《性别、亲密关系与社会》课程教学资源：The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Case number:09-2292 ANDREW J.CHERLIN Johns Hopkins PLTF/DEFT EXHIBIT NO.DIX49 Date admitted: The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage This article argues that marriage has under- when it is appropriate to discipline a child.I gone a process of deinstitutionalization a predicted that,over time,as remarriage after weakening of the social norms that define part- divorce became common,norms would begin ners'behavior-over the past few decades.Ex- to emerge conceming proper behavior in step- amples are presented involving the increasing families-for example,what kind of relationship number and complexity of cohabiting unions a stepfather should have with his stepchildren. and the emergence of same-sex marriage.Two In other words,I expected that remarriage transitions in the meaning of marriage that would become institutionalized,that it would occurred in the United States during the 20th become more like first marriage.But just the century have created the social context for opposite has happened.Remarriage has not deinstitutionalization.The first transition,noted become more like first marriage;rather,first by Ernest Burgess,was from the institutional marriage has become more like remarriage. marriage to the companionate marriage.The Instead of the institutionalization of remarriage, second transition was to the individualized mar- what has occurred over the past few decades is riage in which the emphasis on personal choice the deinstitutionalization of marriage.Yes,re- and self-development expanded.Although the marriage is an incomplete institution,but now, practical importance of marriage has declined, so is first marriage-and for that matter,cohabi- its symbolic significance has remained high and tation. may even have increased.It has become a By deinstitutionalization I mean the weaken- marker of prestige and personal achievement. ing of the social norms that define people's Examples of its symbolic significance are behavior in a social institution such as marriage. presented.The implications for the current state In times of social stability,the taken-for-granted of marriage and its future direction are nature of norms allows people to go about their discussed. lives without having to question their actions or the actions of others.But when social change produces situations outside the reach of estab- A quarter century ago,in an article entitled “Remarriage as an Incomplete Institution” lished norms,individuals can no longer rely on (Cherlin,1978),I argued that American society shared understandings of how to act.Rather, lacked norms about the way that members of they must negotiate new ways of acting,a pro- stepfamilies should act toward each other.Par- cess that is a potential source of conflict and ents and children in first marriages,in contrast, opportunity.On the one hand,the development could rely on well-established norms,such as of new rules is likely to engender disagreement and tension among the relevant actors.On the other hand,the breakdown of the old rules of a gendered institution such as marriage could Department of Sociology,Johns Hopkins University,556 lead to the creation of a more egalitarian rela- Mergenthaler Hall,Baltimore,MD 21218 (cherlin@jhu.edu). tionship between wives and husbands. Key Words:cohabitation,marriage,remarriage,same-sex This perspective,I think,can help us under- marriage. stand the state of contemporary marriage.It 848 Journal of Marriage and Family 66(November 2004):848-861

ANDREW J. CHERLIN Johns Hopkins University The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage This article argues that marriage has under￾gone a process of deinstitutionalization—a weakening of the social norms that define part￾ners’ behavior—over the past few decades. Ex￾amples are presented involving the increasing number and complexity of cohabiting unions and the emergence of same-sex marriage. Two transitions in the meaning of marriage that occurred in the United States during the 20th century have created the social context for deinstitutionalization. The first transition, noted by Ernest Burgess, was from the institutional marriage to the companionate marriage. The second transition was to the individualized mar￾riage in which the emphasis on personal choice and self-development expanded. Although the practical importance of marriage has declined, its symbolic significance has remained high and may even have increased. It has become a marker of prestige and personal achievement. Examples of its symbolic significance are presented. The implications for the current state of marriage and its future direction are discussed. A quarter century ago, in an article entitled ‘‘Remarriage as an Incomplete Institution’’ (Cherlin, 1978), I argued that American society lacked norms about the way that members of stepfamilies should act toward each other. Par￾ents and children in first marriages, in contrast, could rely on well-established norms, such as when it is appropriate to discipline a child. I predicted that, over time, as remarriage after divorce became common, norms would begin to emerge concerning proper behavior in step￾families—for example, what kind of relationship a stepfather should have with his stepchildren. In other words, I expected that remarriage would become institutionalized, that it would become more like first marriage. But just the opposite has happened. Remarriage has not become more like first marriage; rather, first marriage has become more like remarriage. Instead of the institutionalization of remarriage, what has occurred over the past few decades is the deinstitutionalization of marriage. Yes, re￾marriage is an incomplete institution, but now, so is first marriage—and for that matter, cohabi￾tation. By deinstitutionalization I mean the weaken￾ing of the social norms that define people’s behavior in a social institution such as marriage. In times of social stability, the taken-for-granted nature of norms allows people to go about their lives without having to question their actions or the actions of others. But when social change produces situations outside the reach of estab￾lished norms, individuals can no longer rely on shared understandings of how to act. Rather, they must negotiate new ways of acting, a pro￾cess that is a potential source of conflict and opportunity. On the one hand, the development of new rules is likely to engender disagreement and tension among the relevant actors. On the other hand, the breakdown of the old rules of a gendered institution such as marriage could lead to the creation of a more egalitarian rela￾tionship between wives and husbands. This perspective, I think, can help us under￾stand the state of contemporary marriage. It Department of Sociology, Johns Hopkins University, 556 Mergenthaler Hall, Baltimore, MD 21218 (cherlin@jhu.edu). Key Words: cohabitation, marriage, remarriage, same-sex marriage. 848 Journal of Marriage and Family 66 (November 2004): 848–861 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Case number: 09-2292 PLTF/DEFT EXHIBIT NO. DIX49 Date admitted: ________________ By: ___________________________

ANDREW J.CHERLIN Johns Hopkins University The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage This article argues that marriage has under- when it is appropriate to discipline a child.I gone a process of deinstitutionalizationa predicted that,over time,as remarriage after weakening of the social norms that define part- divorce became common,norms would begin ners'behavior-over the past few decades.Ex- to emerge conceming proper behavior in step- amples are presented involving the increasing families-for example,what kind of relationship number and complexity of cohabiting unions a stepfather should have with his stepchildren. and the emergence of same-sex marriage.Two In other words,I expected that remarriage transitions in the meaning of marriage that would become institutionalized,that it would occurred in the United States during the 20th become more like first marriage.But just the century have created the social context for opposite has happened.Remarriage has not deinstitutionalization.The first transition,noted become more like first marriage;rather,first by Ernest Burgess,was from the institutional marriage has become more like remarriage. marriage to the companionate marriage.The Instead of the institutionalization of remarriage, second transition was to the individualized mar- what has occurred over the past few decades is riage in which the emphasis on personal choice the deinstitutionalization of marriage.Yes,re- and self-development expanded.Although the marriage is an incomplete institution,but now, practical importance of marriage has declined, so is first marriage-and for that matter,cohabi- its symbolic significance has remained high and tation. may even have increased.It has become a By deinstitutionalization I mean the weaken- marker of prestige and personal achievement. ing of the social norms that define people's Examples of its symbolic significance are behavior in a social institution such as marriage. presented.The implications for the current state In times of social stability,the taken-for-granted of marriage and its future direction are nature of norms allows people to go about their discussed. lives without having to question their actions or the actions of others.But when social change A quarter century ago,in an article entitled produces situations outside the reach of estab- “Remarriage as an Incomplete Institution” lished norms,individuals can no longer rely on (Cherlin,1978),I argued that American society shared understandings of how to act.Rather, lacked norms about the way that members of they must negotiate new ways of acting,a pro- stepfamilies should act toward each other.Par- cess that is a potential source of conflict and ents and children in first marriages,in contrast, opportunity.On the one hand,the development could rely on well-established norms,such as of new rules is likely to engender disagreement and tension among the relevant actors.On the other hand,the breakdown of the old rules of a gendered institution such as marriage could Department of Sociology,Johns Hopkins University,556 lead to the creation of a more egalitarian rela- Mergenthaler Hall,Baltimore,MD 21218 (cherlin@jhu.edu). tionship between wives and husbands. Key Words:cohabitation,marriage,remarriage,same-sex This perspective,I think,can help us under- marriage. stand the state of contemporary marriage.It 848 Journal of Marriage and Family 66(November 2004):848-861

