports the sex-role specialization in marriage,with the husband taking on the breadwinner role and the wife specializing in housework and childcare.However, increases in economic independence of women make sex-role specialization within marriage less advantageous (Becker 1981).Compared with less-educated women, highly educated women possess more market-oriented human capital and have higher earning potential.Consequently,they may find marriage less beneficial and thus forgo marriage.Empirical evidence for this argument is weak in the United States (Sweeney 2002),but strong in societies where segregated gender roles make it difficult for women to balance work and family (Raymo 2003). Relatedly,individual choice is structurally constrained in societies where gender roles are such that wives focus on being a competent homemaker,and husbands bear the breadwinner role.In these societies,men do not value financial prospects in a potential spouse,and tend to look for younger women,who can bear and raise children while fulfilling the homemaker role.In contrast,women have strong incentives to marry men who are financially stable,typically older and highly educated (Raymo and Iwasawa 2005).Thus,marriage is formed between an older,better-educated man and a younger,less-educated woman. Granted,women's improvement in education increases the likelihood of educational homogamy because of the opportunities for men and women to meet in college and marry soon after college.Yet for college-educated men and women,longer time after school and more investment in careers may suggest that these individuals did http://www.demographic-research.org 1339

Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 45 http://www.demographic-research.org 1339 vary in marriage formation by age and education and in patterns of age and educational assortative marriage in urban China. 2. Background 2.1 Theoretical framework England and Farkas (1986) develop a framework stressing both individual choice and structural constraints to explain the relationships of household, employment, and gender in the United States. We apply this framework to help understand gendered patterns of marriage in contemporary urban China. Individual choice is based on Becker‟s (1981) classic economic theory of marriage: In marriage markets, an individual makes rational choice and marries only if the utility from marriage exceeds the utility from remaining single. Becker posits that the gains to marriage can be greater when women exchange their non-market traits with men‟s earning power, because men tend to have a comparative advantage in labor markets and women often have a comparative advantage in domestic work. This argument supports the sex-role specialization in marriage, with the husband taking on the breadwinner role and the wife specializing in housework and childcare. However, increases in economic independence of women make sex-role specialization within marriage less advantageous (Becker 1981). Compared with less-educated women, highly educated women possess more market-oriented human capital and have higher earning potential. Consequently, they may find marriage less beneficial and thus forgo marriage. Empirical evidence for this argument is weak in the United States (Sweeney 2002), but strong in societies where segregated gender roles make it difficult for women to balance work and family (Raymo 2003). Relatedly, individual choice is structurally constrained in societies where gender roles are such that wives focus on being a competent homemaker, and husbands bear the breadwinner role. In these societies, men do not value financial prospects in a potential spouse, and tend to look for younger women, who can bear and raise children while fulfilling the homemaker role. In contrast, women have strong incentives to marry men who are financially stable, typically older and highly educated (Raymo and Iwasawa 2005). Thus, marriage is formed between an older, better-educated man and a younger, less-educated woman. Granted, women‟s improvement in education increases the likelihood of educational homogamy because of the opportunities for men and women to meet in college and marry soon after college. Yet for college-educated men and women, longer time after school and more investment in careers may suggest that these individuals did

