CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH ATHENS UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS Report No.E115 QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN SHIPPING: A SURVEY OF CURRENT USE AND FUTURE TRENDS Evangelos F.Magirou Department of Informatics Athens University of Economics and Business Harilaos N.Psaraftis Department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering National Technical University of Athens Nikolaos M.Christodoulakis Department of International and European Economic Studies Athens University of Economics and Business ATHENS April 1992
CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH ATHENS UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS Report No. E115 QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN SHIPPING: A SURVEY OF CURRENT USE AND FUTURE TRENDS Evangelos F. Magirou Department of Informatics Athens University of Economics and Business Harilaos N. Psaraftis Department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering National Technical University of Athens Nikolaos M. Christodoulakis Department of International and European Economic Studies Athens University of Economics and Business ATHENS April 1992
2 Table of Contents 0.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 4 1.INTRODUCTION 5 2.THE MAJOR SHIPPING ACTIVITIES 6 2.1 SHIP OWNERS 6 2.2 CHARTERERS 8 2.3 BROKERS 8 2.4 BANKS 9 2.5INSURANCE 10 2.6 SHIPYARDS 11 2.7 THE SHIPPING SECTOR IN THE GREEK ECONOMY 11 3.A SURVEY OF EXISTING METHODS AND TOOLS 13 3.1 FORECASTING 13 3.2 FREIGHT RATE AS FUNCTION OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND 14 3.3 CHARTER MARKET DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY 15 3.4 INVESTMENT AND PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 分 3.5 ACQUISITION STRATEGY-NEW BUILDINGS AND SECOND HAND 16 3.6 THE OPTIMUM SPEED OF SHIPS 17 3.7 WEATHER ROUTING 18 3.8 OPTIMAL LOADING PROBLEMS 18 3.9 MAINTENANCE AND REPLACEMENT 19 3.10 ROUTING,SCHEDULING,AND VESSEL POSITIONING 20 4.THE IMPACT OF QUANTITATIVE METHODS:THE PIRAEUS SCENE. 21 4.1 SHIPPING COMPANIES 21
2 Table of Contents 0. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 4 1. INTRODUCTION 5 2. THE MAJOR SHIPPING ACTIVITIES 6 2. 1 SHIP OWNERS 6 2. 2 CHARTERERS 8 2. 3 BROKERS 8 2. 4 BANKS 9 2. 5 INSURANCE 10 2. 6 SHIPYARDS 11 2. 7 THE SHIPPING SECTOR IN THE GREEK ECONOMY 11 3. A SURVEY OF EXISTING METHODS AND TOOLS 13 3. 1 FORECASTING 13 3. 2 FREIGHT RATE AS FUNCTION OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND 14 3. 3 CHARTER MARKET DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY 15 3. 4 INVESTMENT AND PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 15 3. 5 ACQUISITION STRATEGY - NEW BUILDINGS AND SECOND HAND 16 3. 6 THE OPTIMUM SPEED OF SHIPS 17 3. 7 WEATHER ROUTING 18 3. 8 OPTIMAL LOADING PROBLEMS 18 3. 9 MAINTENANCE AND REPLACEMENT 19 3. 10 ROUTING, SCHEDULING, AND VESSEL POSITIONING 20 4. THE IMPACT OF QUANTITATIVE METHODS: THE PIRAEUS SCENE. 21 4. 1 SHIPPING COMPANIES 21
3 4.2 BROKERS 22 4.3 BANKS 23 4.4 CHARTERERS 23 5.PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS 24 6.REFERENCES 27 7.APPENDIX 29 7.1 OPTIMAL SPEED OF SHIPS 29 7.2 CHARTER MARKET DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY 30 7.3 OPTIMAL POSITIONING 7.4 SHIP ACQUISITION POLICIES 31 7.5 PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS OF SHIPPING DECISIONS 32 7.6 CARGO SELECTION 32 7.7 OPTIMAL WORLD PETROLEUM FLOWS 33 7.8 WEATHER ROUTING 34 7.9 NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN FORECASTING AND ECONOMETRICS 7.9.1 Time-series Analysis and Forecasting. 515 7.9.2 Advances in Econometric modelling. 6
3 4. 2 BROKERS 22 4. 3 BANKS 23 4. 4 CHARTERERS 23 5. PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS 24 6. REFERENCES 27 7. APPENDIX 29 7. 1 OPTIMAL SPEED OF SHIPS 29 7. 2 CHARTER MARKET DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY 30 7. 3 OPTIMAL POSITIONING 31 7. 4 SHIP ACQUISITION POLICIES 31 7. 5 PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS OF SHIPPING DECISIONS 32 7. 6 CARGO SELECTION 32 7. 7 OPTIMAL WORLD PETROLEUM FLOWS 33 7. 8 WEATHER ROUTING 34 7. 9 NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN FORECASTING AND ECONOMETRICS 35 7. 9.1 Time-series Analysis and Forecasting. 35 7. 9.2 Advances in Econometric modelling. 36
0.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We are deeply grateful to the following persons who were kind enough to discuss with us various aspects of this report.Particular acknowledgement goes to Nikos Karelis,Michail Kokkinis,George Panagakos and Petros Pappas.Of course,all opinions expressed herein are those of the authors who are solely responsible for its contents. Tasos Aslidis,Marsoft(Cambridge Mass.) .Costas Bardjis,Marsoft(Cambridge Mass.) Nikos Berstianos,Pyrsos Managing Erik Broekhuizen,BulkNedlloyd (Rotterdam) Hercules Charalambides,World Maritime University (Malmoe) John Coustas,Danaos Management Consultants George Economou,Dry Bulk Aris Gavrielides,Eletson Corporation Costas Grammenos,City University (London) Dennis Hayter,MERC(Rotterdam) John Karastamatis,Eletson Corporation .Nikos Karelis,Midland Bank Michail Kokkinis,Link Maritime Anastassios Kouverianos,Eletson Corporation Nikos Kydonakis,The Swedish Club George Lertas,Eletson Corporation Marianna Moschou,Citibank Kees Oosterhout,BulkNedlloyd (Rotterdam) George Panagakos,DAS International Consultants Dimitrios Paizis,Eletson Corporation Petros Pappas,Ocean Bulk Iraklis Prokopakis,Styga Compania Naviera Panos Solomonides,Midland Bank George Spanos,Spanos Maritime and Trading Terry Trikoglou,Underwriter Leonidas Valmas,A.Karaindros Marine John Vassilakis,Aeolos Maarten Volgers,MERC (Rotterdam) Jelle Wolthuizen,Neddata(Rotterdam) Mathios Zarbis,United Shipping and Trading of Greece