ANDREW J. CHERLIN Johns Hopkins University The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage This article argues that marriage has under￾gone a process of deinstitutionalization—a weakening of the social norms that define part￾ners’ behavior—over the past few decades. Ex￾amples are presented involving the increasing number and complexity of cohabiting unions and the emergence of same-sex marriage. Two transitions in the meaning of marriage that occurred in the United States during the 20th century have created the social context for deinstitutionalization. The first transition, noted by Ernest Burgess, was from the institutional marriage to the companionate marriage. The second transition was to the individualized mar￾riage in which the emphasis on personal choice and self-development expanded. Although the practical importance of marriage has declined, its symbolic significance has remained high and may even have increased. It has become a marker of prestige and personal achievement. Examples of its symbolic significance are presented. The implications for the current state of marriage and its future direction are discussed. A quarter century ago, in an article entitled ‘‘Remarriage as an Incomplete Institution’’ (Cherlin, 1978), I argued that American society lacked norms about the way that members of stepfamilies should act toward each other. Par￾ents and children in first marriages, in contrast, could rely on well-established norms, such as when it is appropriate to discipline a child. I predicted that, over time, as remarriage after divorce became common, norms would begin to emerge concerning proper behavior in step￾families—for example, what kind of relationship a stepfather should have with his stepchildren. In other words, I expected that remarriage would become institutionalized, that it would become more like first marriage. But just the opposite has happened. Remarriage has not become more like first marriage; rather, first marriage has become more like remarriage. Instead of the institutionalization of remarriage, what has occurred over the past few decades is the deinstitutionalization of marriage. Yes, re￾marriage is an incomplete institution, but now, so is first marriage—and for that matter, cohabi￾tation. By deinstitutionalization I mean the weaken￾ing of the social norms that define people’s behavior in a social institution such as marriage. In times of social stability, the taken-for-granted nature of norms allows people to go about their lives without having to question their actions or the actions of others. But when social change produces situations outside the reach of estab￾lished norms, individuals can no longer rely on shared understandings of how to act. Rather, they must negotiate new ways of acting, a pro￾cess that is a potential source of conflict and opportunity. On the one hand, the development of new rules is likely to engender disagreement and tension among the relevant actors. On the other hand, the breakdown of the old rules of a gendered institution such as marriage could lead to the creation of a more egalitarian rela￾tionship between wives and husbands. This perspective, I think, can help us under￾stand the state of contemporary marriage. It Department of Sociology, Johns Hopkins University, 556 Mergenthaler Hall, Baltimore, MD 21218 (cherlin@jhu.edu). Key Words: cohabitation, marriage, remarriage, same-sex marriage. 848 Journal of Marriage and Family 66 (November 2004): 848–861

Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage 849 may even assist in the risky business of predict- The Growth of Cohabitation ing the future of marriage.To some extent,sim- ilar changes in marriage have occurred in the In the 1970s,neither I nor most other American United States,Canada,and much of Europe,but researchers foresaw the greatly increased role of the American situation may be distinctive.Con- cohabitation in the adult life course.We thought sequently,although I include information about that,except among the poor,cohabitation would Canadian and European families,I focus mainly remain a short-term arrangement among child- on the United States. less young adults who would quickly break up or marry.But it has become a more prevalent and more complex phenomenon.For example, THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION cohabitation has created an additional layer of OF MARRIAGE complexity in stepfamilies.When I wrote my Even as I was writing my 1978 article,the article,nearly all stepfamilies were formed by changing division of labor in the home and the the remarriage of one or both spouses.Now, increase in childbearing outside marriage were about one fourth of all stepfamilies in the undermining the institutionalized basis of mar- United States,and one half of all stepfamilies in riage.The distinct roles of homemaker and Canada,are formed by cohabitation rather than breadwinner were fading as more married marriage (Bumpass,Raley,Sweet,1995;Sta- women entered the paid labor force.Looking tistics Canada,2002).It is not uncommon,espe- into the future,I thought that perhaps an equita- cially among the low-income population,for ble division of household labor might become a woman to have a child outside marriage,end institutionalized.But what happened instead her relationship with that partner,and then was the "stalled revolution,"in Hochschild's begin cohabiting with a different partner.This (1989)well-known phrase.Men do somewhat new union is equivalent in structure to a step- more home work than they used to do,but there family but does not involve marriage.Some- is wide variation,and each couple must work times the couple later marries,and if neither has out their own arrangement without clear guide- been married before.their union creates a first lines.In addition,when I wrote the article,I out marriage with stepchildren.As a result,we now of 6 births in the United States occurred outside see an increasing number of stepfamilies that do marriage,already a much higher ratio than at not involve marriage,and an increasing number midcentury (U.S.National Center for Health of first marriages that involve stepfamilies. Statistics,1982).Today,the comparable figure More generally,cohabitation is becoming is 1 out of 3 (U.S.National Center for Health accepted as an alternative to marriage.British Statistics,2003).The percentage is similar in demographer Kathleen Kiernan (2002)writes Canada (Statistics Canada.2003)and in the that the acceptance of cohabitation is occurring United Kingdom and Ireland (Kiernan,2002). in stages in European nations,with some na- In the Nordic countries of Denmark,Iceland, tions further along than others.In stage one, Norway,and Sweden,the figure ranges from cohabitation is a fringe or avant garde phenome- about 45%to about 65%(Kiernan).Marriage is non;in stage two,it is accepted as a testing no longer the nearly universal setting for child- ground for marriage;in stage three,it becomes bearing that it was a half century ago. acceptable as an alternative to marriage;and in Both of these developments-the changing stage four,it becomes indistinguishable from division of labor in the home and the increase in marriage.Sweden and Denmark,she argues, childbearing outside marriage-were well under have made the transition to stage four:in con- way when I wrote my 1978 article,as was trast,Mediterranean countries such as Spain, a steep rise in divorce.Here I discuss two more Italy,and Greece remain in stage one.In the recent changes in family life,both of which early 2000s,the United States appeared to be in have contributed to the deinstitutionalization of transition from stage two to stage three (Smock marriage after the 1970s:the growth of cohabi- Gupta,2002).A number of indicators sug- tation,which began in the 1970s but was not gested that the connection between cohabitation fully appreciated until it accelerated in the and marriage was weakening.The proportion of 1980s and 1990s,and same-sex marriage, cohabiting unions that end in marriage within which emerged as an issue in the 1990s and has 3 years dropped from 60%in the 1970s to come to the fore in the current decade. about 33%in the 1990s (Smock Gupta)

may even assist in the risky business of predict￾ing the future of marriage. To some extent, sim￾ilar changes in marriage have occurred in the United States, Canada, and much of Europe, but the American situation may be distinctive. Con￾sequently, although I include information about Canadian and European families, I focus mainly on the United States. THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MARRIAGE Even as I was writing my 1978 article, the changing division of labor in the home and the increase in childbearing outside marriage were undermining the institutionalized basis of mar￾riage. The distinct roles of homemaker and breadwinner were fading as more married women entered the paid labor force. Looking into the future, I thought that perhaps an equita￾ble division of household labor might become institutionalized. But what happened instead was the ‘‘stalled revolution,’’ in Hochschild’s (1989) well-known phrase. Men do somewhat more home work than they used to do, but there is wide variation, and each couple must work out their own arrangement without clear guide￾lines. In addition, when I wrote the article, 1 out of 6 births in the United States occurred outside marriage, already a much higher ratio than at midcentury (U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, 1982). Today, the comparable figure is 1 out of 3 (U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, 2003). The percentage is similar in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2003) and in the United Kingdom and Ireland (Kiernan, 2002). In the Nordic countries of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, the figure ranges from about 45% to about 65% (Kiernan). Marriage is no longer the nearly universal setting for child￾bearing that it was a half century ago. Both of these developments—the changing division of labor in the home and the increase in childbearing outside marriage—were well under way when I wrote my 1978 article, as was a steep rise in divorce. Here I discuss two more recent changes in family life, both of which have contributed to the deinstitutionalization of marriage after the 1970s: the growth of cohabi￾tation, which began in the 1970s but was not fully appreciated until it accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s, and same-sex marriage, which emerged as an issue in the 1990s and has come to the fore in the current decade. The Growth of Cohabitation In the 1970s, neither I nor most other American researchers foresaw the greatly increased role of cohabitation in the adult life course. We thought that, except among the poor, cohabitation would remain a short-term arrangement among child￾less young adults who would quickly break up or marry. But it has become a more prevalent and more complex phenomenon. For example, cohabitation has created an additional layer of complexity in stepfamilies. When I wrote my article, nearly all stepfamilies were formed by the remarriage of one or both spouses. Now, about one fourth of all stepfamilies in the United States, and one half of all stepfamilies in Canada, are formed by cohabitation rather than marriage (Bumpass, Raley, & Sweet, 1995; Sta￾tistics Canada, 2002). It is not uncommon, espe￾cially among the low-income population, for a woman to have a child outside marriage, end her relationship with that partner, and then begin cohabiting with a different partner. This new union is equivalent in structure to a step￾family but does not involve marriage. Some￾times the couple later marries, and if neither has been married before, their union creates a first marriage with stepchildren. As a result, we now see an increasing number of stepfamilies that do not involve marriage, and an increasing number of first marriages that involve stepfamilies. More generally, cohabitation is becoming accepted as an alternative to marriage. British demographer Kathleen Kiernan (2002) writes that the acceptance of cohabitation is occurring in stages in European nations, with some na￾tions further along than others. In stage one, cohabitation is a fringe or avant garde phenome￾non; in stage two, it is accepted as a testing ground for marriage; in stage three, it becomes acceptable as an alternative to marriage; and in stage four, it becomes indistinguishable from marriage. Sweden and Denmark, she argues, have made the transition to stage four; in con￾trast, Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Italy, and Greece remain in stage one. In the early 2000s, the United States appeared to be in transition from stage two to stage three (Smock & Gupta, 2002). A number of indicators sug￾gested that the connection between cohabitation and marriage was weakening. The proportion of cohabiting unions that end in marriage within 3 years dropped from 60% in the 1970s to about 33% in the 1990s (Smock & Gupta), Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage 849

