《性别、亲密关系与社会》课程教学资源（相亲角文献）INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY：Causes, Patterns, Trends

An.ReK.Sociol.1998.24:395-421 Copyright 1998 by Amual Reviews.All rights reserved INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY:Causes,Patterns, Trends Matthijs Kalmijn Department of Sociology,Utrecht University,Utrecht,The Netherlands; e-mail:m.kalmijn@fsw.ruu.nl 30'SMOIAalenuue'm woy popeojumod'IZp-S6E:Z8661 'Jo1oS 'Aay nuuv KEY WORDS:marriage markets,marriage,mate selection,assortative mating,endogamy ABSTRACT People have a tendency to marry within their social group or to marry a per- son who is close to them in status.Although many characteristics play a role in the choice of a spouse,sociologists have most often examined endogamy and homogamy with respect to race/ethnicity,religion,and socioeconomic status.I first give an overview of hypotheses on the causes of endogamy and homogamy.The various hypotheses that have been suggested in the litera- ture can be distinguished as arguments about three more general factors:(a) the preferences of marriage candidates for certain characteristics in a spouse, (b)the interference of"third parties"in the selection process,and(c)the con- straints of the marriage market in which candidates are searching for a spouse.Second,I summarize empirical research by answering four ques- tions:(a)To what extent are groups endogamous and how do groups differ in this respect?(b)How has endogamy changed over time?(c)Which factors are related to endogamy?(d)How do various dimensions of partner choice coincide?Third,I discuss strengths and weaknesses of past research.Strengths include the mass of descriptive work that has been done and the development of a multifaceted theoretical perspective which gives sociological theorizing an edge over psychological and economic theories of partner choice.Weak- nesses include the lack of standardization of methods in describing patterns and trends and the relatively weak integration of empirical and theoretical work. 395 0360-0572/98/0815-0395S08.00

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998. 24:395–421 Copyright 1998 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY: Causes, Patterns, Trends Matthijs Kalmijn Department of Sociology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands; e-mail: m.kalmijn@fsw.ruu.nl KEY WORDS: marriage markets, marriage, mate selection, assortative mating, endogamy ABSTRACT People have a tendency to marry within their social group or to marry a per￾son who is close to them in status. Although many characteristics play a role in the choice of a spouse, sociologists have most often examined endogamy and homogamy with respect to race/ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic status. I first give an overview of hypotheses on the causes of endogamy and homogamy. The various hypotheses that have been suggested in the litera￾ture can be distinguished as arguments about three more general factors: (a) the preferences of marriage candidates for certain characteristics in a spouse, (b) the interference of “third parties” in the selection process, and (c) the con￾straints of the marriage market in which candidates are searching for a spouse. Second, I summarize empirical research by answering four ques￾tions: (a) To what extent are groups endogamous and how do groups differ in this respect? (b) How has endogamy changed over time? (c) Which factors are related to endogamy? (d) How do various dimensions of partner choice coincide? Third, I discuss strengths and weaknesses of past research. Strengths include the mass of descriptive work that has been done and the development of a multifaceted theoretical perspective which gives sociological theorizing an edge over psychological and economic theories of partner choice. Weak￾nesses include the lack of standardization of methods in describing patterns and trends and the relatively weak integration of empirical and theoretical work. 0360-0572/98/0815-0395$08.00 395 Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998.24:395-421. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

396 KALMIJN INTRODUCTION Since the beginning of this century,sociologists have described patterns of part- ner choice and have tried to explain why people marry within their group(en- dogamy)and why people marry persons close in status(homogamy).The re- search literature can be divided into three traditions,depending on which type of characteristic is considered.Research on ethnic and racial intermarriage originated in immigrant countries such as the United States and is motivated by the question of whether the various nationality groups would integrate with one another and with the original population(Drachsler 1920;Wirth Gold- hamer 1944).Research on religious intermarriage has been done both in and outside the United States and has been concerned with the extent to which churches control the life choices of their members and the degree to which re- ligious involvement translates into the membership of"communal groups" 'MA wo poppouMo1-6:8661010S (Kennedy 1944).Research on socioeconomic homogamy was developed by stratification researchers who used marriage patterns in conjunction with mo- bility patterns to describe how open stratification systems are(Glass 1954). Although the underlying issues are diverse,one common theme is that all traditions characterize social differentiation by describing patterns of social interaction.Building on the Weberian notion of status group closure,students have argued that interaction between social groups provides a fundamental way to describe the group boundaries that make up the social structure.Be- cause marriage is an intimate and often long-term relationship,intermarriage or heterogamy not only reveals the existence of interaction across group boundaries,it also shows that members of different groups accept each other as social equals.Intermarriage can thus be regarded as an intimate link between reyaueys q pop social groups;conversely,endogamy or homogamy can be regarded as a form of group closure. Another common theme lies in the consequences ofintermarriage.First,in- termarriage decreases the salience of cultural distinctions in future generations because the children of mixed marriages are less likely to identify themselves 具量 with a single group.Although mixed couples may socialize their children into the culture of a single group,these children are less likely to identify with that group when intermarriage in society is common.Second,by intermarrying,in- dividuals may lose the negative attitudes they have toward other groups.Al- though personal interaction between groups sometimes fosters conflicts by making economic and cultural differences more apparent,if the relationship is intimate,interaction gives people an opportunity to realize the individual vari- ety among the members of another group and,in doing so,may ultimately weaken their prejudices and stereotypes.Because intermarriage often con- nects the social networks of the two spouses,this applies to a range of outgroup members and not just to the immediate partners