4 0. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We are deeply grateful to the following persons who were kind enough to discuss with us various aspects of this report. Particular acknowledgement goes to Nikos Karelis, Michail Kokkinis, George Panagakos and Petros Pappas. Of course, all opinions expressed herein are those of the authors who are solely responsible for its contents. • Tasos Aslidis, Marsoft (Cambridge Mass.) • Costas Bardjis, Marsoft (Cambridge Mass.) • Nikos Berstianos, Pyrsos Managing • Erik Broekhuizen, BulkNedlloyd (Rotterdam) • Hercules Charalambides, World Maritime University (Malmoe) • John Coustas, Danaos Management Consultants • George Economou, Dry Bulk • Aris Gavrielides, Eletson Corporation • Costas Grammenos, City University (London) • Dennis Hayter, MERC (Rotterdam) • John Karastamatis, Eletson Corporation • Nikos Karelis, Midland Bank • Michail Kokkinis, Link Maritime • Anastassios Kouverianos, Eletson Corporation • Nikos Kydonakis, The Swedish Club • George Lertas, Eletson Corporation • Marianna Moschou, Citibank • Kees Oosterhout, BulkNedlloyd (Rotterdam) • George Panagakos, DAS International Consultants • Dimitrios Paizis, Eletson Corporation • Petros Pappas, Ocean Bulk • Iraklis Prokopakis, Styga Compania Naviera • Panos Solomonides, Midland Bank • George Spanos, Spanos Maritime and Trading • Terry Trikoglou , Underwriter • Leonidas Valmas, A.Karaindros Marine • John Vassilakis, Aeolos • Maarten Volgers, MERC (Rotterdam) • Jelle Wolthuizen, Neddata (Rotterdam) • Mathios Zarbis, United Shipping and Trading of Greece
5 1.INTRODUCTION Ocean shipping is a lucrative and risky business.As pointed out by many of its students. its charter market component is perhaps the purest form of a perfectly competitive market, barriers to entry being smaller than in any other big business and government regulation being extremely difficult to enforce.However,the near perfect market character of chartered shipping coupled with the long lead time required for newbuildings makes it subject to particular violent dynamic effects.As supply of shipping services can only sluggishly adapt to fast changes in demand,the market is plagued by violent fluctuations long periods of depressions followed by booms. One would expect that such competitive conditions make shipping a prime target for the application of quantitative managerial methods,which we will in general refer to as Management Science for short,while making explicit mention of other fields such as Economics,Finance or Forecasting as appropriate.Indeed such analyses began in the 30's with Koopmans'(1939)celebrated work and were revitalized in the 60's by several eminent researchers among which the late Zenon Zannetos.Since then,several efforts have been made to adapt to shipping successful quantitative methods from other fields such as Decision Theory,Mathematical Programming or Portfolio Theory,as evidenced in the 1972 Seminaron Shipping Management in Bergen(Lorange and Norman,1973).The textbooks by Devanney (1971)and Evans-Marlow(1985)are also evident of this trend. In the 80's computer literacy has greatly increased in the shipping business,providing thus data for more sophisticated analyses.Sophistication was also vastly increased in the analyses performed by banks at the wake of heavy losses in their shipping loans following the depressions of the period.However,there is a strong feeling between those involved in shipping that any sort of formal analysis plays a secondary or even tertiary role compared to other qualities such as the gut feeling for the ups and downs of the market, knowledge of the technical details and quirks of the particular fleet and various other trade secrets.Thus,even highly successful operators claim that they avoid using any but the most rudimentary form of analysis.Of course this is not true for big users of shipping services,and in particular of oil companies who routinely use Management Science to assess their shipping needs and coordinate them with their other activities -refining and finished product deliveries. The objective of this report is to survey quantitative methods developed in the fields of Management Science and Operations Research with regard to shipping-especially those aimed at the shipping operator;to assess their impact especially in the setting of Piraeus; and finally to point out specific refinements to existing methods or even suggest completely new methods whose development will hopefully serve pressing shipping decision making needs. In Chapter 2 of the Report we provide a synopsis of the role played by the major participants in the shipping scene with emphasis on the nature of the decisions they have to make.Chapter 3 gives an outline of the well-established Management Science methods in shipping.Chapter 4 surveys the actual use of hese methods in several Greek shipping firms,while Chapter 5 examines possible promising directions for research relevant to shipping needs.A detailed,technical exposition of the methodologies,existing or proposed is given in the Appendix
5 1. INTRODUCTION Ocean shipping is a lucrative and risky business. As pointed out by many of its students, its charter market component is perhaps the purest form of a perfectly competitive market, barriers to entry being smaller than in any other big business and government regulation being extremely difficult to enforce. However, the near perfect market character of chartered shipping coupled with the long lead time required for newbuildings makes it subject to particular violent dynamic effects. As supply of shipping services can only sluggishly adapt to fast changes in demand, the market is plagued by violent fluctuations - long periods of depressions followed by booms. One would expect that such competitive conditions make shipping a prime target for the application of quantitative managerial methods, which we will in general refer to as Management Science for short, while making explicit mention of other fields such as Economics, Finance or Forecasting as appropriate. Indeed such analyses began in the 30's with Koopmans' (1939) celebrated work and were revitalized in the 60's by several eminent researchers among which the late Zenon Zannetos. Since then, several efforts have been made to adapt to shipping successful quantitative methods from other fields such as Decision Theory, Mathematical Programming or Portfolio Theory, as evidenced in the 1972 Seminaron Shipping Management in Bergen (Lorange and Norman, 1973). The textbooks by Devanney (1971) and Evans-Marlow (1985) are also evident of this trend. In the 80's computer literacy has greatly increased in the shipping business, providing thus data for more sophisticated analyses. Sophistication was also