850 Journal of Marriage and Family suggesting that fewer cohabiting unions were distinctions between married and unmarried trial marriages (or that fewer trial marriages same-sex and opposite-sex couples were elimi- were succeeding).In fact,Manning and Smock nated for couples who have lived together for at (2003)reported that among 115 cohabiting least a year.Still,the Supreme Court of Canada working-class and lower middle-class adults ruled in 2002 that when cohabiting partners dis- who were interviewed in depth,none said that solve their unions,they do not have to divide he or she was deciding between marriage and their assets equally,nor can one partner be com- cohabitation at the start of the union.Moreover, pelled to pay maintenance payments to the only 36%of adults in the 2002 United States other,even when children are involved (Nova General Social Survey disagreed with the state- Scotia [Attorney General]v.Walsh,2002).In ment,"It is alright for a couple to live together France,unmarried couples may enter into Civil without intending to get married"(Davis, Solidarity Pacts.which give them most of the Smith,Marsden,2003).And a growing share rights and responsibilities of married couples of births to unmarried women in the United after the pact has existed for 3 years (Daley, States (about 40%in the 1990s)were to cohab- 2000).Several other countries have instituted iting couples(Bumpass Lu,2000).The com- registered partnerships (Lyall,2004). parable share was about 60%in Britain (Ermisch.2001). Canada appears to have entered stage three The Emergence of Same-Sex Marriage (Smock Gupta,2002).Sixty-nine percent of The most recent development in the deinstitu- births to unmarried women were to cohabiting tionalization of marriage is the movement to couples in 1997 and 1998 (Juby,Marcil- legalize same-sex marriage.It became a public Gratton,Le Bourdais,in press).More- issue in the United States in 1993,when the over,the national figures for Canada mask Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that a state law substantial provincial variation.In particular, restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples the rise in cohabitation has been far greater in violated the Hawaii state constitution (Baehr Quebec than elsewhere in Canada.In 1997 and v.Lewin,1993).Subsequently,Hawaii voters 1998,84%of unmarried women who gave birth passed a state constitutional amendment barring in Quebec were cohabiting (Juby,Marcil- same-sex marriage.In 1996,the United States Gratton,Le Bourdais).And four out of five Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, Quebeckers entering a first union did so by which allowed states to refuse to recognize cohabiting rather than marrying (Le Bourdais same-sex marriages licensed in other states.The Juby,2002).The greater acceptance of cohabi- act's constitutionality has not been tested as of tation in Quebec seems to have a cultural basis. this writing because until recently,no state al- Francophone Quebeckers have substantially lowed same-sex marriages.However,in 2003, higher likelihoods of cohabiting than do the Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down English-speaking Quebeckers or Canadians in a state law limiting marriage to opposite-sex the other English-speaking provinces (Statistics couples,and same-sex marriage became legal in Canada,1997).Celine Le Bourdais and Nicole May 2004 (although opponents may eventually Marcil-Gratton (1996)argue that Francophone succeed in prohibiting it through a state consti- Quebeckers draw upon a French,rather than tutional amendment).The issue has developed Anglo-Saxon,model of family life.In fact, further in Canada:In the early 2000s,courts in levels of cohabitation in Quebec are similar to British Columbia,Ontario,and Quebec ruled levels in France,whereas levels in English- that laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex speaking Canada and in the United States are couples were discriminatory,and it appears more similar to the lower levels in Great Britain likely that the federal government will legalize (Kiernan,2002). gay marriage throughout the nation.Although To be sure,cohabitation is becoming more social conservatives in the United States are institutionalized.In the United States,states and seeking a federal constitutional amendment,I municipalities are moving toward granting co- think it is reasonable to assume that same-sex habiting couples some of the rights and respon- marriage will be allowed in at least some North sibilities that married couples have.Canada American jurisdictions in the future.In Europe, has gone further:Under the Modernization of same-sex marriage has been legalized in Benefits and Obligations Act of 2000,legal Belgium and The Netherlands

suggesting that fewer cohabiting unions were trial marriages (or that fewer trial marriages were succeeding). In fact, Manning and Smock (2003) reported that among 115 cohabiting working-class and lower middle-class adults who were interviewed in depth, none said that he or she was deciding between marriage and cohabitation at the start of the union. Moreover, only 36% of adults in the 2002 United States General Social Survey disagreed with the state￾ment, ‘‘It is alright for a couple to live together without intending to get married’’ (Davis, Smith, & Marsden, 2003). And a growing share of births to unmarried women in the United States (about 40% in the 1990s) were to cohab￾iting couples (Bumpass & Lu, 2000). The com￾parable share was about 60% in Britain (Ermisch, 2001). Canada appears to have entered stage three (Smock & Gupta, 2002). Sixty-nine percent of births to unmarried women were to cohabiting couples in 1997 and 1998 (Juby, Marcil￾Gratton, & Le Bourdais, in press). More￾over, the national figures for Canada mask substantial provincial variation. In particular, the rise in cohabitation has been far greater in Quebec than elsewhere in Canada. In 1997 and 1998, 84% of unmarried women who gave birth in Quebec were cohabiting (Juby, Marcil￾Gratton, & Le Bourdais). And four out of five Quebeckers entering a first union did so by cohabiting rather than marrying (Le Bourdais & Juby, 2002). The greater acceptance of cohabi￾tation in Quebec seems to have a cultural basis. Francophone Quebeckers have substantially higher likelihoods of cohabiting than do English-speaking Quebeckers or Canadians in the other English-speaking provinces (Statistics Canada, 1997). Ce´line Le Bourdais and Nicole Marcil-Gratton (1996) argue that Francophone Quebeckers draw upon a French, rather than Anglo-Saxon, model of family life. In fact, levels of cohabitation in Quebec are similar to levels in France, whereas levels in English￾speaking Canada and in the United States are more similar to the lower levels in Great Britain (Kiernan, 2002). To be sure, cohabitation is becoming more institutionalized. In the United States, states and municipalities are moving toward granting co￾habiting couples some of the rights and respon￾sibilities that married couples have. Canada has gone further: Under the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act of 2000, legal distinctions between married and unmarried same-sex and opposite-sex couples were elimi￾nated for couples who have lived together for at least a year. Still, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 2002 that when cohabiting partners dis￾solve their unions, they do not have to divide their assets equally, nor can one partner be com￾pelled to pay maintenance payments to the other, even when children are involved (Nova Scotia [Attorney General] v. Walsh, 2002). In France, unmarried couples may enter into Civil Solidarity Pacts, which give them most of the rights and responsibilities of married couples after the pact has existed for 3 years (Daley, 2000). Several other countries have instituted registered partnerships (Lyall, 2004). The Emergence of Same-Sex Marriage The most recent development in the deinstitu￾tionalization of marriage is the movement to legalize same-sex marriage. It became a public issue in the United States in 1993, when the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that a state law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the Hawaii state constitution (Baehr v. Lewin, 1993). Subsequently, Hawaii voters passed a state constitutional amendment barring same-sex marriage. In 1996, the United States Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, which allowed states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages licensed in other states. The act’s constitutionality has not been tested as of this writing because until recently, no state al￾lowed same-sex marriages. However, in 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down a state law limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, and same-sex marriage became legal in May 2004 (although opponents may eventually succeed in prohibiting it through a state consti￾tutional amendment). The issue has developed further in Canada: In the early 2000s, courts in British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec ruled that laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples were discriminatory, and it appears likely that the federal government will legalize gay marriage throughout the nation. Although social conservatives in the United States are seeking a federal constitutional amendment, I think it is reasonable to assume that same-sex marriage will be allowed in at least some North American jurisdictions in the future. In Europe, same-sex marriage has been legalized in Belgium and The Netherlands. 850 Journal of Marriage and Family

Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage 85 Lesbian and gay couples who choose to meaning of marriage during the 20th century. marry must actively construct a marital world The cultural trends included,first,an emphasis with almost no institutional support.Lesbians on emotional satisfaction and romantic love and gay men already use the term“family”to that intensified early in the century.Then,dur- describe their close relationships,but they usu- ing the last few decades of the century,an ethic ally mean something different from the standard of expressive individualism-which Bellah. marriage-based family.Rather.they often refer Marsden,Sullivan,Swidler,Tipton (1985) to what sociologists have called a "family of describe as the belief that "each person has choice":one that is formed largely through vol- a unique core of feeling and intuition that untary ties among individuals who are not bio- should unfold or be expressed if individuality is logically or legally related (Weeks,Heaphy, to be realized"(p.334)became more impor- Donovan,2001;Weston,1991).Now they face tant.On the material side,the trends include the the task of integrating marriages into these decline of agricultural labor and the correspond- larger networks of friends and kin.The partners ing increase in wage labor;the decline in child will not even have the option of falling back on and adult mortality;rising standards of living; the gender-differentiated roles of heterosexual and,in the last half of the 20th century,the marriage.This is not to say that there will be no movement of married women into the paid division of labor;one study of gay and lesbian workforce. couples found that in homes where one partner These developments,along with historical works longer hours and earns substantially more events such as the Depression and World War than the other partner,the one with the less II,produced two great changes in the meaning demanding,lower paying job did more house- of marriage during the 20th century.Emest Bur- work and more of the work of keeping in touch gess famously labeled the first one as a transi- with family and friends.The author suggests tion“from an institution to a companionship” that holding a demanding professional or mana- (Burgess Locke,1945).In describing the rise gerial job may make it difficult for a person to of the companionate marriage,Burgess was invest fully in sharing the work at home,regard- referring to the single-earer,breadwinner- less of gender or sexual orientation (Carrington, homemaker marriage that flourished in the 1999). 1950s.Although husbands and wives in the We might expect same-sex couples who have companionate marriage usually adhered to children,or who wish to have children through a sharp division of labor,they were supposed to adoption or donor insemination,to be likely to be each other's companions-friends,lovers- avail themselves of the option of marriage.(Ac- to an extent not imagined by the spouses in the cording to the United States Census Bureau institutional marriages of the previous era.The [2003b],33%of women in same-sex partner- increasing focus on bonds of sentiment within ships and 22%of men in same-sex partnerships nuclear families constituted an important but had children living with them in 2000.)Basic limited step in the individualization of family issues.such as who would care for the children. life.Much more so than in the 19th century,the would have to be resolved family by family. emotional satisfaction of the spouses became an The obligations of the partners to each other fol- important criterion for marital success.How- lowing a marital dissolution have also yet to be ever,through the 1950s,wives and husbands worked out.In these and many other ways,gay tended to derive satisfaction from their partici- and lesbian couples who marry in the near pation in a marriage-based nuclear family future would need to create a marriage-centered (Roussel,1989).That is to say,they based their kin network through discussion,negotiation, gratification on playing marital roles well:being and experiment. good providers,good homemakers,and respon- sible parents. Two Transitions in the Meaning of Marriage During this first change in meaning,marriage remained the only socially acceptable way to In a larger sense,all of these develop- have a sexual relationship and to raise children ments-the changing division of labor,child- in the United States,Canada,and Europe,with bearing outside of marriage,cohabitation,and the possible exception of the Nordic countries. gay marriage-are the result of long-term In his history of British marriages,Gillis(1985) cultural and material trends that altered the labeled the period from 1850 to 1960 the "era

Lesbian and gay couples who choose to marry must actively construct a marital world with almost no institutional support. Lesbians and gay men already use the term ‘‘family’’ to describe their close relationships, but they usu￾ally mean something different from the standard marriage-based family. Rather, they often refer to what sociologists have called a ‘‘family of choice’’: one that is formed largely through vol￾untary ties among individuals who are not bio￾logically or legally related (Weeks, Heaphy, & Donovan, 2001; Weston, 1991). Now they face the task of integrating marriages into these larger networks of friends and kin. The partners will not even have the option of falling back on the gender-differentiated roles of heterosexual marriage. This is not to say that there will be no division of labor; one study of gay and lesbian couples found that in homes where one partner works longer hours and earns substantially more than the other partner, the one with the less demanding, lower paying job did more house￾work and more of the work of keeping in touch with family and friends. The author suggests that holding a demanding professional or mana￾gerial job may make it difficult for a person to invest fully in sharing the work at home, regard￾less of gender or sexual orientation (Carrington, 1999). We might expect same-sex couples who have children, or who wish to have children through adoption or donor insemination, to be likely to avail themselves of the option of marriage. (Ac￾cording to the United States Census Bureau [2003b], 33% of women in same-sex partner￾ships and 22% of men in same-sex partnerships had children living with them in 2000.) Basic issues, such as who would care for the children, would have to be resolved family by family. The obligations of the partners to each other fol￾lowing a marital dissolution have also yet to be worked out. In these and many other ways, gay and lesbian couples who marry in the near future would need to create a marriage-centered kin network through discussion, negotiation, and experiment. Two Transitions in the Meaning of Marriage In a larger sense, all of these develop￾ments—the changing division of labor, child￾bearing outside of marriage, cohabitation, and gay marriage—are the result of long-term cultural and material trends that altered the meaning of marriage during the 20th century. The cultural trends included, first, an emphasis on emotional satisfaction and romantic love that intensified early in the century. Then, dur￾ing the last few decades of the century, an ethic of expressive individualism—which Bellah, Marsden, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton (1985) describe as the belief that ‘‘each person has a unique core of feeling and intuition that should unfold or be expressed if individuality is to be realized’’ (p. 334)—became more impor￾tant. On the material side, the trends include the decline of agricultural labor and the correspond￾ing increase in wage labor; the decline in child and adult mortality; rising standards of living; and, in the last half of the 20th century, the movement of married women into the paid workforce. These developments, along with historical events such as the Depression and World War II, produced two great changes in the meaning of marriage during the 20th century. Ernest Bur￾gess famously labeled the first one as a transi￾tion ‘‘from an institution to a companionship’’ (Burgess & Locke, 1945). In describing the rise of the companionate marriage, Burgess was referring to the single-earner, breadwinner￾homemaker marriage that flourished in the 1950s. Although husbands and wives in the companionate marriage usually adhered to a sharp division of labor, they were supposed to be each other’s companions—friends, lovers— to an extent not imagined by the spouses in the institutional marriages of the previous era. The increasing focus on bonds of sentiment within nuclear families constituted an important but limited step in the individualization of family life. Much more so than in the 19th century, the emotional satisfaction of the spouses became an important criterion for marital success. How￾ever, through the 1950s, wives and husbands tended to derive satisfaction from their partici￾pation in a marriage-based nuclear family (Roussel, 1989). That is to say, they based their gratification on playing marital roles well: being good providers, good homemakers, and respon￾sible parents. During this first change in meaning, marriage remained the only socially acceptable way to have a sexual relationship and to raise children in the United States, Canada, and Europe, with the possible exception of the Nordic countries. In his history of British marriages, Gillis (1985) labeled the period from 1850 to 1960 the ‘‘era Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage 851

852 Journal of Marriage and Family of mandatory marriage."In the United States, and husbands became more flexible and open to marriage and only marriage was one's ticket of negotiation.And an even more individualistic admission to a full family life.Prior to marry- perspective on the rewards of marriage took ing,almost no one cohabited with a partner root.When people evaluated how satisfied they except among the poor and the avant garde.As were with their marriages,they began to think recently as the 1950s,premarital cohabitation in more in terms of the development of their own the United States was restricted to a small sense of self and the expression of their feel- minority (perhaps 5%)of the less educated ings,as opposed to the satisfaction they gained (Bumpass,Sweet,Cherlin,1991).In the early through building a family and playing the roles 1950s,only about 4%of children were born of spouse and parent.The result was a transition outside marriage (U.S.National Center for from the companionate marriage to what we Health Statistics,1982).In fact,during the late might call the individualized marriage. 1940s and the 1950s,major changes that The transition to the individualized marriage increased the importance of marriage occurred began in the 1960s and accelerated in the 1970s, in the life course of young adults.More peo- as shown by an American study of the changing ple marriedabout 95%of young adults in themes in popular magazine articles offering the United States in the 1950s,compared with marital advice in every decade between 1900 about 90%early in the century (Cherlin, and 1979 (Cancian,1987).The author identified 1992)-and they married at younger ages. three themes that characterized beliefs about the Between 1900 and 1960,the estimated median post-1960-style marriage.The first was self- age at first marriage in the United States fell development:Each person should develop a from 26 to 23 for men,and from 22 to 20 for fulfilling,independent self instead of merely sac- women(U.S.Census Bureau,2003a).The birth rificing oneself to one's partner.The second was rate,which had been falling for a century or that roles within marriage should be flexible and more,increased sharply,creating the "baby negotiable.The third was that communication boom.”The post-World WarⅡincrease in mar- and openness in confronting problems are essen- riage and childbearing also occurred in many tial.She then tallied the percentage of articles in European countries(Roussel,1989). each decade that contained one or more of these But beginning in the 1960s,marriage's domi- three themes.About one third of the articles in nance began to diminish,and the second great the first decade of the century,and again at mid- change in the meaning of marriage occurred.In century,displayed these themes,whereas about the United States,the median age at marriage two thirds displayed these themes in the 1970s. returned to and then exceeded the levels of the The author characterized this transition as a shift early 1900s.In 2000,the median age was 27 for in emphasis "from role to self"(Cancian). men and 25 for women (U.S.Census Bureau, During this second change in the meaning of 2003a).Many young adults stayed single into marriage,the role of the law changed signifi- their mid to late 20s,some completing college cantly as well.This transformation was most educations and starting careers.Cohabitation apparent in divorce law.In the United States prior to (and after)marriage became much more and most other developed countries,legal re- acceptable.Childbearing outside marriage be- strictions on divorce were replaced by statutes came less stigmatized and more accepted.Birth that recognized consensual and even unilateral rates resumed their long-term declines and sunk divorce.The transition to "private ordering" to all-time lows in most countries.Divorce rates (Mnookin Komhauser,1979)allowed cou- rose to unprecedented levels.Same-sex unions ples to negotiate the details of their divorce found greater acceptance as well. agreements within broad limits.Most European During this transition,the companionate mar- nations experienced similar legal developments riage lost ground not only as the demographic (Glendon,1989;Thery,1993).Indeed,French standard but also as a cultural ideal.It was grad- social demographer Louis Roussel (1989)wrote ually overtaken by forms of marriage (and non- of a "double deinstitutionalization"in behavior marital families)that Burgess had not foreseen, and in law:a greater hesitation of young adults particularly marriages in which both the hus- to enter into marriage,combined with a loosen- band and the wife worked outside the home. ing of the legal regulation of marriage. Although women continued to do most of the Sociological theorists of late modemity (or housework and child care,the roles of wives postmoderity)such as Anthony Giddens