INTRODUCTION Since the beginning of this century, sociologists have described patterns of part￾ner choice and have tried to explain why people marry within their group (en￾dogamy) and why people marry persons close in status (homogamy). The re￾search literature can be divided into three traditions, depending on which type of characteristic is considered. Research on ethnic and racial intermarriage originated in immigrant countries such as the United States and is motivated by the question of whether the various nationality groups would integrate with one another and with the original population (Drachsler 1920; Wirth & Gold￾hamer 1944). Research on religious intermarriage has been done both in and outside the United States and has been concerned with the extent to which churches control the life choices of their members and the degree to which re￾ligious involvement translates into the membership of “communal groups” (Kennedy 1944). Research on socioeconomic homogamy was developed by stratification researchers who used marriage patterns in conjunction with mo￾bility patterns to describe how open stratification systems are (Glass 1954). Although the underlying issues are diverse, one common theme is that all traditions characterize social differentiation by describing patterns of social interaction. Building on the Weberian notion of status group closure, students have argued that interaction between social groups provides a fundamental way to describe the group boundaries that make up the social structure. Be￾cause marriage is an intimate and often long-term relationship, intermarriage or heterogamy not only reveals the existence of interaction across group boundaries, it also shows that members of different groups accept each other as social equals. Intermarriage can thus be regarded as an intimate link between social groups; conversely, endogamy or homogamy can be regarded as a form of group closure. Another common theme lies in the consequences of intermarriage. First, in￾termarriage decreases the salience of cultural distinctions in future generations because the children of mixed marriages are less likely to identify themselves with a single group. Although mixed couples may socialize their children into the culture of a single group, these children are less likely to identify with that group when intermarriage in society is common. Second, by intermarrying, in￾dividuals may lose the negative attitudes they have toward other groups. Al￾though personal interaction between groups sometimes fosters conflicts by making economic and cultural differences more apparent, if the relationship is intimate, interaction gives people an opportunity to realize the individual vari￾ety among the members of another group and, in doing so, may ultimately weaken their prejudices and stereotypes. Because intermarriage often con￾nects the social networks of the two spouses, this applies to a range of outgroup members and not just to the immediate partners. 396 KALMIJN Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998.24:395-421. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY 397 In short,what makes intermarriage sociologically relevant lies in its inher- ent dynamic:It is not just a reflection of the boundaries that currently separate groups in society,it also bears the potential of cultural and socioeconomic change.While marriage patterns are in this sense telling social indicators,they do not tell us everything.First,if members of two groups do not marry one an- other,it does not necessarily mean that both groups are closed.It takes two to marry,and if one group is closed while the other is open,endogamy may still prevail.Research on marriage is less informative in this respect than,for in- stance,research on individual racial prejudice.In a similar vein,homogamy tells a somewhat ambiguous story about the preferences and prejudices of status groups.Homogamy will occur if people prefer to marry into high-status groups,but it will also occur when people prefer to marry status-equals.In high-status groups,preferences for high-status spouses and preferences for status-equals are similar,but in lower-status groups,these are different. Second,marriage patterns result from both preference and opportunity.Op- portunity to marry within the group depends on many factors,such as residen- 9/LZ/60 tial segregation,the composition of local marriage markets,group size,and so on.As a result,endogamy does not necessarily point to a personally felt social distance toward a certain outgroup.Such preferences play a role,but to what extent they determine the actual choices people make is an empirical question. Marriage patterns simply tell us which groups interact with whom,and while this is an important piece of information,they do not tell us why. A third and final limitation of marriage patterns lies in demographic trends Declining marriage rates,the rise of cohabitation,and the increase in divorce 1-S6E:8661 1010S suggest that it is not always valid to treat marriage patterns as indicators of dif- ferentiation in society as a whole.Some of these problems can be solved more easily than others.The rise of cohabitation poses no real problem because one can often include cohabiting couples in the analysis.Declining marriage rates are also less of a problem because they are largely the result of marriage de- 2 lays;the vast majority of a given birth cohort eventually marries.The rise of divorce is more problematic,because intermarriage and divorce are often posi- 具量 tively related.A high rate of ethnic intermarriage may point to open social groups,but if mixed marriages are more likely to break up,such a conclusion would need further study. In the past decades,researchers have described patterns of intermarriage, examined individual variations in intermarriage,and assessed changes in in- termarriage over time.In addition,both theoretical and empirical studies have developed hypotheses about why people marry within their group and why some do while others do not.Because such hypotheses are often not tested di- rectly,I divide my review into a theoretical and an empirical section.The goal of the theoretical section is to review micro-and macro-level hypotheses about the causes of intermarriage and homogamy and to put these into a general theo-