vastly increased in the analyses performed by banks at the wake of heavy losses in their shipping loans following the depressions of the period. However, there is a strong feeling between those involved in shipping that any sort of formal analysis plays a secondary or even tertiary role compared to other qualities such as the gut feeling for the ups and downs of the market, knowledge of the technical details and quirks of the particular fleet and various other trade secrets. Thus, even highly successful operators claim that they avoid using any but the most rudimentary form of analysis. Of course this is not true for big users of shipping services, and in particular of oil companies who routinely use Management Science to assess their shipping needs and coordinate them with their other activities - refining and finished product deliveries. The objective of this report is to survey quantitative methods developed in the fields of Management Science and Operations Research with regard to shipping - especially those aimed at the shipping operator; to assess their impact especially in the setting of Piraeus; and finally to point out specific refinements to existing methods or even suggest completely new methods whose development will hopefully serve pressing shipping decision making needs. In Chapter 2 of the Report we provide a synopsis of the role played by the major participants in the shipping scene with emphasis on the nature of the decisions they have to make. Chapter 3 gives an outline of the well-established Management Science methods in shipping. Chapter 4 surveys the actual use of hese methods in several Greek shipping firms, while Chapter 5 examines possible promising directions for research relevant to shipping needs. A detailed, technical exposition of the methodologies, existing or proposed is given in the Appendix
6 2.THE MAJOR SHIPPING ACTIVITIES This section describes the major shipping activities,with an emphasis on the kinds of decisions facing each of the players in the market. 2.1 SHIP OWNERS Supply of marine transportation services is provided by ship owners,therefore decisions by ship owners play a crucial role in the shipping market.The fact that the spectrum of such decisions and the way they are made are very broad and diverse can be understood from the fact that the spectrum of owners in the market and the services they provide are equally broad and diverse:For instance,one may study (a)an independent tramp operator having only one ship,(b)a major oil company operating a fleet of tankers,(c)an owner operating a general cargo ship,(d)a large liner company such as Sea Land,who is owned by CSX,a railroad,and offers intermodal services,and so on.Since the economic scenario behind a particular case may vary dramatically,it would be a mistake to lump all ship owners into a single category and treat all decisions in a uniform way. A first-level classification that can be made is to divide shipping into two sectors:the charter (or tramp)market (where,as mentioned earlier,conditions of almost pure competition prevail),and the liner market(which is organized on a more or less cartelized basis).The charter market includes the tanker and drybulk markets as major components, and the liner market includes general cargo as well as unitized cargo ships (containerships and roll on/roll off(ro/ro)ships belong to the latter category) Ship ownership in the tanker market (the most significant component of the charter market)is divided between the so-called independent operators (or simply independents) and oil companies. An independent operator has no transport requirements of his own;he is there simply to offer his ships to the market.Decisions facing him can be classified into three lavels: strategic,tactical,and operational. Strategic decisions involve capital acquisition issues,such as the sale or purchase of a particular ship (or ships),including which shipyard to buy it from,when to do so,whether it is new or second-hand,what form of financing should be used,and so on.The planning horizon for such decisions is on the order of 5-20 years. Tactical desisions involve the allocation/utilization of ships owned by the operator, including the issue of which charter should be fixed,whether to offer the ship in the spot market or in the term market,whether the ship should be laid up,how the ship should be "positioned"to be best used in future charters,what should be the ship's operating speed,routine maintenance,and so on.Tactical decisions have a shorter planning horizon,on the order of a few months to 2 years. Finally,operational decisions have a much shorter time horizon (a few days to a few months),and involve issues of the day-to-day operation of the ship,such as management of stores and supplies,bunkering,non-routine maintenance,etc.The line between the tactical and operational decision levels is to some extent arbitrary and depends on the idiosyncrasy of the particular owner. At first glance,an oil company operating a tanker fleet faces similar kinds of decisions. However,the delineation of these decisions among the three levels,as well as the way these decisions are made may be very different from the case of an independent tanker owner.For instance,longer planning horizons are more likely to be used,and strategic
6 2. THE MAJOR SHIPPING ACTIVITIES This section describes the major shipping activities, with an emphasis on the kinds of decisions facing each of the players in the market. 2. 