of mandatory marriage.’’ In the United States, marriage and only marriage was one’s ticket of admission to a full family life. Prior to marry￾ing, almost no one cohabited with a partner except among the poor and the avant garde. As recently as the 1950s, premarital cohabitation in the United States was restricted to a small minority (perhaps 5%) of the less educated (Bumpass, Sweet, & Cherlin, 1991). In the early 1950s, only about 4% of children were born outside marriage (U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, 1982). In fact, during the late 1940s and the 1950s, major changes that increased the importance of marriage occurred in the life course of young adults. More peo￾ple married—about 95% of young adults in the United States in the 1950s, compared with about 90% early in the century (Cherlin, 1992)—and they married at younger ages. Between 1900 and 1960, the estimated median age at first marriage in the United States fell from 26 to 23 for men, and from 22 to 20 for women (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003a). The birth rate, which had been falling for a century or more, increased sharply, creating the ‘‘baby boom.’’ The post-World War II increase in mar￾riage and childbearing also occurred in many European countries (Roussel, 1989). But beginning in the 1960s, marriage’s domi￾nance began to diminish, and the second great change in the meaning of marriage occurred. In the United States, the median age at marriage returned to and then exceeded the levels of the early 1900s. In 2000, the median age was 27 for men and 25 for women (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003a). Many young adults stayed single into their mid to late 20s, some completing college educations and starting careers. Cohabitation prior to (and after) marriage became much more acceptable. Childbearing outside marriage be￾came less stigmatized and more accepted. Birth rates resumed their long-term declines and sunk to all-time lows in most countries. Divorce rates rose to unprecedented levels. Same-sex unions found greater acceptance as well. During this transition, the companionate mar￾riage lost ground not only as the demographic standard but also as a cultural ideal. It was grad￾ually overtaken by forms of marriage (and non￾marital families) that Burgess had not foreseen, particularly marriages in which both the hus￾band and the wife worked outside the home. Although women continued to do most of the housework and child care, the roles of wives and husbands became more flexible and open to negotiation. And an even more individualistic perspective on the rewards of marriage took root. When people evaluated how satisfied they were with their marriages, they began to think more in terms of the development of their own sense of self and the expression of their feel￾ings, as opposed to the satisfaction they gained through building a family and playing the roles of spouse and parent. The result was a transition from the companionate marriage to what we might call the individualized marriage. The transition to the individualized marriage began in the 1960s and accelerated in the 1970s, as shown by an American study of the changing themes in popular magazine articles offering marital advice in every decade between 1900 and 1979 (Cancian, 1987). The author identified three themes that characterized beliefs about the post-1960-style marriage. The first was self￾development: Each person should develop a fulfilling, independent self instead of merely sac￾rificing oneself to one’s partner. The second was that roles within marriage should be flexible and negotiable. The third was that communication and openness in confronting problems are essen￾tial. She then tallied the percentage of articles in each decade that contained one or more of these three themes. About one third of the articles in the first decade of the century, and again at mid￾century, displayed these themes, whereas about two thirds displayed these themes in the 1970s. The author characterized this transition as a shift in emphasis ‘‘from role to self’’ (Cancian). During this second change in the meaning of marriage, the role of the law changed signifi- cantly as well. This transformation was most apparent in divorce law. In the United States and most other developed countries, legal re￾strictions on divorce were replaced by statutes that recognized consensual and even unilateral divorce. The transition to ‘‘private ordering’’ (Mnookin & Kornhauser, 1979) allowed cou￾ples to negotiate the details of their divorce agreements within broad limits. Most European nations experienced similar legal developments (Glendon, 1989; The´ry, 1993). Indeed, French social demographer Louis Roussel (1989) wrote of a ‘‘double deinstitutionalization’’ in behavior and in law: a greater hesitation of young adults to enter into marriage, combined with a loosen￾ing of the legal regulation of marriage. Sociological theorists of late modernity (or postmodernity) such as Anthony Giddens 852 Journal of Marriage and Family

Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage 853 (1991.1992)in Britain and Ulrich Beck and a partner,or sequentially with several partners, Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim in Germany (1995, without an explicit consideration of whether 2002)also have written about the growing indi- a marriage will occur.One may have children vidualization of personal life.Consistent with with one's eventual spouse or with someone the idea of deinstitutionalization,they note the else before marrying.One may,in some juris- declining power of social norms and laws as reg- dictions,marry someone of the same gender ulating mechanisms for family life,and they and build a shared marital world with few stress the expanding role of personal choice. guidelines to rely on.Within marriage,roles are They argue that as traditional sources of identity more flexible and negotiable.although women such as class,religion,and community lose still do more than their share of the household influence,one's intimate relationships become work and childrearing. central to self-identity.Giddens (1991,1992) The second difference is in the nature of the writes of the emergence of the "pure relation- rewards that people seek through marriage and ship":an intimate partnership entered into for its other close relationships.Individuals aim for own sake,which lasts only as long as both part- personal growth and deeper intimacy through ners are satisfied with the rewards(mostly inti- more open communication and mutually shared macy and love)that they get from it.It is in disclosures about feelings with their partners. some ways the logical extension of the increas- They may feel justified in insisting on changes ing individualism and the deinstitutionalization in a relationship that no longer provides them of marriage that occurred in the 20th century. with individualized rewards.In contrast,they The pure relationship is not tied to an institu- are less likely than in the past to focus on the re- tion such as marriage or to the desire to raise wards to be found in fulfilling socially valued children.Rather,it is "free-floating,"indepen- roles such as the good parent or the loyal and dent of social institutions or economic life.Unlike supportive spouse.The result of these changing marriage,it is not regulated by law,and its mem- contexts has been a deinstitutionalization of bers do not enjoy special legal rights.It exists pri- marriage,in which social norms about family marily in the realms of emotion and self-identity. and personal life count for less than they did Although the theorists of late modernity during the heyday of the companionate mar- believe that the quest for intimacy is becoming riage,and far less than during the period of the the central focus of personal life,they do not institutional marriage.Instead,personal choice predict that marriage will remain distinctive and self-development loom large in people's and important.Marriage,they claim,has construction of their marital careers. become a choice rather than a necessity for adults who want intimacy,companionship, WHY DO PEOPLE STILL MARRY? and children.According to Beck and Beck- Gernsheim(1995),we will see "a huge variety There is a puzzle within the story of deinstitu- of ways of living together or apart which will tionalization that needs solving.Although fewer continue to exist side by side"(pp.141-142). Americans are marrying than during the peak Giddens (1992)even argues that marriage has years of marriage in the mid-20th century, already become "just one life-style among most-nearly 90%,according to a recent esti- others"(p.154),although people may not yet mate (Goldstein Kenney,2001)-will even- realize it because of institutional lag. tually marry.A survey of high school seniors conducted annually since 1976 shows no decline in the importance they attach to mar- The Current Context of Marriage riage.The percentage of young women who Overall,research and writing on the changing respond that they expect to marry has stayed meaning of marriage suggest that it is now situ- constant at roughly 80%(and has increased ated in a very different context than in the past. from 71%to 78%for young men).The percent- This is true in at least two senses.First,individ- age who respond that "having a good marriage uals now experience a vast latitude for choice in and family life"is extremely important has also their personal lives.More forms of marriage remained constant,at about 80%for young and more alternatives to marriage are socially women and 70%for young men (Thornton acceptable.Moreover,one may fit marriage into Young-DeMarco,2001).What is more,in the one's life in many ways:One may first live with 1990s and early 2000s,a strong promarriage