In short, what makes intermarriage sociologically relevant lies in its inher￾ent dynamic: It is not just a reflection of the boundaries that currently separate groups in society, it also bears the potential of cultural and socioeconomic change. While marriage patterns are in this sense telling social indicators, they do not tell us everything. First, if members of two groups do not marry one an￾other, it does not necessarily mean that both groups are closed. It takes two to marry, and if one group is closed while the other is open, endogamy may still prevail. Research on marriage is less informative in this respect than, for in￾stance, research on individual racial prejudice. In a similar vein, homogamy tells a somewhat ambiguous story about the preferences and prejudices of status groups. Homogamy will occur if people prefer to marry into high-status groups, but it will also occur when people prefer to marry status-equals. In high-status groups, preferences for high-status spouses and preferences for status-equals are similar, but in lower-status groups, these are different. Second, marriage patterns result from both preference and opportunity. Op￾portunity to marry within the group depends on many factors, such as residen￾tial segregation, the composition of local marriage markets, group size, and so on. As a result, endogamy does not necessarily point to a personally felt social distance toward a certain outgroup. Such preferences play a role, but to what extent they determine the actual choices people make is an empirical question. Marriage patterns simply tell us which groups interact with whom, and while this is an important piece of information, they do not tell us why. A third and final limitation of marriage patterns lies in demographic trends. Declining marriage rates, the rise of cohabitation, and the increase in divorce suggest that it is not always valid to treat marriage patterns as indicators of dif￾ferentiation in society as a whole. Some of these problems can be solved more easily than others. The rise of cohabitation poses no real problem because one can often include cohabiting couples in the analysis. Declining marriage rates are also less of a problem because they are largely the result of marriage de￾lays; the vast majority of a given birth cohort eventually marries. The rise of divorce is more problematic, because intermarriage and divorce are often posi￾tively related. A high rate of ethnic intermarriage may point to open social groups, but if mixed marriages are more likely to break up, such a conclusion would need further study. In the past decades, researchers have described patterns of intermarriage, examined individual variations in intermarriage, and assessed changes in in￾termarriage over time. In addition, both theoretical and empirical studies have developed hypotheses about why people marry within their group and why some do while others do not. Because such hypotheses are often not tested di￾rectly, I divide my review into a theoretical and an empirical section. The goal of the theoretical section is to review micro- and macro-level hypotheses about the causes of intermarriage and homogamy and to put these into a general theo￾INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY 397 Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998.24:395-421. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

398 KALMIJN retical framework.The goal of the empirical section is to summarize patterns variations,and trends in intermarriage.I focus on the three main sociological group characteristics (i.e.race and ethnicity,religion,and socioeconomic status),I limit myself to Western societies,and I discuss studies conducted in the last decade. THEORETICAL WORK ON INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY Marriage patterns arise from the interplay between three social forces:the preferences of individuals for certain characteristics in a spouse,the influence of the social group of which they are members,and the constraints of the mar- 8J0'SMOIAJI enuue'MMM wog riage market in which they are searching for a spouse (Kalmijn 1991b).Al- though these factors represent analytically distinct hypotheses,they have most often been regarded as complementary elements of a single theory,and that is what distinguishes the sociological perspective from economic or psychologi- cal theories on partner choice (e.g.Winch 1958). Preferences of Marriage Candidates 含 To understand aggregate patterns of marriage selection,researchers use the concept of a marriage market.Unmarried men and women operate within a marriage market where each individual considers a set of potential spouses. Potential spouses are evaluated on the basis of the resources they have to offer and individuals compete with each other for the spouse they want most by of- fering their own resources in return.Several kinds of resources obviously play a role in the choice of a spouse,but sociologists have mostly focused on socio- economic and cultural resources.When married,spouses pool these resources to produce family goods,such as economic well-being,status,social confir- mation,and affection. SOCIOECONOMIC RESOURCES Socioeconomic resources are defined as re- sources that produce economic well-being and status.Economic well-being is 具量 shared by the family members and status is granted to the family as a unit rather than to its individual members.As a result,the income and status of one spouse contribute to the income and status of the other by raising the income and status of the family.People maximize their income and status by searching for a spouse with attractive socioeconomic resources.The outcome of this competition is that the most attractive candidates select among themselves while the least attractive candidates have to rely on one another.Competition for socioeconomic resources on the marriage market thus leads to an aggregate pattern of homogamy. The nature of this competition varies with the role women play in society When marriage is based on the benefits that stem from the division of paid and