1 SHIP OWNERS Supply of marine transportation services is provided by ship owners, therefore decisions by ship owners play a crucial role in the shipping market. The fact that the spectrum of such decisions and the way they are made are very broad and diverse can be understood from the fact that the spectrum of owners in the market and the services they provide are equally broad and diverse: For instance, one may study (a) an independent tramp operator having only one ship, (b) a major oil company operating a fleet of tankers, (c) an owner operating a general cargo ship, (d) a large liner company such as Sea Land, who is owned by CSX, a railroad, and offers intermodal services, and so on. Since the economic scenario behind a particular case may vary dramatically, it would be a mistake to lump all ship owners into a single category and treat all decisions in a uniform way. A first-level classification that can be made is to divide shipping into two sectors: the charter (or tramp) market (where, as mentioned earlier, conditions of almost pure competition prevail), and the liner market (which is organized on a more or less cartelized basis). The charter market includes the tanker and drybulk markets as major components, and the liner market includes general cargo as well as unitized cargo ships (containerships and roll on/roll off (ro/ro) ships belong to the latter category). Ship ownership in the tanker market (the most significant component of the charter market) is divided between the so-called independent operators (or simply independents) and oil companies. An independent operator has no transport requirements of his own; he is there simply to offer his ships to the market. Decisions facing him can be classified into three lavels: strategic, tactical, and operational. Strategic decisions involve capital acquisition issues, such as the sale or purchase of a particular ship (or ships), including which shipyard to buy it from, when to do so, whether it is new or second-hand, what form of financing should be used, and so on. The planning horizon for such decisions is on the order of 5-20 years. Tactical desisions involve the allocation/utilization of ships owned by the operator, including the issue of which charter should be fixed, whether to offer the ship in the spot market or in the term market, whether the ship should be laid up, how the ship should be "positioned" to be best used in future charters, what should be the ship's operating speed, routine maintenance, and so on. Tactical decisions have a shorter planning horizon, on the order of a few months to 2 years. Finally, operational decisions have a much shorter time horizon (a few days to a few months), and involve issues of the day-to-day operation of the ship, such as management of stores and supplies, bunkering, non-routine maintenance, etc. The line between the tactical and operational decision levels is to some extent arbitrary and depends on the idiosyncrasy of the particular owner. At first glance, an oil company operating a tanker fleet faces similar kinds of decisions. However, the delineation of these decisions among the three levels, as well as the way these decisions are made may be very different from the case of an independent tanker owner. For instance, longer planning horizons are more likely to be used, and strategic
7 issues are likely to be more important.This means that decisions that are operational for an independent owner may be tactical for an oil company,and decisions that are tactical for an independent owner may be strategic for an oil company.As an example,an oil company may decide at the strategic level to use its ships only to carry its own oil,and not to offer them in the charter market.The fact that the function of an oil company's tanker division is mainly to satisfy the company's transport requirements(rather than make a profit in the market)means that the behavior of an oil company in the market will generally be quite different from that of an independent owner. Optimizing the utilization of an oil company's tanker fleet to transport its own oil is an area where important tactical decisions are made.These may include both the matching of vessels to specific shipping requests,and the routing and scheduling of these vessels. The situation in the drybulk market is similar with that in the tanker market.An additional type of decision however is important here,and involves the commodity,which the ship will carry.The drybulk market is less homogeneous than the tanker market in that it involves bulk cargo as diverse as coal,ores,grain,and others.With some exceptions,a ship may be used in many of these diverse trades,and exactly how this should be done becomes an important decision.This decision is more pronounced for OBO carriers (ore/bulk/oil),which can,in addition to the drybulk market,also trade in oil.Since this decision depends on the state of the various markets for the relevant commodities,it is a tactical type of decision and may also involve routing considerations. The second major component of the shipping market,the liner market,is organized along very different lines.It is natural therefore to expect different kinds of decisions.Indeed, one of the prime decisions facing a liner cartel(or conference)is how to set freight rates for the various commodities it carries.Traditional cartelization means that rates are set uniformly (ie are the same for all members of the cartel).The cartel then"charges what the traffic can bear".This means that on a $/ton basis there can be wide disparity among rates for commodities being carried on the same ship for the same trip.Liner market ratemaking is therefore a major type of decision,and a strategic one for that matter. Another strategic decision for each member of a shipping conference is the selection of routes that will be served,of the schedules that will be followed,and of the shipping capacity that will be placed on those routes.Service (as opposed to price)competition in the liner market means that decisions such as frequency of service and operating speed are very important. The advent of intermodal services (door-to-door or around-the-world)has introduced new kinds of services in the liner market.A detailed description of these services is beyond the scope of this report.However,it is obvious that important types of decisions are involved: these range from marine terminal management to intermodal network design,from intermodal rate-making to control of flow of empty containers,and from intermodal routing to schedule coordination across different modes(ship/rail or ship/road). As a general rule,in the liner market many more decisions are strategic in nature than in the charter market.This is due to the fact that many more costs in the liner market are fixed costs as opposed to variable.Of course,decisions on maintenance and replacement,management of stores and supplies etc.Are very similar in nature to their counterparts in the charter market