Qian and Oian:The gender divide in urban China:Singlehood and assortative mating by age and education not or no longer have a relationship established while in college.The longer the departure from school,the less likely it is that they would meet people with same levels of educational attainment (Mare 1991).Indeed,research on assortative mating in the United States shows that those married in age 30s tend to have lower educational homogamy than those married in age 20s (Qian 1998).More notably,men in age 30s are more likely than their female counterparts to marry someone who is less educated and younger.The "gendered double standard of aging"contributes to the deteriorating position of older women in marriage markets because a premium on youthful beauty devalues women more than men as they age(England and Farkas 1986;England and McClintock 2009).In sum,in societies with highly segregated gender roles, convergence in men's and women's educational attainment contributes to shrinking availabilities of potential partners and lower marriage prospects among older,highly educated women(Raymo and Iwasawa 2005) 2.2 Urban context in China and family norms Under the conceptual framework employed in the current study,individual choice is constrained by structural factors.Indeed,China's contextual factors play an important role in shaping individual marriage behavior.The first factor is the gender system (England and Farkas 1986;Oppenheimer 1988).Empirically,the effect of education on marriage depends on gender role differentiation:in societies with greater gender- asymmetric division of labor within households,such as Italy and East and Southeast Asia,women's educational level is found to be negatively associated with entry into marriage(Jones and Gubhaju 2009;Pinnelli and De Rose 1995;Raymo 2003),while in societies with more gender-egalitarian division of labor within households,such as the United States,Sweden,and West Germany,women's education is insignificantly or positively related to marriage (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995;Goldstein and Kenney 2001;Hoem 1995:Sweeney 2002). China provides a unique context of gender relations.Like most former socialist states,the Chinese government was active in promoting gender equality as a policy goal,with women's participation in paid employment considered as key to women's liberation and China's economic development (Zhou 2003).Although equality with men was never attained even during the collectivist period,female employment rate was among the highest in the world (Attane 2012;Parish and Busse 2000).However, the rapid transition from a planned to a market economy has eroded the power of the state in sustaining gender equality (Bian 2002;Tang and Parish 2000).During the economic reform,women's position in the labor market,relative to men's,has deteriorated significantly in urban China (Attane 2012).As a result of growing labor 1340 http://www.demographic-research.org

Qian and Qian: The gender divide in urban China: Singlehood and assortative mating by age and education 1340 http://www.demographic-research.org not or no longer have a relationship established while in college. The longer the departure from school, the less likely it is that they would meet people with same levels of educational attainment (Mare 1991). Indeed, research on assortative mating in the United States shows that those married in age 30s tend to have lower educational homogamy than those married in age 20s (Qian 1998). More notably, men in age 30s are more likely than their female counterparts to marry someone who is less educated and younger. The “gendered double standard of aging” contributes to the deteriorating position of older women in marriage markets because a premium on youthful beauty devalues women more than men as they age (England and Farkas 1986; England and McClintock 2009). In sum, in societies with highly segregated gender roles, convergence in men‟s and women‟s educational attainment contributes to shrinking availabilities of potential partners and lower marriage prospects among older, highly educated women (Raymo and Iwasawa 2005). 2.2 Urban context in China and family norms Under the conceptual framework employed in the current study, individual choice is constrained by structural factors. Indeed, China‟s contextual factors play an important role in shaping individual marriage behavior. The first factor is the gender system (England and Farkas 1986; Oppenheimer 1988). Empirically, the effect of education on marriage depends on gender role differentiation: in societies with greater genderasymmetric division of labor within households, such as Italy and East and Southeast Asia, women‟s educational level is found to be negatively associated with entry into marriage (Jones and Gubhaju 2009; Pinnelli and De Rose 1995; Raymo 2003), while in societies with more gender-egalitarian division of labor within households, such as the United States, Sweden, and West Germany, women‟s education is insignificantly or positively related to marriage (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995; Goldstein and Kenney 2001; Hoem 1995; Sweeney 2002). China provides a unique context of gender relations. Like most former socialist states, the Chinese government was active in promoting gender equality as a policy goal, with women‟s participation in paid employment considered as key to women‟s liberation and China‟s economic development (Zhou 2003). Although equality with men was never attained even during the collectivist period, female employment rate was among the highest in the world (Attané 2012; Parish and Busse 2000). However, the rapid transition from a planned to a market economy has eroded the power of the state in sustaining gender equality (Bian 2002; Tang and Parish 2000). During the economic reform, women‟s position in the labor market, relative to men‟s, has deteriorated significantly in urban China (Attané 2012). As a result of growing labor