retical framework. The goal of the empirical section is to summarize patterns, variations, and trends in intermarriage. I focus on the three main sociological group characteristics (i.e. race and ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic status), I limit myself to Western societies, and I discuss studies conducted in the last decade. THEORETICAL WORK ON INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY Marriage patterns arise from the interplay between three social forces: the preferences of individuals for certain characteristics in a spouse, the influence of the social group of which they are members, and the constraints of the mar￾riage market in which they are searching for a spouse (Kalmijn 1991b). Al￾though these factors represent analytically distinct hypotheses, they have most often been regarded as complementary elements of a single theory, and that is what distinguishes the sociological perspective from economic or psychologi￾cal theories on partner choice (e.g. Winch 1958). Preferences of Marriage Candidates To understand aggregate patterns of marriage selection, researchers use the concept of a marriage market. Unmarried men and women operate within a marriage market where each individual considers a set of potential spouses. Potential spouses are evaluated on the basis of the resources they have to offer and individuals compete with each other for the spouse they want most by of￾fering their own resources in return. Several kinds of resources obviously play a role in the choice of a spouse, but sociologists have mostly focused on socio￾economic and cultural resources. When married, spouses pool these resources to produce family goods, such as economic well-being, status, social confir￾mation, and affection. SOCIOECONOMIC RESOURCES Socioeconomic resources are defined as re￾sources that produce economic well-being and status. Economic well-being is shared by the family members and status is granted to the family as a unit rather than to its individual members. As a result, the income and status of one spouse contribute to the income and status of the other by raising the income and status of the family. People maximize their income and status by searching for a spouse with attractive socioeconomic resources. The outcome of this competition is that the most attractive candidates select among themselves while the least attractive candidates have to rely on one another. Competition for socioeconomic resources on the marriage market thus leads to an aggregate pattern of homogamy. The nature of this competition varies with the role women play in society. When marriage is based on the benefits that stem from the division of paid and 398 KALMIJN Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998.24:395-421. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY 399 domestic labor in the household,prevailing gender differences in earnings give men a comparative advantage in productive labor so that the wife's time is used more productively when it is spent on household labor.As a result,men and women exchange paid and domestic labor resources.Similar arguments have been made with regard to status and prestige.When the status of the fam- ily depends primarily on the occupation of the husband,there will be an ex- change of male prestige and female qualities in other respects,such as class background,physical attractiveness,and cultural participation (Jacobs Fur- stenberg 1986;Stevens et al 1990;Uunk 1996). Both types of exchange suggest that men,unlike women,do not compete among themselves for female socioeconomic resources in the marriage mar- ket.There are good reasons to believe that this has changed.An increasing number of married women participate in the labor market and married women's work is now less often motivated by temporary economic needs of 0'SMOIAIenu MA wo popeojuMod'I-S6E:8661 o1oS the family.Several authors believe that these changes have made women's so- cioeconomic resources increasingly attractive to men.The wife's human capi- 9922/60 tal may facilitate the husband's access to networks that are helpful in his ca- reer,her earnings may subsidize his human capital investments,and the eco- nomic security she provides may lessen his need to settle for short-term career benefits,thus increasing his opportunity to choose more attractive,long-term career objectives.Because female labor is now often the reflection of women's desire to work outside the home,rather than a reflection of the economic needs of the family,the wife's socioeconomic resources may also become increas- ingly important for the status of the family (Davis 1984). CULTURAL RESOURCES While the importance of socioeconomic resources is reyaueys q pop based on a preference to marry a resourceful spouse,independent of one's own resources,the role of cultural resources is based on a preference to marry someone who is similar.Preferences for cultural similarity have been ad- 2 dressed most extensively in the social psychological literature on personal at- traction(Byrne 1971).Similarity of values and opinions leads to mutual con- 具量 firmation ofeach other's behavior and worldviews,similarity of taste is attrac- tive because it enlarges opportunities to participate in joint activities,and simi- larity of knowledge creates a common basis for conversation,which enhances mutual understanding. Although originally developed to explain attraction between strangers in day-to-day interaction,these notions have also been applied to marriage(Di- Maggio Mohr 1985;Kalmijn 1994).Because cultural similarity leads to per- sonal attraction,it is a prerequisite for getting involved with someone.Because of its instrumental effects,cultural similarity also encourages people to estab- lish a long-term relationship.Since many activities in marriage are joint,such as the raising of children,the purchase of a house and other consumer durables

domestic labor in the household, prevailing gender differences in earnings give men a comparative advantage in productive labor so that the wife’s time is used more productively when it is spent on household labor. As a result, men and women exchange paid and domestic labor resources. Similar arguments have been made with regard to status and prestige. When the status of the fam￾ily depends primarily on the occupation of the husband, there will be an ex￾change of male prestige and female qualities in other respects, such as class background, physical attractiveness, and cultural participation (Jacobs & Fur￾stenberg 1986; Stevens et al 1990; Uunk 1996). Both types of exchange suggest that men, unlike women, do not compete among themselves for female socioeconomic resources in the marriage mar￾ket. There are good reasons to believe that this has changed. An increasing number of married women participate in the labor market and married women’s work is now less often motivated by temporary economic needs of the family. Several authors believe that these changes have made women’s so￾cioeconomic resources increasingly attractive to men. The wife’s human capi￾tal may facilitate the husband’s access to networks that are helpful in his ca￾reer, her earnings may subsidize his human capital investments, and the eco￾nomic security she provides may lessen his need to settle for short-term career benefits, thus increasing his opportunity to choose more attractive, long-term career objectives. Because female labor is now often the reflection of women’s desire to work outside the home, rather than a reflection of the economic needs of the family, the wife’s socioeconomic resources may also become increas￾ingly important for the status of the family (Davis 1984). CULTURAL RESOURCES While the importance of socioeconomic resources is based on a preference to marry a resourceful spouse, independent of one’s own resources, the role of cultural resources is based on a preference to marry someone who is similar. Preferences for cultural similarity have been ad￾dressed most extensively in the social psychological literature on personal at￾traction (Byrne 1971). Similarity of values and opinions leads to mutual con￾firmation of each other’s behavior and worldviews, similarity of taste is attrac￾tive because it enlarges opportunities to participate in joint activities, and simi￾larity of knowledge creates a common basis for conversation, which enhances mutual understanding. Although originally developed to explain attraction between strangers in day-to-day interaction, these notions have also been applied to marriage (Di￾Maggio & Mohr 1985; Kalmijn 1994). Because cultural similarity leads to per￾sonal attraction, it is a prerequisite for getting involved with someone. Because of its instrumental effects, cultural similarity also encourages people to estab￾lish a long-term relationship. Since many activities in marriage are joint, such as the raising of children, the purchase of a house and other consumer durables, INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY 399 Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998.24:395-421. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