(1991, 1992) in Britain and Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim in Germany (1995, 2002) also have written about the growing indi￾vidualization of personal life. Consistent with the idea of deinstitutionalization, they note the declining power of social norms and laws as reg￾ulating mechanisms for family life, and they stress the expanding role of personal choice. They argue that as traditional sources of identity such as class, religion, and community lose influence, one’s intimate relationships become central to self-identity. Giddens (1991, 1992) writes of the emergence of the ‘‘pure relation￾ship’’: an intimate partnership entered into for its own sake, which lasts only as long as both part￾ners are satisfied with the rewards (mostly inti￾macy and love) that they get from it. It is in some ways the logical extension of the increas￾ing individualism and the deinstitutionalization of marriage that occurred in the 20th century. The pure relationship is not tied to an institu￾tion such as marriage or to the desire to raise children. Rather, it is ‘‘free-floating,’’ indepen￾dent of social institutions or economic life. Unlike marriage, it is not regulated by law, and its mem￾bers do not enjoy special legal rights. It exists pri￾marily in the realms of emotion and self-identity. Although the theorists of late modernity believe that the quest for intimacy is becoming the central focus of personal life, they do not predict that marriage will remain distinctive and important. Marriage, they claim, has become a choice rather than a necessity for adults who want intimacy, companionship, and children. According to Beck and Beck￾Gernsheim (1995), we will see ‘‘a huge variety of ways of living together or apart which will continue to exist side by side’’ (pp. 141–142). Giddens (1992) even argues that marriage has already become ‘‘just one life-style among others’’ (p. 154), although people may not yet realize it because of institutional lag. The Current Context of Marriage Overall, research and writing on the changing meaning of marriage suggest that it is now situ￾ated in a very different context than in the past. This is true in at least two senses. First, individ￾uals now experience a vast latitude for choice in their personal lives. More forms of marriage and more alternatives to marriage are socially acceptable. Moreover, one may fit marriage into one’s life in many ways: One may first live with a partner, or sequentially with several partners, without an explicit consideration of whether a marriage will occur. One may have children with one’s eventual spouse or with someone else before marrying. One may, in some juris￾dictions, marry someone of the same gender and build a shared marital world with few guidelines to rely on. Within marriage, roles are more flexible and negotiable, although women still do more than their share of the household work and childrearing. The second difference is in the nature of the rewards that people seek through marriage and other close relationships. Individuals aim for personal growth and deeper intimacy through more open communication and mutually shared disclosures about feelings with their partners. They may feel justified in insisting on changes in a relationship that no longer provides them with individualized rewards. In contrast, they are less likely than in the past to focus on the re￾wards to be found in fulfilling socially valued roles such as the good parent or the loyal and supportive spouse. The result of these changing contexts has been a deinstitutionalization of marriage, in which social norms about family and personal life count for less than they did during the heyday of the companionate mar￾riage, and far less than during the period of the institutional marriage. Instead, personal choice and self-development loom large in people’s construction of their marital careers. WHY DO PEOPLE STILL MARRY? There is a puzzle within the story of deinstitu￾tionalization that needs solving. Although fewer Americans are marrying than during the peak years of marriage in the mid-20th century, most—nearly 90%, according to a recent esti￾mate (Goldstein & Kenney, 2001)—will even￾tually marry. A survey of high school seniors conducted annually since 1976 shows no decline in the importance they attach to mar￾riage. The percentage of young women who respond that they expect to marry has stayed constant at roughly 80% (and has increased from 71% to 78% for young men). The percent￾age who respond that ‘‘having a good marriage and family life’’ is extremely important has also remained constant, at about 80% for young women and 70% for young men (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001). What is more, in the 1990s and early 2000s, a strong promarriage Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage 853

854 Journal of Marriage and Family movement emerged among gay men and lesbi- tection.In the 1950s,half of all unmarried preg- ans in the United States,who sought the right to nant women in the United States married before marry with increasing success.Clearly,mar- the birth of their child.whereas in the 1990s. riage remains important to many people in the only one fourth married (U.S.Census Bureau, United States.Consequently,I think the inter- 1999).Finally,evolutionary theory cannot esting question is not why so few people are explain the persistence of the formal wedding marrying,but rather,why so many people are style in which people are still marrying (see marrying,or planning to marry,or hoping to below).Studies of preindustrial societies have marry,when cohabitation and single parent- found that although many have elaborate ceremo- hood are widely acceptable options.(This ques- nies,others have little or no ceremony (Ember. tion may be less relevant in Canada and the Ember,Peregrine,2002;Stephens,1963). many European nations where the estimated The mid-20th century specialization model of proportions of who will ever marry are lower.) economist Gary Becker (1965,1981)also seems less relevant than when it was intro- The Gains to Marriage duced.Becker assumed that women were rela- tively more productive at home than men,and The dominant theoretical perspectives on mar- that men were relatively more productive (i.e., riage in the 20th century do not provide much they could earn higher wages)in the labor mar- guidance on the question of why marriage re- ket.He argued that women and men could mains so popular.The structural functionalists increase their utility by exchanging,through in social anthropology and sociology in the marriage,women's home work for men's labor early-to mid-20th century emphasized the role market work.The specialization model would of marriage in ensuring that a child would have predict that in the present era,women with less a link to the status of a man,a right to his pro- labor market potential would be more likely to tection,and a claim to inherit his property marry because they would gain the most econom- (Mair,1971).But as the law began to recognize ically from finding a husband.But several studies the rights of children born outside marriage,and show that in recent decades,women in the United as mothers acquired resources by working in States and Canada with less education (and there- the paid work force,these reasons for marriage fore less labor market potential)are less likely to become less important. marry (Lichter,McLaughlin,Kephart,Landry, Nor is evolutionary theory very helpful. 1992;Oppenheimer,Blossfeld,Wackerow, Although there may be important evolutionary 1995;Qian Preston,1993;Sweeney,2002; influences on family behavior.it is unlikely that Turcotte Goldscheider,1998).This finding humans have developed an innate preference suggests that the specialization model may no for marriage as we know it.The classical longer hold.Moreover,the specialization model account of our evolutionary heritage is that was developed before cohabitation was wide- women,whose reproductive capacity is limited spread,and offers no explanation for why cou- by pregnancy and lactation (which delays the ples would marry rather than cohabit. return of ovulation),seek stable pair bonds with From a rational choice perspective,then, men,whereas men seek to maximize their fertil- what benefits might contemporary marriage ity by impregnating many women.Rather than offer that would lead cohabiting couples to being "natural,"marriage-centered kinship was marry rather than cohabit?I suggest that the described in much early-and mid-20th century major benefit is what we might call enforceable anthropological writing as the social invention trust (Cherlin,2000;Portes Sensenbrenner. that solved the problem of the sexually wander- 1993).Marriage still requires a public commit- ing male (Tiger Fox,1971).Moreover,when ment to a long-term,possibly lifelong relation- dependable male providers are not available, ship.This commitment is usually expressed in women may prefer a reproductive strategy of front of relatives,friends.and religious con- relying on a network of female kin and more gregants.Cohabitation,in contrast,requires than one man (Hrdy,1999).In addition,mar- only a private commitment,which is easier to riages are increasingly being formed well after break.Therefore,marriage,more so than cohab- a child is born,yet evolutionary theory suggests itation,lowers the risk that one's partner will that the impetus to marry should be greatest renege on agreements that have been made.In when newbom children need support and pro- the language of economic theory,marriage