Demographic Research:Volume 31,Article 45 market insecurity for women,women have strong incentives to marry up in status in categories such as age and education,to achieve high living standards through marriage. Relatedly,the breadwinner role of the husband and the homemaker role of the wife remain firmly in place in Chinese families(Qian and Qian 2014;Zuo 2003;Zuo and Bian 2001).Strikingly,since the 2000s,there has been a growing emphasis on traditional gender roles among Chinese men and women (Attane 2012).Urban women's domestic responsibilities are further reinforced by the unequal role given to mothers to raise the perfect child under the one-child family policy (Evans 2010;Greenhalgh 2010).Indeed,career-oriented women are commonly criticized as "selfish," “nonfeminine,.”and“irresponsible to household needs,”whereas husbands'failure to fulfill the provider role is often the primary source of marital conflict(Zuo and Bian 2001).This suggests that women value economic prospects in a potential mate,and that women with high earning potentials and career aspirations may not find marriage beneficial,due to clashes between career and family.Thus,we hypothesize that educational attainment is positively associated with men's but negatively associated with women's likelihood of marriage in urban China. Meanwhile,attitudes toward gender equality vary substantially by gender itself.In China,women hold more egalitarian work and family values than men (Chang 1999). Highly educated individuals are more likely to hold egalitarian gender attitudes,but the educational effect is stronger for women than for men(Shu 2004).This suggests that highly educated women may not want to compromise their careers when they search for marriageable partners.In contrast,highly educated men with less egalitarian gender attitudes may prefer to marry less-educated women.As a result,the marriage pool may be small among highly educated women due to a shortage of similarly educated men who share similar levels of egalitarian gender-role expectations.This contributes to a "marriage squeeze"for highly educated women in urban China (Jones 2007). In addition,parents often meddle with their children's marriage(Jennings,Axinn, and Ghimire 2012).Unlike Western cultures,China has long-standing,strong, intergenerational family ties.Although arranged marriages are banned in China,parents remain actively involved in their children's choice of mate(Riley 1994;Xu and Whyte 1990).Parents attempt to ensure that their children meet,date,and marry the"right" person.Their influence is twofold.Indirectly,they socialize their children about gender roles and mate choices well before their children are ready for marriage (Riley 1994). Directly,they often disapprove their children's inclinations to form nontraditional marriages,in which the wife is older than the husband or the husband has less schooling than the wife. http://www.demographic-research.org 1341

Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 45 http://www.demographic-research.org 1341 market insecurity for women, women have strong incentives to marry up in status in categories such as age and education, to achieve high living standards through marriage. Relatedly, the breadwinner role of the husband and the homemaker role of the wife remain firmly in place in Chinese families (Qian and Qian 2014; Zuo 2003; Zuo and Bian 2001). Strikingly, since the 2000s, there has been a growing emphasis on traditional gender roles among Chinese men and women (Attané 2012). Urban women‟s domestic responsibilities are further reinforced by the unequal role given to mothers to raise the perfect child under the one-child family policy (Evans 2010; Greenhalgh 2010). Indeed, career-oriented women are commonly criticized as “selfish,” “nonfeminine,” and “irresponsible to household needs,” whereas husbands‟ failure to fulfill the provider role is often the primary source of marital conflict (Zuo and Bian 2001). This suggests that women value economic prospects in a potential mate, and that women with high earning potentials and career aspirations may not find marriage beneficial, due to clashes between career and family. Thus, we hypothesize that educational attainment is positively associated with men‟s but negatively associated with women‟s likelihood of marriage in urban China. Meanwhile, attitudes toward gender equality vary substantially by gender itself. In China, women hold more egalitarian work and family values than men (Chang 1999). Highly educated individuals are more likely to hold egalitarian gender attitudes, but the educational effect is stronger for women than for men (Shu 2004). This suggests that highly educated women may not want to compromise their careers when they search for marriageable partners. In contrast, highly educated men with less egalitarian gender attitudes may prefer to marry less-educated women. As a result, the marriage pool may be small among highly educated women due to a shortage of similarly educated men who share similar levels of egalitarian gender-role expectations. This contributes to a “marriage squeeze” for highly educated women in urban China (Jones 2007). In addition, parents often meddle with their children‟s marriage (Jennings, Axinn, and Ghimire 2012). Unlike Western cultures, China has long-standing, strong, intergenerational family ties. Although arranged marriages are banned in China, parents remain actively involved in their children‟s choice of mate (Riley 1994; Xu and Whyte 1990). Parents attempt to ensure that their children meet, date, and marry the “right” person. Their influence is twofold. Indirectly, they socialize their children about gender roles and mate choices well before their children are ready for marriage (Riley 1994). Directly, they often disapprove their children‟s inclinations to form nontraditional marriages, in which the wife is older than the husband or the husband has less schooling than the wife