400 KALMIJN and the spending of leisure time,dissimilarity in taste would complicate these shared activities.More generally,people prefer to marry someone who has similar cultural resources because this enables them to develop a common life- style in marriage that produces social confirmation and affection. PREFERENCES AND HOMOGAMY Preferences for socioeconomic and cultural resources do not by themselves translate into homogamy and endogamy with respect to social characteristics.Some authors argue that social characteristics are correlated with such resources,and that homogamy or endogamy is the un- intended by-product of individual preferences for resources in a partner.This argument has often been made for educational homogamy,because education is not only strongly related to income and status,but also to taste,values,and lifestyles (Kalmijn 1991a).Similar arguments can be made for horizontally differentiated groups,such as ethnic groups,although in this case,endogamy is probably more the result of preferences for cultural similarity and not so much the result of competition for economically attractive spouses. Other authors argue that social characteristics are more than simply corre- lates of the resources partners bring to the marriage market.Characteristics 多 such as education,occupation,race,and ethnicity are also seen as badges that individuals wear to show others what kind of person they are.In this perspec- tive,spouse selection is regarded as a filter process.In the first step,people de- velop a network of friends,acquaintances,and possibly marriage candidates with whom they share some objective social characteristic.In the second step, people find their spouse by interacting within these homogeneous networks. The second step is also the phase in which psychological characteristics come into play,but at that time,homogamy with respect to objective social charac- teristics is already insured (Murstein 1976). Third Parties A second hypothesis about why people marry within their group focuses on 2 people who are not directly involved in the marriage.Because mixed mar- riages may threaten the internal cohesion and homogeneity of the group,"third 具量 parties"have an incentive to keep new generations from marrying exoga- mously.There are two ways in which third parties prevent exogamy:by group identification and by group sanctions. GROUP IDENTIFICATION Children are typically brought up with a sense of group identification.Identification either takes the form of an awareness of a common social history,what is sometimes called a "sense of peoplehood" (Gordon 1964),or it can take the form of a more psychological sense of being different from others.The stronger such feelings of group identification,the more people have internalized norms of endogamy,and the more likely it is that they marry homogamously or endogamously.The notion of group identi-

and the spending of leisure time, dissimilarity in taste would complicate these shared activities. More generally, people prefer to marry someone who has similar cultural resources because this enables them to develop a common life￾style in marriage that produces social confirmation and affection. PREFERENCES AND HOMOGAMY Preferences for socioeconomic and cultural resources do not by themselves translate into homogamy and endogamy with respect to social characteristics. Some authors argue that social characteristics are correlated with such resources, and that homogamy or endogamy is the un￾intended by-product of individual preferences for resources in a partner. This argument has often been made for educational homogamy, because education is not only strongly related to income and status, but also to taste, values, and lifestyles (Kalmijn 1991a). Similar arguments can be made for horizontally differentiated groups, such as ethnic groups, although in this case, endogamy is probably more the result of preferences for cultural similarity and not so much the result of competition for economically attractive spouses. Other authors argue that social characteristics are more than simply corre￾lates of the resources partners bring to the marriage market. Characteristics such as education, occupation, race, and ethnicity are also seen as badges that individuals wear to show others what kind of person they are. In this perspec￾tive, spouse selection is regarded as a filter process. In the first step, people de￾velop a network of friends, acquaintances, and possibly marriage candidates with whom they share some objective social characteristic. In the second step, people find their spouse by interacting within these homogeneous networks. The second step is also the phase in which psychological characteristics come into play, but at that time, homogamy with respect to objective social charac￾teristics is already insured (Murstein 1976). Third Parties A second hypothesis about why people marry within their group focuses on people who are not directly involved in the marriage. Because mixed mar￾riages may threaten the internal cohesion and homogeneity of the group, “third parties” have an incentive to keep new generations from marrying exoga￾mously. There are two ways in which third parties prevent exogamy: by group identification and by group sanctions. GROUP IDENTIFICATION Children are typically brought up with a sense of group identification. Identification either takes the form of an awareness of a common social history, what is sometimes called a “sense of peoplehood” (Gordon 1964), or it can take the form of a more psychological sense of being different from others. The stronger such feelings of group identification, the more people have internalized norms of endogamy, and the more likely it is that they marry homogamously or endogamously. The notion of group identi- 400 KALMIJN Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998.24:395-421. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY 401 fication has been especially important for racial and ethnic groups,where norms ofendogamy are believed to be firmly internalized(Merton 1941).Such norms,however,may also apply to other kinds of groups such as social classes and educational groups. How strongly younger generations identify themselves with the group de- pends to a great extent on the homogeneity of the networks in which they are em- bedded.When adolescents live in neighborhoods that are homogeneous with respect to the social and cultural characteristics of their parents,they are more likely to develop a sense of belonging to that group.While residential segrega- tion in urban areas hampers opportunities to intermarry directly,as is dis- cussed later,it also reduced exogamy by intensifying feelings of group solidar- ity.Identification with the origin group is believed to be weakened by higher education.Owing to the emphasis on individual achievement and universalis- tic principles in higher education,the college-educated may be less likely to 'MA wo poppouMo1-6:8661010S identify themselves with their social and cultural roots(Hwang et al 1995). GROUP SANCTIONS Even if people have not internalized norms of endog- amy,they may still refrain from marrying exogamously because of the sanc- tions third parties apply.The three most important examples of parties that sanction intermarriage are the family,the church,and the state.Although in Western societies parental control over children's marriage decisions is lim- ited,there are still ways in which parents can interfere.They set up meetings with potential spouses,they play the role of matchmaker,they give advice and opinions about the candidates,and they may withdraw support in the early years of the child's marriage.Nevertheless,they do not have strong sanctions when children decide against their will. reyaueys q pop Somewhat stronger sanctions are provided by the church.Both the Catholic church and various Protestant denominations have denounced interfaith mar- riages for centuries,although the nature and strength of their disapproval have 2 changed over time.Religious institutions attempt to control intermarriage in part because they are competing for members.Religious intermarriage entails 具量 the risk of losing members and may weaken church attachment in future gen- erations.If interfaith marriages occur anyway,it is not always in the interest of the church to apply sanctions because the competing church may accept the marriage and hence gain members.This helps explain why the Roman Catho- lic church,for example,has often accepted interfaith marriages on the condi- tion that the children be raised as Catholics.Because of competing pressures, however,spouses in interfaith marriages often decide not to raise their children in a religious fashion.If this occurs,both religious institutions stand to lose strength in society. The strongest sanctions against intermarriage have been provided by the state.Laws on racial intermarriage in the United States-abolished in