7 issues are likely to be more important. This means that decisions that are operational for an independent owner may be tactical for an oil company, and decisions that are tactical for an independent owner may be strategic for an oil company. As an example, an oil company may decide at the strategic level to use its ships only to carry its own oil, and not to offer them in the charter market. The fact that the function of an oil company's tanker division is mainly to satisfy the company's transport requirements (rather than make a profit in the market) means that the behavior of an oil company in the market will generally be quite different from that of an independent owner. Optimizing the utilization of an oil company's tanker fleet to transport its own oil is an area where important tactical decisions are made. These may include both the matching of vessels to specific shipping requests, and the routing and scheduling of these vessels. The situation in the drybulk market is similar with that in the tanker market. An additional type of decision however is important here, and involves the commodity, which the ship will carry. The drybulk market is less homogeneous than the tanker market in that it involves bulk cargo as diverse as coal, ores, grain, and others. With some exceptions, a ship may be used in many of these diverse trades, and exactly how this should be done becomes an important decision. This decision is more pronounced for OBO carriers (ore/bulk/oil), which can, in addition to the drybulk market, also trade in oil. Since this decision depends on the state of the various markets for the relevant commodities, it is a tactical type of decision and may also involve routing considerations. The second major component of the shipping market, the liner market, is organized along very different lines. It is natural therefore to expect different kinds of decisions. Indeed, one of the prime decisions facing a liner cartel (or conference) is how to set freight rates for the various commodities it carries. Traditional cartelization means that rates are set uniformly (ie are the same for all members of the cartel). The cartel then "charges what the traffic can bear". This means that on a $/ton basis there can be wide disparity among rates for commodities being carried on the same ship for the same trip. Liner market ratemaking is therefore a major type of decision, and a strategic one for that matter. Another strategic decision for each member of a shipping conference is the selection of routes that will be served, of the schedules that will be followed, and of the shipping capacity that will be placed on those routes. Service (as opposed to price) competition in the liner market means that decisions such as frequency of service and operating speed are very important. The advent of intermodal services (door-to-door or around-the-world) has introduced new kinds of services in the liner market. A detailed description of these services is beyond the scope of this report. However, it is obvious that important types of decisions are involved: these range from marine terminal management to intermodal network design, from intermodal rate-making to control of flow of empty containers, and from intermodal routing to schedule coordination across different modes (ship/rail or ship/road). As a general rule, in the liner market many more decisions are strategic in nature than in the charter market. This is due to the fact that many more costs in the liner market are fixed costs as opposed to variable. Of course, decisions on maintenance and replacement, management of stores and supplies etc. Are very similar in nature to their counterparts in the charter market
8 2.2 CHARTERERS In the charter market,the most important decision of a charterer is whether to go spot or buy a time charter.If the latter choice is made,the question is what is the best charter duration.Although this type of decision is tactical in nature(for it depends on expectations largely influenced by the state of the market),some charterers base it on strategic considerations and are not likely to change it significantly in view of charter market fluctuations:as an example,a particular oil company,in addition to being a ship owner, satisfies a large part of its requirements by chartering from independents mainly in the term market,and is not likely to change that philosophy as a result of the state of the market. Of course,a charterer in the term market can (if he wants)relet the vessel he has chartered,ie.Offer it in the spot market.This type of decision may make sense if the charterer has no actual other use for the ship during the period under consideration In the liner market,the spectrum of charterer decisions is usually confined to the selection of the liner company among the members of a cartel that provides better service to the shipper.The possible exception is if the scale of the shipment is large.In this case,it may make sense to "consolidate"freight and turn to the charter market as an alternative (ie. charter a whole ship if quantity warrants it). 2.3 BROKERS Ship brokers mediate between supply and demand of shipping services,fixing ships through single trip charters,time charters,contracts of affreightment and the like.They also mediate in the acts of sale and purchase of vessels,new or second hand and even in reorder deals.Such activities rely mainly on an efficient information collection process and ths modern communication media have revolutionized the business.Needless to say personal contacts play an all-important role. Efficient handling of data is of prime concern to brokers.In the process of fixing a client's ship the broker must present in an extremely short notice all available opportunities and help him select among alternative charters.The reverse process must be carried out for a charterer's demand;the available ships must be identified with all the relevant information concerning the ships'characteristics,location and other specific information,including of course the required fee. The sale of a particular ship also requires the compilation of technical data on the ship. More crucial is the identification of potential buyers.In the case of a client interested in purchasing a used ship of certain characteristics the data collection process is even more difficult.Advances in data processing allow reasonably sized brokerage houses to keep almost complete records of existing ships in CD stored databases that are compiled by specialized firms. Brokers are additionally called on to play a consultant's role for their clients.They might advise against a deal of sale,purchase or charter although this is against their short run interests,i.e.there is a loss of commission.This consulting activity is traditionally supported by the brokers'individual feel of the market,partly shaped by following the specialized literature,journals and reports.It is not often though that a shipping enconomist is employed in a brokerage house solely in a consulting capacity.As in every brokerage business,executives are valued for the business they bring and any consulting role that will only indirectly generate profits is secondary to the main profit generating function,fixing deals