Demographic Research:Volume 31,Article 45 3.Data,sample,and measurement 3.1 Data In this study,we pool nationally representative samples from the Chinese General Social Surveys (CGSS)conducted in 2003,2005,2006,and 2008.The CGSS is a repeated cross-sectional survey that started in 2003.Currently,four waves of data and related information are available online through a public data archive-Chinese Social Survey Open Database (www.cssod.org).The 2003 through 2008 waves of the CGSS used a multi-stage,stratified,random sampling method and included nationally representative samples of adults aged 18 and above (see Bian and Li 2012 for more details).The CGSS data are ideal for this study because the surveys collected information on respondents'current marital status and year of first marriage along with other sociodemographic characteristics for respondents and their spouses. 3.2 Sample We restrict the analysis to urban residents because of strong urban and rural differences in education and marriage (Han 2010;Treiman 2012)and,more importantly,most highly educated men and women in China live in urban areas.Our analytic sample includes the couples first married between 2000 and 2008'and their never married counterparts at risk of forming such marriages over the same period.Specifically,we include the couples first married at ages 20 to 49 years between 2000 and 2008 and their never married counterparts in the same age range.We use this age range because the legal minimum age at marriage is 20 for women and 22 for men in China and almost no one marries for the first time after age 49 (Lindgren 2009).This study provides an important update,as no prior research has examined assortative marriage patterns since the 2000s,right after the 1999 college expansion in China. We carry out the analysis in two steps.First,we calculate first marriage rates by education and age among men and women,respectively.To calculate first marriage rates,we follow Raymo and Iwasawa(2005)to reconstruct the population at risk of first marriage.Specifically,we generate person-year data for never married men and We rely only on respondents'marital order to distinguish first marriages from higher-order marriages, because our data include information on whether the respondent is married for the first time,but have no marital order information of the spouse.Fortunately,marriages contracted between spouses of different marriage orders are rare.We performed additional analysis using data from the 2006 CGSS,which is the only survey that has information on the marriage order of the spouse,and showed that only 10 out of 676 first- time-married respondents had a remarried spouse.Thus,a lack of controls over the marriage order of the spouse is unlikely to bias the results. http://www.demographic-research.org 1343

Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 45 http://www.demographic-research.org 1343 3. Data, sample, and measurement 3.1 Data In this study, we pool nationally representative samples from the Chinese General Social Surveys (CGSS) conducted in 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008. The CGSS is a repeated cross-sectional survey that started in 2003. Currently, four waves of data and related information are available online through a public data archive – Chinese Social Survey Open Database (www.cssod.org). The 2003 through 2008 waves of the CGSS used a multi-stage, stratified, random sampling method and included nationally representative samples of adults aged 18 and above (see Bian and Li 2012 for more details). The CGSS data are ideal for this study because the surveys collected information on respondents‟ current marital status and year of first marriage along with other sociodemographic characteristics for respondents and their spouses. 3.2 Sample We restrict the analysis to urban residents because of strong urban and rural differences in education and marriage (Han 2010; Treiman 2012) and, more importantly, most highly educated men and women in China live in urban areas. Our analytic sample includes the couples first married between 2000 and 20083 and their never married counterparts at risk of forming such marriages over the same period. Specifically, we include the couples first married at ages 20 to 49 years between 2000 and 2008 and their never married counterparts in the same age range. We use this age range because the legal minimum age at marriage is 20 for women and 22 for men in China and almost no one marries for the first time after age 49 (Lindgren 2009). This study provides an important update, as no prior research has examined assortative marriage patterns since the 2000s, right after the 1999 college expansion in China. We carry out the analysis in two steps. First, we calculate first marriage rates by education and age among men and women, respectively. To calculate first marriage rates, we follow Raymo and Iwasawa (2005) to reconstruct the population at risk of first marriage. Specifically, we generate person-year data for never married men and 3 We rely only on respondents‟ marital order to distinguish first marriages from higher-order marriages, because our data include information on whether the respondent is married for the first time, but have no marital order information of the spouse. Fortunately, marriages contracted between spouses of different marriage orders are rare. We performed additional analysis using data from the 2006 CGSS, which is the only survey that has information on the marriage order of the spouse, and showed that only 10 out of 676 firsttime-married respondents had a remarried spouse. Thus, a lack of controls over the marriage order of the spouse is unlikely to bias the results