fication has been especially important for racial and ethnic groups, where norms of endogamy are believed to be firmly internalized (Merton 1941). Such norms, however, may also apply to other kinds of groups such as social classes and educational groups. How strongly younger generations identify themselves with the group de￾pends to a great extent on the homogeneity of the networks in which they are em￾bedded. When adolescents live in neighborhoods that are homogeneous with respect to the social and cultural characteristics of their parents, they are more likely to develop a sense of belonging to that group. While residential segrega￾tion in urban areas hampers opportunities to intermarry directly, as is dis￾cussed later, it also reduced exogamy by intensifying feelings of group solidar￾ity. Identification with the origin group is believed to be weakened by higher education. Owing to the emphasis on individual achievement and universalis￾tic principles in higher education, the college-educated may be less likely to identify themselves with their social and cultural roots (Hwang et al 1995). GROUP SANCTIONS Even if people have not internalized norms of endog￾amy, they may still refrain from marrying exogamously because of the sanc￾tions third parties apply. The three most important examples of parties that sanction intermarriage are the family, the church, and the state. Although in Western societies parental control over children’s marriage decisions is lim￾ited, there are still ways in which parents can interfere. They set up meetings with potential spouses, they play the role of matchmaker, they give advice and opinions about the candidates, and they may withdraw support in the early years of the child’s marriage. Nevertheless, they do not have strong sanctions when children decide against their will. Somewhat stronger sanctions are provided by the church. Both the Catholic church and various Protestant denominations have denounced interfaith mar￾riages for centuries, although the nature and strength of their disapproval have changed over time. Religious institutions attempt to control intermarriage in part because they are competing for members. Religious intermarriage entails the risk of losing members and may weaken church attachment in future gen￾erations. If interfaith marriages occur anyway, it is not always in the interest of the church to apply sanctions because the competing church may accept the marriage and hence gain members. This helps explain why the Roman Catho￾lic church, for example, has often accepted interfaith marriages on the condi￾tion that the children be raised as Catholics. Because of competing pressures, however, spouses in interfaith marriages often decide not to raise their children in a religious fashion. If this occurs, both religious institutions stand to lose strength in society. The strongest sanctions against intermarriage have been provided by the state. Laws on racial intermarriage in the United States—abolished in INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY 401 Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998.24:395-421. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

402 KALMIJN 1967-are a well-known example(Davis 1991).When slavery was abolished, the gradual decline in formal inequality of blacks and whites went hand-in- hand with a growing anxiety about the social boundary between the races,and this anxiety was stronger when contacts were more intimate.Interracial dating and marriage were condemned with great vigor,and strong social norms emerged against interracial contacts with possible sexual undertones,such as interracial dancing and swimming.The emerging doctrine of no social equal- ity was formalized in legislation that segregated the races in public facilities (Jim Crow laws)and legislation that controlled their sexual and marital con- tacts (antimiscegenation laws). Marriage Markets Endogamy and homogamy are not only governed by individual-and group- 'MA wo poppouMo1-6:8661010S level factors,but also by structural arrangements.The chances to marry en- dogamously are higher the more often one meets people within the group and the more often one interacts with group members on a day-to-day basis.Con- tact opportunities are shaped by several structural arrangements.Some studies 多 focus on the demographic composition of the population as a whole,other studies examine regional distributions of groups,and yet other studies analyze smaller,functional settings,such as the school and the workplace. THE LOGIC OF NUMBERS When interaction occurs randomly,the chance that a woman in a certain group marries someone in her own group equals the pro- portion of men who are in that group.As a result,members of a small group will have lower chances of marrying endogamously than members of a larger group.The effect of group size implies that endogamy is negatively related to the degree of heterogeneity of a population(Blau Schwartz 1984).To ex- plain this,one can think of two populations,each consisting of two groups. One population is heterogeneous and has 50%in each group(e.g.100 in group A,100 in group B),while the other is homogeneous and has 90%in one group and 10%in the other (e.g.180 in group A,20 in group B).Both populations 具量 have equal numbers of males and females in each group.In the heterogeneous population,the number of women expected to marry within the group will be 0.5 x 50=25 for A and 0.5 x 50=25 for B,which boils down to 50%marrying within the group.In the homogeneous population,the number of women ex- pected to marry within the group will be 0.9 x 90=81 for A and 0.1 x 10=1 for B,which boils down to 82%.This shows that in a heterogeneous population, endogamy is lower than in a homogeneous population,provided that marriage is random. THE GEOGRAPHY OF GROUPS The chance to encounter a member of one's own group does not depend on group size alone but also on the way a group is