8 2. 2 CHARTERERS In the charter market, the most important decision of a charterer is whether to go spot or buy a time charter. If the latter choice is made, the question is what is the best charter duration. Although this type of decision is tactical in nature (for it depends on expectations largely influenced by the state of the market), some charterers base it on strategic considerations and are not likely to change it significantly in view of charter market fluctuations: as an example, a particular oil company, in addition to being a ship owner, satisfies a large part of its requirements by chartering from independents mainly in the term market, and is not likely to change that philosophy as a result of the state of the market. Of course, a charterer in the term market can (if he wants) relet the vessel he has chartered, ie. Offer it in the spot market. This type of decision may make sense if the charterer has no actual other use for the ship during the period under consideration. In the liner market, the spectrum of charterer decisions is usually confined to the selection of the liner company among the members of a cartel that provides better service to the shipper. The possible exception is if the scale of the shipment is large. In this case, it may make sense to "consolidate" freight and turn to the charter market as an alternative (ie. charter a whole ship if quantity warrants it). 2. 3 BROKERS Ship brokers mediate between supply and demand of shipping services, fixing ships through single trip charters, time charters, contracts of affreightment and the like. They also mediate in the acts of sale and purchase of vessels, new or second hand and even in reorder deals. Such activities rely mainly on an efficient information collection process and ths modern communication media have revolutionized the business. Needless to say personal contacts play an all-important role. Efficient handling of data is of prime concern to brokers. In the process of fixing a client's ship the broker must present in an extremely short notice all available opportunities and help him select among alternative charters. The reverse process must be carried out for a charterer's demand; the available ships must be identified with all the relevant information concerning the ships' characteristics, location and other specific information, including of course the required fee. The sale of a particular ship also requires the compilation of technical data on the ship. More crucial is the identification of potential buyers. In the case of a client interested in purchasing a used ship of certain characteristics the data collection process is even more difficult. Advances in data processing allow reasonably sized brokerage houses to keep almost complete records of existing ships in CD stored databases that are compiled by specialized firms. Brokers are additionally called on to play a consultant's role for their clients. They might advise against a deal of sale, purchase or charter although this is against their short run interests, i.e. there is a loss of commission. This consulting activity is traditionally supported by the brokers' individual feel of the market, partly shaped by following the specialized literature, journals and reports. It is not often though that a shipping enconomist is employed in a brokerage house solely in a consulting capacity. As in every brokerage business, executives are valued for the business they bring - and any consulting role that will only indirectly generate profits is secondary to the main profit generating function, fixing deals
Brokers mediate between their clients and shipping banks.This is an imporant task, especially in the sale and purchase activity.The broker's consulting role is again of importance here,as he must help make the intended transaction look sound from the bank's point of view.He must help in the preparation of the feasibility study that might be submitted to the bank,and also help bolster his client's profile Vis a Vis the bank.The relation of brokers and shipping banks also extends to the services experienced brokers provide by participating in evaluation boards of specific banks. The decisions faced by a broker are of lesser economic consequence than those of a shipowner or a bank,as much smaller risks are involved for him.It is thus natural to expect a smaller reliance on methodology.On the other hand,to be a successful broker, one must act with as deep an understanding of the market as those responsible for actually making these decisions.Therefore,if banks,owners or big charterers practice sophisticated decision-making methodologies,the broker must follow suit. An important internal decision faced in brokerage houses is the degree of information technology to be adopted.Although no self-respecting broker can do without the standard communication equipment,there are other mainly computer related technologies that are not obviously cost effective.For instance,investment in sophisticated data bases, intelligent message transmission through computer networks and the like,might or might not be justified,depending on the business size,the philosophy of operation and other factors.Other investments,relating to improving client relations might prove immensely more profitable. 