LECTURE FOUR ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM 取消式唯物主义(或译为“消除式唯物主义”)
LECTURE FOUR ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM 取消式唯物主义（或译为“消除式唯物主义”）
THE FIRST APPROXIMATION TO ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM(对取消式唯物主义 的权宜性表达) Eliminative materialism ( or eliminativism取消主义) is the radical claim that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of p the mind is deeply wrong and that some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense do not actually exist
THE FIRST APPROXIMATION TO ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM (对取消式唯物主义 的权宜性表达) Eliminative materialism (or eliminativism 取消主义) is the radical claim that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind is deeply wrong and that some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense do not actually exist
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM AND THE MIND/BRAIN IDENTITY THEORY ( D According to identity theory we can legitimately talk about mind but we need to keep the very fact in mind that any talk about metal states is just another way of talking about the corresponding brain states Parallel to this case: it is fairly okay to talk about water, but you need to know that water is nothing but h,o
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM AND THE MIND/BRAIN IDENTITY THEORY (I) According to identity theory, we can legitimately talk about mind, but we need to keep the very fact in mind that any talk about metal states is just another way of talking about the corresponding brain states. Parallel to this case: it is fairly okay to talk about water, but you need to know that water is nothing but H2O
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM AND THE MIND/BRAIN IDENTITY THEORY (ID According to eliminative materialism, we cannot legitimately talk about mind, and we need to keep the very fact in mind that any talk about the menta states is nonsense and hence should be eliminated rather than be reduced to another vocabulary(say, of the brain states Parallel to these cases: it is wildly wrong to talk about Phlogiston(燃素) in modern chemistry or ether(以太is the term used to describe a medium for the propagation of light) in modern physics, since they do not exist at all By the way, the Michelson-Morley experiment(Ey 尔逊默雷实验) was performed in 1887 by Albert Michelson and Edward Morley in Cleveland, Ohio. Its results are generally considered to be the first strong evidence against the theory of ether
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM AND THE MIND/BRAIN IDENTITY THEORY (II) According to eliminative materialism, we cannot legitimately talk about mind, and we need to keep the very fact in mind that any talk about the mental states is nonsense, and hence should be eliminated, rather than be reduced to another vocabulary (say, of the brain states). Parallel to these cases: it is wildly wrong to talk about Phlogiston (燃素) in modern chemistry or ether(以太is the term used to describe a medium for the propagation of light) in modern physics, since they do not exist at all. By the way, the Michelson–Morley experiment (麦克 尔逊—默雷实验) was performed in 1887 by Albert Michelson and Edward Morley in Cleveland, Ohio. Its results are generally considered to be the first strong evidence against the theory of ether
SO THE CONCLUSION IS: ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM IS DEFINITELY MORE RADIAL THAN IDENTITY THEORY, INCLUDING TYPE-TO-TYPE IDENTITY THEROY AND TOKEN-TO-TOKEN THEORY
SO THE CONCLUSION IS: ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM IS DEFINITELY MORE RADIAL THAN IDENTITY THEORY, INCLUDING TYPE-TO-TYPE IDENTITY THEROY AND TOKEN-TO-TOKEN THEORY
BUT WHAT DOES“ RADICAL MEAN IN THIS CONTEXT? How radical a species of materialism is, is measured in terms of how remote it is from dualism. In this sense, the token-to-token identity theory is the least radical one, the eliminative materialism is the most radical one, and the type to-type materialism is something in the middle There are other species of materialism which are weaker or less radical than eliminative materialism, but we will talk about them later
BUT WHAT DOES “RADICAL” MEAN IN THIS CONTEXT? How radical a species of materialism is, is measured in terms of how remote it is from dualism. In this sense, the token-to-token identity theory is the least radical one, the eliminative materialism is the most radical one, and the typeto-type materialism is something in the middle. There are other species of materialism which are weaker or less radical than eliminative materialism, but we will talk about them later
A COUPLE OF ELIMINATIVISTS IN CALIFORNIA (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO, OR UCSD) Patricia smith Paul churchland(保尔邱 Churchland(帕琪夏娅邱 琪兰德, born oct.21, 琪兰德, born July16,1943, 1942, Canada) Canada)
A COUPLE OF ELIMINATIVISTS IN CALIFORNIA (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO , OR UCSD) Paul Churchland (保尔· 邱 琪兰德， born Oct. 21, 1942, Canada) Patricia Smith Churchland (帕琪夏娅· 邱 琪兰德， born July 16, 1943, Canada)
BUT THERE IS A PROBLEM FOR CHURCHLANDS As we know the le target of eliminative materialism is our commonsensical account of mentality which is expected to be eliminated o And the elimination of this sort is also supposed to be parallel to the elimination of phlogiston in chemistry o But our commonsensical account of mentality is not something like a theory of ether or a theory of Phlogiston, since they are typical scientific theories, whereas our common sense is just a loose talk o Did Churchlands choose a wrong target?
BUT THERE IS A PROBLEM FOR CHURCHLANDS: As we know, the target of eliminative materialism is our commonsensical account of mentality, which is expected to be eliminated. And the elimination of this sort is also supposed to be parallel to the elimination of phlogiston in chemistry. But our commonsensical account of mentality is not something like a theory of ether or a theory of Phlogiston, since they are typical scientific theories, whereas our common sense is just a loose talk. Did Churchlands choose a wrong target?
THERE IS A CHEAP FIX FOR THIS PROBLEM Just say that our commonsensical account of mentality suffices for a theory, i.e., FOLK PSYCHOLOGY(俗成心理学) Folk psychology is assumed to consist of both generalizations(or laws) and specific theoretical posits denoted by our everyday psychological terms like belief or pain. The generalizations are assumed to describe the various causal or counterfactual relations and regularities of the posits. For instance, a typical example of a folk psychological generalization would be If someone has the desire for X and the belief that the best way to get X is by doing Y, then (barring certain conditions) that person will tend to do y If I have the desire for water and the belief that the best way to get water is to buy a bottle of water from the super market, then (barring certain conditions)I will tend to buy a bottle of water in a supermarket
THERE IS A CHEAP FIX FOR THIS PROBLEM: Just say that our commonsensical account of mentality suffices for a theory, i.e., FOLK PSYCHOLOGY (俗成心理学). Folk psychology is assumed to consist of both generalizations (or laws) and specific theoretical posits, denoted by our everyday psychological terms like ‘belief’ or ‘pain’. The generalizations are assumed to describe the various causal or counterfactual relations and regularities of the posits. For instance, a typical example of a folk psychological generalization would be: If someone has the desire for X and the belief that the best way to get X is by doing Y, then (barring certain conditions) that person will tend to do Y. If I have the desire for water and the belief that the best way to get water is to buy a bottle of water from the super market, then (barring certain conditions) I will tend to buy a bottle of water in a supermarket
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FOLK PSYCHOLOGY AND BEHAVIORISM o Both tend to generalize what an agent would regularly do when a mental process is going on in his mind, but behaviorists tend to say something more The behavioral generalizations can replace our talk about mentality While folk psychologists would say The behavioral generalizations are still about mentality. We still need to keep our mental vocabulary in our philosophical dictionary
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FOLK PSYCHOLOGY AND BEHAVIORISM Both tend to generalize what an agent would regularly do when a mental process is going on in his mind, but behaviorists tend to say something more: The behavioral generalizations can replace our talk about mentality; While folk psychologists would say: The behavioral generalizations are still about mentality. We still need to keep our mental vocabulary in our philosophical dictionary