Qian and Oian:The gender divide in urban China:Singlehood and assortative mating by age and education women,as each of them was at risk of first marriage at every single age,starting at age 20 until 49 years old or until censored by the surveys.We then generate person-year data among those married after 2000-they remained single after age 20 until the age they married.We merge the data for the married and unmarried individuals for men and women,separately,and create never married person-year data starting at age 20 and ending at age 49,the age censored by the surveys,or the age they married,for the period between 2000 and 2008.We do not distinguish marriages within the period, because the data are sparse and because the substantive results are similar if the period is further classified into specific years.The final number of person-years is 11,311 for women and 14,156 for men. Second,we explore assortative mating patterns by education and age.Dropping six observations with missing data results in a sample of 2,151 couples first married between ages 20 and 49 during the 2000-2008 period. 3.3 Measurement The CGSS asked respondents their educational attainment,and,if married,their spouses'education at the time of the survey.We do not have information on educational attainment at the time of the wedding.However,these two measures should be similar because we focus on newlyweds,and educational upgrading after marriage is rare in China.We classify educational attainment into four groups:less than senior high school,senior high school,vocational college (Da Zhuan),and four-year college or higher.Due to compulsory nine-year education in urban China,all people with junior high school or less are collapsed into one educational group. Individuals are grouped into three age categories:20-24,25-29,and 30-49,which reflects three typical ages of marriage in China:early,normal,and late.Note that in this study,age of a never married person refers to age at the time of surveys,while age of a married person refers to age at first marriage.We do not further disaggregate the age category for 30 and above into consistent five-year age groups because a small proportion of people marry for the first time after age 30 in China (Jones and Gubhaju 2009).Indeed,in our sample,2.5%and 5.5%of person-years are between 35 and 49 years of age for women and for men,respectively,while only 4.5 percent of couples are those having at least one spouse older than 34.Results are substantively the same if we limit the age range to 20-34 years(results available upon request). 1344 http://www.demographic-research.org

Qian and Qian: The gender divide in urban China: Singlehood and assortative mating by age and education 1344 http://www.demographic-research.org women, as each of them was at risk of first marriage at every single age, starting at age 20 until 49 years old or until censored by the surveys. We then generate person-year data among those married after 2000 – they remained single after age 20 until the age they married. We merge the data for the married and unmarried individuals for men and women, separately, and create never married person-year data starting at age 20 and ending at age 49, the age censored by the surveys, or the age they married, for the period between 2000 and 2008. We do not distinguish marriages within the period, because the data are sparse and because the substantive results are similar if the period is further classified into specific years. The final number of person-years is 11,311 for women and 14,156 for men. Second, we explore assortative mating patterns by education and age. Dropping six observations with missing data results in a sample of 2,151 couples first married between ages 20 and 49 during the 2000–2008 period. 3.3 Measurement The CGSS asked respondents their educational attainment, and, if married, their spouses‟ education at the time of the survey. We do not have information on educational attainment at the time of the wedding. However, these two measures should be similar because we focus on newlyweds, and educational upgrading after marriage is rare in China. We classify educational attainment into four groups: less than senior high school, senior high school, vocational college (Da Zhuan), and four-year college or higher. Due to compulsory nine-year education in urban China, all people with junior high school or less are collapsed into one educational group. Individuals are grouped into three age categories: 20–24, 25–29, and 30–49, which reflects three typical ages of marriage in China: early, normal, and late. Note that in this study, age of a never married person refers to age at the time of surveys, while age of a married person refers to age at first marriage. We do not further disaggregate the age category for 30 and above into consistent five-year age groups because a small proportion of people marry for the first time after age 30 in China (Jones and Gubhaju 2009). Indeed, in our sample, 2.5% and 5.5% of person-years are between 35 and 49 years of age for women and for men, respectively, while only 4.5 percent of couples are those having at least one spouse older than 34. Results are substantively the same if we limit the age range to 20–34 years (results available upon request)