movement emerged among gay men and lesbi￾ans in the United States, who sought the right to marry with increasing success. Clearly, mar￾riage remains important to many people in the United States. Consequently, I think the inter￾esting question is not why so few people are marrying, but rather, why so many people are marrying, or planning to marry, or hoping to marry, when cohabitation and single parent￾hood are widely acceptable options. (This ques￾tion may be less relevant in Canada and the many European nations where the estimated proportions of who will ever marry are lower.) The Gains to Marriage The dominant theoretical perspectives on mar￾riage in the 20th century do not provide much guidance on the question of why marriage re￾mains so popular. The structural functionalists in social anthropology and sociology in the early- to mid-20th century emphasized the role of marriage in ensuring that a child would have a link to the status of a man, a right to his pro￾tection, and a claim to inherit his property (Mair, 1971). But as the law began to recognize the rights of children born outside marriage, and as mothers acquired resources by working in the paid work force, these reasons for marriage become less important. Nor is evolutionary theory very helpful. Although there may be important evolutionary influences on family behavior, it is unlikely that humans have developed an innate preference for marriage as we know it. The classical account of our evolutionary heritage is that women, whose reproductive capacity is limited by pregnancy and lactation (which delays the return of ovulation), seek stable pair bonds with men, whereas men seek to maximize their fertil￾ity by impregnating many women. Rather than being ‘‘natural,’’ marriage-centered kinship was described in much early- and mid-20th century anthropological writing as the social invention that solved the problem of the sexually wander￾ing male (Tiger & Fox, 1971). Moreover, when dependable male providers are not available, women may prefer a reproductive strategy of relying on a network of female kin and more than one man (Hrdy, 1999). In addition, mar￾riages are increasingly being formed well after a child is born, yet evolutionary theory suggests that the impetus to marry should be greatest when newborn children need support and pro￾tection. In the 1950s, half of all unmarried preg￾nant women in the United States married before the birth of their child, whereas in the 1990s, only one fourth married (U.S. Census Bureau, 1999). Finally, evolutionary theory cannot explain the persistence of the formal wedding style in which people are still marrying (see below). Studies of preindustrial societies have found that although many have elaborate ceremo￾nies, others have little or no ceremony (Ember, Ember, & Peregrine, 2002; Stephens, 1963). The mid-20th century specialization model of economist Gary Becker (1965, 1981) also seems less relevant than when it was intro￾duced. Becker assumed that women were rela￾tively more productive at home than men, and that men were relatively more productive (i.e., they could earn higher wages) in the labor mar￾ket. He argued that women and men could increase their utility by exchanging, through marriage, women’s home work for men’s labor market work. The specialization model would predict that in the present era, women with less labor market potential would be more likely to marry because they would gain the most econom￾ically from finding a husband. But several studies show that in recent decades, women in the United States and Canada with less education (and there￾fore less labor market potential) are less likely to marry (Lichter, McLaughlin, Kephart, & Landry, 1992; Oppenheimer, Blossfeld, & Wackerow, 1995; Qian & Preston, 1993; Sweeney, 2002; Turcotte & Goldscheider, 1998). This finding suggests that the specialization model may no longer hold. Moreover, the specialization model was developed before cohabitation was wide￾spread, and offers no explanation for why cou￾ples would marry rather than cohabit. From a rational choice perspective, then, what benefits might contemporary marriage offer that would lead cohabiting couples to marry rather than cohabit? I suggest that the major benefit is what we might call enforceable trust (Cherlin, 2000; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). Marriage still requires a public commit￾ment to a long-term, possibly lifelong relation￾ship. This commitment is usually expressed in front of relatives, friends, and religious con￾gregants. Cohabitation, in contrast, requires only a private commitment, which is easier to break. Therefore, marriage, more so than cohab￾itation, lowers the risk that one’s partner will renege on agreements that have been made. In the language of economic theory, marriage 854 Journal of Marriage and Family

Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage 855 lowers the transaction costs of enforcing agree- may even have increased.Marriage is at once ments between the partners (Pollak,1985).It al- less dominant and more distinctive than it was. lows individuals to invest in the partnership It has evolved from a marker of conformity to with less fear of abandonment.For instance,it a marker of prestige.Marriage is a status one allows the partners to invest financially in joint builds up to,often by living with a partner long-term purchases such as homes and auto- beforehand.by attaining steady employment or mobiles.It allows caregivers to make relation- starting a career,by putting away some savings, ship-specific investments (England Farkas, and even by having children.Marriage's place 1986)in the couple's children-investments of in the life course used to come before those in- time and effort that,unlike strengthening one's vestments were made,but now it often comes job skills,would not be easily portable to afterward.It used to be the foundation of adult another intimate relationship. personal life;now it is sometimes the capstone. Nevertheless,the difference in the amount of It is something to be achieved through one's enforceable trust that marriage brings,compared own efforts rather than something to which one with cohabitation,is eroding.Although relatives routinely accedes. and friends will view a divorce with disappoint- ment,they will accept it more readily than their How Low-Income Individuals See Marriage counterparts would have two generations ago. As I noted,cohabiting couples are increasingly Paradoxically,it is among the lower social strata gaining the rights previously reserved to married in the United States,where marriage rates are couples.It seems likely that over time,the legal lowest,that both the persistent preference for differences between cohabitation and marriage marriage and its changing meaning seem clear- will become minimal in the United States,Cana- est.Although marriage is optional and often da,and many European countries.The advan- foregone,it has by no means faded away among tage of marriage in enhancing trust will then the poor and near poor.Instead,it is a much depend on the force of public commitments, sought-after but elusive goal.They tell observ- both secular and religious,by the partners. ers that they wish to marry,but will do so only In general,the prevailing theoretical perspec- when they are sure they can do it successfully: tives are of greater value in explaining why mar- when their partner has demonstrated the ability riage has declined than why it persists.With to hold a decent job and treat them fairly and more women working outside the home,the pre- without abuse,when they have a security dictions of the specialization model are less rele- deposit or a down payment for a decent apart- vant.Although the rational choice theorists ment or home,and when they have enough in remind us that marriage still provides enforce- the bank to pay for a nice wedding party for able trust,it seems clear that its enforcement family and friends.Edin and Kefalas (forthcom- power is declining.Recently,evolutionary theo- ing),who studied childbearing and intimate re- rists have argued that women who have difficulty lationships among 165 mothers in 8 low-and finding men who are reliable providers might moderate-income Philadelphia neighborhoods, choose a reproductive strategy that involves sin- wrote,"In some sense,marriage is a form of gle parenthood and kin networks,a strategy that social bragging about the quality of the couple is consistent with changes that have occurred in relationship,a powerfully symbolic way of ele- low-income families.And although the insights vating one's relationship above others in the of the theorists of late moderity help us under- community,particularly in a community where stand the changing meaning of marriage,they marriage is rare.” predict that marriage will lose its distinctive sta- Along with several collaborators,I am con- tus,and indeed may already have become just ducting a study of low-income families in three one lifestyle among others.Why,then,are so United States cities.The ethnographic compo- many people still marrying? nent of that study is directed by Linda Burton of Pennsylvania State University.A 27-year-old mother told one of our ethnographers: The Symbolic Significance of Marriage What has happened is that although the practi- I was poor all my life and so was Reginald When I got pregnant,we agreed we would marry cal importance of being married has declined, some day in the future because we loved each its symbolic importance has remained high,and other and wanted to raise our child together.But

lowers the transaction costs of enforcing agree￾ments between the partners (Pollak, 1985). It al￾lows individuals to invest in the partnership with less fear of abandonment. For instance, it allows the partners to invest financially in joint long-term purchases such as homes and auto￾mobiles. It allows caregivers to make relation￾ship-specific investments (England & Farkas, 1986) in the couple’s children—investments of time and effort that, unlike strengthening one’s job skills, would not be easily portable to another intimate relationship. Nevertheless, the difference in the amount of enforceable trust that marriage brings, compared with cohabitation, is eroding. Although relatives and friends will view a divorce with disappoint￾ment, they will accept it more readily than their counterparts would have two generations ago. As I noted, cohabiting couples are increasingly gaining the rights previously reserved to married couples. It seems likely that over time, the legal differences between cohabitation and marriage will become minimal in the United States, Cana￾da, and many European countries. The advan￾tage of marriage in enhancing trust will then depend on the force of public commitments, both secular and religious, by the partners. In general, the prevailing theoretical perspec￾tives are of greater value in explaining why mar￾riage has declined than why it persists. With more women working outside the home, the pre￾dictions of the specialization model are less rele￾vant. Although the rational choice theorists remind us that marriage still provides enforce￾able trust, it seems clear that its enforcement power is declining. Recently, evolutionary theo￾rists have argued that women who have difficulty finding men who are reliable providers might choose a reproductive strategy that involves sin￾gle parenthood and kin networks, a strategy that is consistent with changes that have occurred in low-income families. And although the insights of the theorists of late modernity help us under￾stand the changing meaning of marriage, they predict that marriage will lose its distinctive sta￾tus, and indeed may already have become just one lifestyle among others. Why, then, are so many people still marrying? The Symbolic Significance of Marriage What has happened is that although the practi￾cal importance of being married has declined, its symbolic importance has remained high, and may even have increased. Marriage is at once less dominant and more distinctive than it was. It has evolved from a marker of conformity to a marker of prestige. Marriage is a status one builds up to, often by living with a partner beforehand, by attaining steady employment or starting a career, by putting away some savings, and even by having children. Marriage’s place in the life course used to come before those in￾vestments were made, but now it often comes afterward. It used to be the foundation of adult personal life; now it is sometimes the capstone. It is something to be achieved through one’s own efforts rather than something to which one routinely accedes. How Low-Income Individuals See Marriage Paradoxically, it is among the lower social strata in the United States, where marriage rates are lowest, that both the persistent preference for marriage and its changing meaning seem clear￾est. Although marriage is optional and often foregone, it has by no means faded away among the poor and near poor. Instead, it is a much sought-after but elusive goal. They tell observ￾ers that they wish to marry, but will do so only when they are sure they can do it successfully: when their partner has demonstrated the ability to hold a decent job and treat them fairly and without abuse, when they have a security deposit or a down payment for a decent apart￾ment or home, and when they have enough in the bank to pay for a nice wedding party for family and friends. Edin and Kefalas (forthcom￾ing), who studied childbearing and intimate re￾lationships among 165 mothers in 8 low- and moderate-income Philadelphia neighborhoods, wrote, ‘‘In some sense, marriage is a form of social bragging about the quality of the couple relationship, a powerfully symbolic way of ele￾vating one’s relationship above others in the community, particularly in a community where marriage is rare.’’ Along with several collaborators, I am con￾ducting a study of low-income families in three United States cities. The ethnographic compo￾nent of that study is directed by Linda Burton of Pennsylvania State University. A 27-year-old mother told one of our ethnographers: I was poor all my life and so was Reginald. When I got pregnant, we agreed we would marry some day in the future because we loved each other and wanted to raise our child together. But Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage 855