2.4 BANKS Shipping banks risk huge losses in times of market downturns.These risks are balanced by comparable profit expectations during normal states of the market or during booms. Overall,the operation of a maritime bank reflects to a great extent the high-risk environment of shipping. The major decision faced by the banks'shipping branches is to screen bad loans and, naturally,attract shipowners with good prospects.Intangible factors play an important role in these decisions,much more so than in other areas of banking.Loan securities are of significance here since the main form of collateral (the ship)will probably have sunk to a small fraction of its value in case the debtor is in financial difficulty in a market downturn. The unpredictability of shipping makes formal feasibility studies of particular loan proposals extremely unreliable,much more than in other economic activities.Therefore the objective assessment of the shipowner's managerial potential(proven or manifest)and integrity are of prime importance. The amount to be lent is of particular importance in most banking deals.Usually owners seek a large amount of leverage,saving their own money for the hard times.A lender is of course not eager to do this and thus increase the risk of the undertaking.However, pressure from owners is such that competition among banks leads sometimes to overfinancing,with the expected catastrophic effects during market downturns. Loan management and auditing is a crucial aspect of everyday banking practice.Banks must guard against bad loans by keeping a close eye on their debtors'operation and intervene if possible at the first signs of difficulty.If the difficulties persist a bank might even consider selling the high risk loan (a rather difficult proposition)or even precede to more drastic measures.Timing is all-important,since being forced into financial difficulties when they still have a chance to recover should not lose good clients
9 Brokers mediate between their clients and shipping banks. This is an imporant task, especially in the sale and purchase activity. The broker's consulting role is again of importance here, as he must help make the intended transaction look sound from the bank's point of view. He must help in the preparation of the feasibility study that might be submitted to the bank, and also help bolster his client's profile Vis a Vis the bank. The relation of brokers and shipping banks also extends to the services experienced brokers provide by participating in evaluation boards of specific banks. The decisions faced by a broker are of lesser economic consequence than those of a shipowner or a bank, as much smaller risks are involved for him. It is thus natural to expect a smaller reliance on methodology. On the other hand, to be a successful broker, one must act with as deep an understanding of the market as those responsible for actually making these decisions. Therefore, if banks, owners or big charterers practice sophisticated decision-making methodologies, the broker must follow suit. An important internal decision faced in brokerage houses is the degree of information technology to be adopted. Although no self-respecting broker can do without the standard communication equipment, there are other mainly computer related technologies that are not obviously cost effective. For instance, investment in sophisticated data bases, intelligent message transmission through computer networks and the like, might or might not be justified, depending on the business size, the philosophy of operation and other factors. Other investments, relating to improving client relations might prove immensely more profitable. 2. 4 BANKS Shipping banks risk huge losses in times of market downturns. These risks are balanced by comparable profit expectations during normal states of the market or during booms. Overall, the operation of a maritime bank reflects to a great extent the high-risk environment of shipping. The major decision faced by the banks' shipping branches is to screen bad loans and, naturally, attract shipowners with good prospects. Intangible factors play an important role in these decisions, much more so than in other areas of banking. Loan securities are of significance here since the main form of collateral (the ship) will probably have sunk to a small fraction of its value in case the debtor is in financial difficulty in a market downturn. The unpredictability of shipping makes formal feasibility studies of particular loan proposals extremely unreliable, much more than in other economic activities. Therefore the objective assessment of the shipowner's managerial potential (proven or manifest) and integrity are of prime importance. The amount to be lent is of particular importance in most banking deals. Usually owners seek a large amount of leverage, saving their own money for the hard times. A lender is of course not eager to do this and thus increase the risk of the undertaking. However, pressure from owners is such that competition among banks leads sometimes to overfinancing, with the expected catastrophic effects during market downturns. Loan management and auditing is a crucial aspect of everyday banking practice. Banks must guard against bad loans by keeping a close eye on their debtors' operation and intervene if possible at the first signs of difficulty. If the difficulties persist a bank might even consider selling the high risk loan (a rather difficult proposition) or even precede to more drastic measures. Timing is all-important, since being forced into financial difficulties when they still have a chance to recover should not lose good clients