1967—are a well-known example (Davis 1991). When slavery was abolished, the gradual decline in formal inequality of blacks and whites went hand-in￾hand with a growing anxiety about the social boundary between the races, and this anxiety was stronger when contacts were more intimate. Interracial dating and marriage were condemned with great vigor, and strong social norms emerged against interracial contacts with possible sexual undertones, such as interracial dancing and swimming. The emerging doctrine of no social equal￾ity was formalized in legislation that segregated the races in public facilities (Jim Crow laws) and legislation that controlled their sexual and marital con￾tacts (antimiscegenation laws). Marriage Markets Endogamy and homogamy are not only governed by individual- and group￾level factors, but also by structural arrangements. The chances to marry en￾dogamously are higher the more often one meets people within the group and the more often one interacts with group members on a day-to-day basis. Con￾tact opportunities are shaped by several structural arrangements. Some studies focus on the demographic composition of the population as a whole, other studies examine regional distributions of groups, and yet other studies analyze smaller, functional settings, such as the school and the workplace. THE LOGIC OF NUMBERS When interaction occurs randomly, the chance that a woman in a certain group marries someone in her own group equals the pro￾portion of men who are in that group. As a result, members of a small group will have lower chances of marrying endogamously than members of a larger group. The effect of group size implies that endogamy is negatively related to the degree of heterogeneity of a population (Blau & Schwartz 1984). To ex￾plain this, one can think of two populations, each consisting of two groups. One population is heterogeneous and has 50% in each group (e.g. 100 in group A, 100 in group B), while the other is homogeneous and has 90% in one group and 10% in the other (e.g. 180 in group A, 20 in group B). Both populations have equal numbers of males and females in each group. In the heterogeneous population, the number of women expected to marry within the group will be 0.5 x 50 = 25 for A and 0.5 x 50 = 25 for B, which boils down to 50% marrying within the group. In the homogeneous population, the number of women ex￾pected to marry within the group will be 0.9 x 90 = 81 for A and 0.1 x 10 = 1 for B, which boils down to 82%. This shows that in a heterogeneous population, endogamy is lower than in a homogeneous population, provided that marriage is random. THE GEOGRAPHY OF GROUPS The chance to encounter a member of one’s own group does not depend on group size alone but also on the way a group is 402 KALMIJN Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998.24:395-421. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY 403 dispersed geographically (Blau Schwartz 1984).Groups that are concen- trated in specific regions of the country generally have more opportunity to marry endogamously than groups that are not(Lieberson Waters 1988).Ex- amples are common in the literature on ethnic groups,e.g.Asian-Americans in California,Jewish-Americans in New York City,or Catholics and Protestants separated in the southern and northern parts of the Netherlands.An additional reason why it is important to consider the geography of groups is that isolation may be correlated with group size.Smaller groups are often more isolated. Jewish-Americans,for example,may have partly overcome the constraints of their small group size through geographic concentration.They are a small group in a large country,but a large group in a small region. Although relaxing the assumption of an even geographic distribution is more realistic,it also leads to new problems.If one controls for geographic segregation-by calculating endogamy rates for specific regions,for in- 'MA wo poppouMo1-6:8661010S stance-one implicitly assumes that people base their decision to live in a given area on factors that are independent of ingroup preferences.This is not always realistic.For instance,there is much regional concentration of Italian- Americans in the United States,but even though this can in part be attributed to 多 their particular immigration history and occupational opportunities,the prefer- ences of Italian-Americans play a role as well (Lieberson 1980).While it is dif- ficult to make a precise distinction between preferences and constraints,it is generally true that the smaller the marriage market one studies,the more the structure of the market is affected by preferences and the less by constraints. LOCAL MARRIAGE MARKETS Unmarried people do not just wander around a region looking for a spouse;they spend most of their life in small and func- reyaueys q pop tional places,such as neighborhoods,schools,workplaces,bars,and clubs Such"local marriage markets"are often socially segregated,and that is why they are important for explaining marriage patterns.In the sociological litera- 2 ture,three local markets have been considered most frequently:the school,the neighborhood,and the workplace.Of these three,schools are considered the 具量 most efficient markets because they are homogeneous with respect to age and heterogeneous with respect to sex.Workplaces are considered less efficient, but increased participation of women in the labor market and declining occu- pational sex segregation suggest that this may have changed(Davis 1984).Al- though it has not often been studied where couples meet,a French study shows that the settings sociologists analyze are not the most common meeting places. Among young French couples,fewer than 5%met in the neighborhood,fewer than 10%met at school,and just over 10%met at work(Bozon Heran 1989). To clarify how local marriage markets affect homogamy,authors have looked at the composition of these markets with respect to social characteris- tics.What distinguishes the neighborhood from the school and the workplace