856 Journal of Marriage and Family we would not get married until we could afford eventual divorce,”and82%agreed that“Itis to get a house and pay all the utility bills on time. extremely important to you to be economically I have this thing about utility bills.Our gas and electric got turned off all the time when we were set before you get married."Moreover,most growing up and we wanted to make sure that indicated a view of marriage as centered on inti- would not happen when we got married.That macy and love more than on practical matters was our biggest worry....We worked together such as finances and children.Ninety-four per- and built up savings and then we got married.It's cent of those who had never married agreed that forever for us. "when you marry,you want your spouse to be Another woman in our study,already living your soul mate,first and foremost."In contrast, with the man she was engaged to and had chil- only 16%agreed that "the main purpose of dren with,told an ethnographer she was not yet marriage these days is to have children."And ready to marry him: over 80%of the women agreed that it is more important "to have a husband who can commu- But I'm not ready to do that yet.I told him,we're not financially ready yet.He knows that.I told nicate about his deepest feelings than to have him by the end of this year,maybe.I told him a husband who makes a good living."The au- that last year.Plus,we both need to lear to con- thors of the report conclude,"While marriage is trol our tempers,you could say.He doesn't losing much of its broad public and institutional understand that bills and kids and [our relation- character,it is gaining popularity as a Super- ship]come first,not [his]going out and getting new clothes or [his]doing this and that.It's the Relationship,an intensely private spiritualized kids,then us.He gets paid good,about five hun- union,combining sexual fidelity,romantic love, dred dollars a week.How hard is it to give me emotional intimacy,and togetherness"(p.13). money and help with the bills? Note that for this woman,more is required of The Wedding as a Status Symbol a man than a steady job before he is marriage- able.He has to leamn to tum over most of his Even the wedding has become an individual paycheck to his family rather than spending it achievement.In the distant past,a wedding was an event at which two kinship groups formed an on his friends and himself.He must put his rela- alliance.More recently,it has been an event tionship with his partner ahead of running with his single male friends,a way of saying that organized and paid for by parents,at which they display their approval and support for their a husband must place a priority on providing companionship and intimacy to his wife and on child's marriage.In both cases,it has been the ritual that provides legal and social approval for being sexually faithful.And he and his partner have to learn to control their tempers,a vague having children.But in keeping with the deinsti- referent to the possibility that physical abuse tutionalization of marriage,it is now becoming an event centered on and often controlled by the exists in the relationship.In sum,the demands couple themselves,having less to do with fam- low-income women place on men include not just a reliable income,as important as that is, ily approval or having children than in the past. One might assume,then,that weddings would but also a commitment to put family first,pro- become smaller and that many couples would vide companionship,be faithful,and avoid abu- forgo a public wedding altogether.But that does sive behavior. not appear to have happened for most couples. The wedding,it seems,has become an impor- How Young Adults in General See It tant symbol of the partners'personal achieve- ments and a stage in their self-development The changing meaning of marriage is not (Bulcroft,Bulcroft,Bradley,Simpson,2000). limited to the low-income population.Consider A 1984 survey of 459 ever-married women a nationally representative survey of 1,003 in the Detroit metropolitan area provided infor- adults,ages 20-29,conducted in 2001 on mation on trends in wedding practices in the attitudes toward marriage (Whitehead United States during much of the 20th century. Popenoe,2001).A majority responded in ways Whyte (1990)divided the women into a prewar suggestive of the view that marriage is a status group who married between 1925 and 1944, that one builds up to.Sixty-two percent agreed a baby boom group who married between 1945 with the statement,"Living together with some- and 1964,and a more recent group who married one before marriage is a good way to avoid an between 1965 and 1984.Across the more than

we would not get married until we could afford to get a house and pay all the utility bills on time. I have this thing about utility bills. Our gas and electric got turned off all the time when we were growing up and we wanted to make sure that would not happen when we got married. That was our biggest worry. . We worked together and built up savings and then we got married. It’s forever for us. Another woman in our study, already living with the man she was engaged to and had chil￾dren with, told an ethnographer she was not yet ready to marry him: But I’m not ready to do that yet. I told him, we’re not financially ready yet. He knows that. I told him by the end of this year, maybe. I told him that last year. Plus, we both need to learn to con￾trol our tempers, you could say. He doesn’t understand that bills and kids and [our relation￾ship] come first, not [his] going out and getting new clothes or [his] doing this and that. It’s the kids, then us. He gets paid good, about five hun￾dred dollars a week. How hard is it to give me money and help with the bills? Note that for this woman, more is required of a man than a steady job before he is marriage￾able. He has to learn to turn over most of his paycheck to his family rather than spending it on his friends and himself. He must put his rela￾tionship with his partner ahead of running with his single male friends, a way of saying that a husband must place a priority on providing companionship and intimacy to his wife and on being sexually faithful. And he and his partner have to learn to control their tempers, a vague referent to the possibility that physical abuse exists in the relationship. In sum, the demands low-income women place on men include not just a reliable income, as important as that is, but also a commitment to put family first, pro￾vide companionship, be faithful, and avoid abu￾sive behavior. How Young Adults in General See It The changing meaning of marriage is not limited to the low-income population. Consider a nationally representative survey of 1,003 adults, ages 20–29, conducted in 2001 on attitudes toward marriage (Whitehead & Popenoe, 2001). A majority responded in ways suggestive of the view that marriage is a status that one builds up to. Sixty-two percent agreed with the statement, ‘‘Living together with some￾one before marriage is a good way to avoid an eventual divorce,’’ and 82% agreed that ‘‘It is extremely important to you to be economically set before you get married.’’ Moreover, most indicated a view of marriage as centered on inti￾macy and love more than on practical matters such as finances and children. Ninety-four per￾cent of those who had never married agreed that ‘‘when you marry, you want your spouse to be your soul mate, first and foremost.’’ In contrast, only 16% agreed that ‘‘the main purpose of marriage these days is to have children.’’ And over 80% of the women agreed that it is more important ‘‘to have a husband who can commu￾nicate about his deepest feelings than to have a husband who makes a good living.’’ The au￾thors of the report conclude, ‘‘While marriage is losing much of its broad public and institutional character, it is gaining popularity as a Super￾Relationship, an intensely private spiritualized union, combining sexual fidelity, romantic love, emotional intimacy, and togetherness’’ (p. 13). The Wedding as a Status Symbol Even the wedding has become an individual achievement. In the distant past, a wedding was an event at which two kinship groups formed an alliance. More recently, it has been an event organized and paid for by parents, at which they display their approval and support for their child’s marriage. In both cases, it has been the ritual that provides legal and social approval for having children. But in keeping with the deinsti￾tutionalization of marriage, it is now becoming an event centered on and often controlled by the couple themselves, having less to do with fam￾ily approval or having children than in the past. One might assume, then, that weddings would become smaller and that many couples would forgo a public wedding altogether. But that does not appear to have happened for most couples. The wedding, it seems, has become an impor￾tant symbol of the partners’ personal achieve￾ments and a stage in their self-development (Bulcroft, Bulcroft, Bradley, & Simpson, 2000). A 1984 survey of 459 ever-married women in the Detroit metropolitan area provided infor￾mation on trends in wedding practices in the United States during much of the 20th century. Whyte (1990) divided the women into a prewar group who married between 1925 and 1944, a baby boom group who married between 1945 and 1964, and a more recent group who married between 1965 and 1984. Across the more than 856 Journal of Marriage and Family