10 An internal decision by commercial banks relates to the funds to be allocated to their shipping branches,as well as the required return on those funds committed to shipping in view of the risk-returns involved.This is a decision banks are particularly concerned with, and such portfolio management issues abound in banking.Naturally,this important strategic decision depends on the relative position of shipping with respect to the other economic activities the bank is involved in. As with brokers,bank executives are increasingly asked to play the role of an informal consultant to their clients.Thus a bank's image is to a great extent influenced by the success or failure of these informal activities.It is clear therefore that a certain degree of feedback exists here,as observed about brokers'activities:the use of sophisticated decision methodologies by one actor in the shipping market will quickly filter to the others Therefore,if the use of quantitative methodologies becomes more widespread among owners or charterers t will find its place in banking circles and vice versa. 2.5 INSURANCE Insurance policies have traditionally played an important role in shipping due to the great risks involved.The maritime lore is full of stories about shipowners who have been destroyed or saved by calculated or inadvertent insurance decisions.Many stories are in the gray area between the legal and the illegal activities of shipping.A vast amount of experience exists in the field compiled by insurance and underwriting companies. From the point of view of a shipping manager the obvious decision is how to select the proper amount of insurance coverage,taking nto account the reliability of the insurance company and the costs involved.Insurance agents often complain that shipping managers usually overlook the quality of the services they offer,and concentrate instead on the (cheaper)premia offered by other (competing)companies.It is obvious however that shipowners and their financing banks pay attention to both of these aspects. The shipowner needs insurance to be covered from physical loss or damage (hull and marine),liability to third parties (protection and indemnity)and loss or interruption of earnings.Some insurance is dictated by govenmental insurance regulations,mortgagees or other contractual requirements.Beyond this,the owner can decide on the additional cover that is proper.Usually the negotiations are carried out through insurance brokers who specialize in various types of insurance (P&l,hull and machinery,loss of earnings,strikes,war or legal risks). The knowledge of the legal clauses in the contracts is of paramount importance in negotiating,perhaps even more so than the negotiation about the premium or the coverage itself.Personal relations with brokers are also of great importance as nsurance is eventually a matter of utmost good faith.Selecting the appropriate insurance organization (insurance company,underwriting syndicate or club)is also of some importance. Among the several negotiation points in an insurance contract,of relative importance are (a)the value placed on the ship and(b)the deductible amount(the amount paid by the owner over which nsurance payments are made).The value placed on the ship is negotiated betweeen the owner and the underwriters,and (in principle)reflects the ship's actual value in the (fluctuating)market.Setting a high deductible is a way of reducing premia at the expense of extra risk-which is however guaranteed not to be of catastrophic proportions
10 An internal decision by commercial banks relates to the funds to be allocated to their shipping branches, as well as the required return on those funds committed to shipping in view of the risk-returns involved. This is a decision banks are particularly concerned with, and such portfolio management issues abound in banking. Naturally, this important strategic decision depends on the relative position of shipping with respect to the other economic activities the bank is involved in. As with brokers, bank executives are increasingly asked to play the role of an informal consultant to their clients. Thus a bank's image is to a great extent influenced by the success or failure of these informal activities. It is clear therefore that a certain degree of feedback exists here, as observed about brokers' activities: the use of sophisticated decision methodologies by one actor in the shipping market will quickly filter to the others. Therefore, if the use of quantitative methodologies becomes more widespread among owners or charterers t will find its place in banking circles and vice versa. 2. 5 INSURANCE Insurance policies have traditionally played an important role in shipping due to the great risks involved. The maritime lore is full of stories about shipowners who have been destroyed or saved by calculated or inadvertent insurance decisions. Many stories are in the gray area between the legal and the illegal activities of shipping. A vast amount of experience exists in the field compiled by insurance and underwriting companies. From the point of view of a shipping manager the obvious decision is how to select the proper amount of insurance coverage, taking nto account the reliability of the insurance company and the costs involved. Insurance agents often complain that shipping managers usually overlook the quality of the services they offer, and concentrate instead on the (cheaper) premia offered by other (competing) companies. It is obvious however that shipowners and their financing banks pay attention to both of these aspects. The shipowner needs insurance to be covered from physical loss or damage (hull and marine), liability to third parties (protection and indemnity) and loss or interruption of earnings. Some insurance is dictated by govenmental insurance regulations, mortgagees or other contractual requirements. Beyond this, the owner can decide on the additional cover that is proper. Usually the negotiations are carried out through insurance brokers who specialize in various types of insurance (P&I, hull and machinery, loss of earnings, strikes, war or legal risks). The knowledge of the legal clauses in the contracts is of paramount importance in negotiating, perhaps even more so than the negotiation about the premium or the coverage itself. Personal relations with brokers are also of great importance as nsurance is eventually a matter of utmost good faith. Selecting the appropriate insurance organization (insurance company, underwriting syndicate or club) is also of some importance. Among the several negotiation points in an insurance contract, of relative importance are (a) the value placed on the ship and (b) the deductible amount (the amount paid by the owner over which nsurance payments are made). The value placed on the ship is negotiated betweeen the owner and the underwriters, and (in principle) reflects the ship's actual value in the (fluctuating) market. Setting a high deductible is a way of reducing premia at the expense of extra risk - which is however guaranteed not to be of catastrophic proportions