dispersed geographically (Blau & Schwartz 1984). Groups that are concen￾trated in specific regions of the country generally have more opportunity to marry endogamously than groups that are not (Lieberson & Waters 1988). Ex￾amples are common in the literature on ethnic groups, e.g. Asian-Americans in California, Jewish-Americans in New York City, or Catholics and Protestants separated in the southern and northern parts of the Netherlands. An additional reason why it is important to consider the geography of groups is that isolation may be correlated with group size. Smaller groups are often more isolated. Jewish-Americans, for example, may have partly overcome the constraints of their small group size through geographic concentration. They are a small group in a large country, but a large group in a small region. Although relaxing the assumption of an even geographic distribution is more realistic, it also leads to new problems. If one controls for geographic segregation—by calculating endogamy rates for specific regions, for in￾stance—one implicitly assumes that people base their decision to live in a given area on factors that are independent of ingroup preferences. This is not always realistic. For instance, there is much regional concentration of Italian￾Americans in the United States, but even though this can in part be attributed to their particular immigration history and occupational opportunities, the prefer￾ences of Italian-Americans play a role as well (Lieberson 1980). While it is dif￾ficult to make a precise distinction between preferences and constraints, it is generally true that the smaller the marriage market one studies, the more the structure of the market is affected by preferences and the less by constraints. LOCAL MARRIAGE MARKETS Unmarried people do not just wander around a region looking for a spouse; they spend most of their life in small and func￾tional places, such as neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, bars, and clubs. Such “local marriage markets” are often socially segregated, and that is why they are important for explaining marriage patterns. In the sociological litera￾ture, three local markets have been considered most frequently: the school, the neighborhood, and the workplace. Of these three, schools are considered the most efficient markets because they are homogeneous with respect to age and heterogeneous with respect to sex. Workplaces are considered less efficient, but increased participation of women in the labor market and declining occu￾pational sex segregation suggest that this may have changed (Davis 1984). Al￾though it has not often been studied where couples meet, a French study shows that the settings sociologists analyze are not the most common meeting places. Among young French couples, fewer than 5% met in the neighborhood, fewer than 10% met at school, and just over 10% met at work (Bozon & Heran 1989). To clarify how local marriage markets affect homogamy, authors have looked at the composition of these markets with respect to social characteris￾tics. What distinguishes the neighborhood from the school and the workplace INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY 403 Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998.24:395-421. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only

404 KALMIJN is that it is homogeneous with respect to factors such as ethnicity,race,reli- gion,and family background,i.e.characteristics transmitted by parents(Lie- berson 1980).Schools are less homogeneous in ascribed characteristics,al- though there are exceptions,e.g.Catholic colleges and black colleges.At the same time,schools are not necessarily homogeneous with respect to educa- tional attainment.Differences in ultimate educational attainment are larger in high schools,for example,than in universities,simply because the educational system works like a funnel,particularly in the United States(Mare 1991).In general,however,it is expected that colleges promote educational homogamy more than neighborhoods do,while neighborhoods promote ethnic endogamy and homogamy of family background more than schools.Whether workplaces encourage homogamy highly depends on the type of work,but on average, they probably do not encourage socioeconomic homogamy as much as schools. 'MA wo poppouMo1-6:8661010S EMPIRICAL WORK ON INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY Empirical work has addressed four questions:(a)To what extent are groups endogamous or homogamous,and how do groups differ in these respects?(b) How have endogamy and homogamy changed over time?(c)Which factors are related to endogamy and homogamy,and in particular,what is the role of gender,education,and geographic regions and local marriage markets?(d) How do various dimensions of partner choice coincide?Before I summarize the main findings,I discuss how researchers have tackled these issues method- ologically. reyaueys q pop Measures and Models Intermarriage can be calculated for the stock of marriages at a given point in time(prevalence measures)or for people who marry in a given period of time (incidence measures).Incidence measures are generally preferable,in particu- lar if one analyzes trends.If the stock of marriages is used,one can analyze 具量 characteristics at the time of survey or characteristics at the time of marriage. The latter measures are more suitable than the former because some character- istics change after marriage.Because partners may become more alike during marriage-they may switch faith,for example,or influence each other's occu- pational career-current measures of homogamy tend to be biased upwardly. To describe intermarriage,various measures have been used.To explain these, it is helpful to consider the following marriage table. MEASURES The most general measure is the percentage of couples intermar- rying:(CBA+CAB)/N.When calculating group-specific measures,it makes a difference if one considers couples or individuals.The percentage of A-type

is that it is homogeneous with respect to factors such as ethnicity, race, reli￾gion, and family background, i.e. characteristics transmitted by parents (Lie￾berson 1980). Schools are less homogeneous in ascribed characteristics, al￾though there are exceptions, e.g. Catholic colleges and black colleges. At the same time, schools are not necessarily homogeneous with respect to educa￾tional attainment. Differences in ultimate educational attainment are larger in high schools, for example, than in universities, simply because the educational system works like a funnel, particularly in the United States (Mare 1991). In general, however, it is expected that colleges promote educational homogamy more than neighborhoods do, while neighborhoods promote ethnic endogamy and homogamy of family background more than schools. Whether workplaces encourage homogamy highly depends on the type of work, but on average, they probably do not encourage socioeconomic homogamy as much as schools. EMPIRICAL WORK ON INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY Empirical work has addressed four questions: (a) To what extent are groups endogamous or homogamous, and how do groups differ in these respects? (b) How have endogamy and homogamy changed over time? (c) Which factors are related to endogamy and homogamy, and in particular, what is the role of gender, education, and geographic regions and local marriage markets? (d) How do various dimensions of partner choice coincide? Before I summarize the main findings, I discuss how researchers have tackled these issues method￾ologically. Measures and Models Intermarriage can be calculated for the stock of marriages at a given point in time (prevalence measures) or for people who marry in a given period of time (incidence measures). Incidence measures are generally preferable, in particu￾lar if one analyzes trends. If the stock of marriages is used, one can analyze characteristics at the time of survey or characteristics at the time of marriage. The latter measures are more suitable than the former because some character￾istics change after marriage. Because partners may become more alike during marriage—they may switch faith, for example, or influence each other’s occu￾pational career—current measures of homogamy tend to be biased upwardly. To describe intermarriage, various measures have been used. To explain these, it is helpful to consider the following marriage table. MEASURES The most general measure is the percentage of couples intermar￾rying: (CBA+CAB)/N. When calculating group-specific measures, it makes a difference if one considers couples or individuals. The percentage of A-type 404 KALMIJN Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1998.24:395-421. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by Shanghai Jiaotong University on 09/27/16. For personal use only