Lecture nine The Zombie Argument 人皮囊论证
The Zombie Argument 人皮囊论证
The most famous philosopher who put forward the zombie argument David John Chalmers(born 20 April 1966)is an Australian philosopherspe cializing in the area of philosophy ot mind and philosophy of anguage, whose recent work concerns verbal disputes. He is Professor of Philosoph and Director of the Centre for Consciousness at the Australian Nationa University. He is also Visiting Professor of Philosophy at New York University
• David John Chalmers (born 20 April 1966) is an Australian philosopherspe cializing in the area of philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, whose recent work concerns verbal disputes. He is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Centre for Consciousness at the Australian National University. He is also Visiting Professor of Philosophy at New York University
What does philosophical Zombie mean? A philosophical zombie or pGGoU gQ91244 zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a y:'d hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia or sentience. When a zombie is poked with a sharp object for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain(it may say "ouch"and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)
• A philosophical zombie or pzombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience. [1]When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)
In what sense does the idea of zombie make troubles for physicalism? 1. Physicalism is the view that the physical world is all there is. If they are right, then other true factual statements are nothing but the re description of the physical. Think about how the God created the orld in a physicalist framework 2. So if physicalism is right, accounts for consciousness should be re descriptions of the physical. 3. There should be Zombies, whose physical properties are like normal persons, but lacking consciousness. 4. So from the physical perspective, the absence of consciousness makes explanatory problem for physicalism. Or in other words, there is a"explanatory gap"between having the physical and lacking the mental 5. Therefore, physicalism is false
• 1. Physicalism is the view that the physical world is all there is. If they are right, then other true factual statements are nothing but the redescription of the physical. Think about how the God created the world in a physicalist framework. • 2. So if physicalism is right, accounts for consciousness should be redescriptions of the physical. • 3. There should be Zombies, whose physical properties are like normal persons, but lacking consciousness. • 4. So from the physical perspective, the absence of consciousness makes explanatory problem for physicalism. Or in other words, there is a “explanatory gap” between having the physical and lacking the mental. • 5. Therefore, physicalism is false
A Terminological Problem: What is consciousness Here consciousness means“ qualic”. Qualia(/kwa. lie/ or/'kweIlie/), singular "quale"(Latin pronunciation: I kwa: lel), from a Latin word meaning for"what sort" or what kind, is a term used in philosophy to refer to subjective conscious experiences as raw feels
• Here consciousness means “qualia”. • Qualia ( /ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/), singular "quale" (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkwaːle]), from a Latin word meaning for "what sort" or "what kind," is a term used in philosophy to refer to subjective conscious experiences as 'raw feels
The conceivability argument for the possibility of zombies Zombies are conceivable 2. Whatever is conceivable is possible. 3. Therefore zombies are possible. ● Or more technically 1. Zombies are conceivable in some thought experiments 2. Whatever exits in a thought experiment exists in a possible world 3. Therefore there are zombies in some possible worlds It is important to remember that physicalism cannot hold if zombie exits in even one possible world
• 1.Zombies are conceivable. • 2.Whatever is conceivable is possible. • 3.Therefore zombies are possible. • Or more technically, • 1. Zombies are conceivable in some thought experiments. • 2. Whatever exits in a thought experiment exists in a possible world. • 3. Therefore there are zombies in some possible worlds. • It is important to remember that physicalism cannot hold if zombie exits in even one possible world
The first problem: Are zombies conceivable? Chalmers finds the conceivability of zombies ' obvious he remarks that "it certainly seems that a coherent situation is described: I can discern no contradiction in the description(1996, p.96). However, intuition is something that cannot be relied on in philosophy. We need more detailed justifications
• Chalmers finds the conceivability of zombies ‘obvious’: he remarks that ‘it certainly seems that a coherent situation is described; I can discern no contradiction in the description’ (1996, p. 96). However, intuition is something that cannot be relied on in philosophy. We need more detailed justifications
Argument for the conceivability (1) Suppose a person is progressively being deprived of qualia in one sense modality(感官道) after another, even though most of he time he continues to produce behavior that would have been appropriate if he had retained full consciousness. As soon as all his sense modalities have been affected, his patterns of behavior revert to normal; but the suggestion is that it is at least intelligible to say he has become a zombie(Kirk 1974a) EVALUAT|○N: However, this line of reasoning falls well short of establishing that zombies are really conceivable. It seems to depend on much the same cluster of intuitions as the original idea
• Suppose a person is progressively being deprived of qualia in one sense modality (感官道) after another, even though most of the time he continues to produce behavior that would have been appropriate if he had retained full consciousness. As soon as all his sense modalities have been affected, his patterns of behavior revert to normal; but the suggestion is that it is at least intelligible to say he has become a zombie (Kirk 1974a). • EVALUATION: • However, this line of reasoning falls well short of establishing that zombies are really conceivable. It seems to depend on much the same cluster of intuitions as the original idea
Argument for the conceivability (2) Another thought experiment involves a team of micro- Lilliputians(小人国成员) who invade Gulliver' s head(格列佛 的脑袋), disconnect his afferent(感受的) and efferent (效应的) nerves, monitor the inputs from his afferent nerves and send outputs down his efferent nerves to produce behavior indistinguishable from what it would have been originally. The resulting system has the same behavioral dispositions as Gulliver but(allegedly) lacks sensations and other experiences, contrary to the 'Entailment Thesis, according to which the physical facts entail the psychological facts(Kirk 1974b)
• Another thought experiment involves a team of microLilliputians(小人国成员) who invade Gulliver‘s head（格列佛 的脑袋）, disconnect his afferent （感受的） and efferent （效应的） nerves, monitor the inputs from his afferent nerves, and send outputs down his efferent nerves to produce behavior indistinguishable from what it would have been originally. The resulting system has the same behavioral dispositions as Gulliver but (allegedly) lacks sensations and other experiences, contrary to the ‘Entailment Thesis’, according to which the physical facts entail the psychological facts (Kirk 1974b). •
Argument for the conceivability (3) Suppose a population of tiny people disable your brain and replicate its functions themselves, while keeping the rest of your body in working order; each homunculus(小人 uses a cell phone to perform the signal-receiving and -transmitting functions of an individual neuron. Now, would such a system be conscious: Intuitivel one may be inclined to say obviously not. Some, notably functionalists, bite the bullet and answer yes. However, the argument does not depend on assuming that the homunculus-head would not be conscious. It depends only on the assumption that its not being conscious is conceivable- which many people find reasonable. In Chalmers's words, all that matters here is that when we say the system might lack consciousness, 'a meaningful possibility is being expressed, and it is an open question whether consciousness arises or not(1996, p. 97). If he is right, then the system is not conscious. In that case it is already very much like a zombie, the only difference being that it has little people where a zombie has neurons
• Suppose a population of tiny people disable your brain and replicate its functions themselves, while keeping the rest of your body in working order; each homunculus （小人）uses a cell phone to perform the signal-receiving and -transmitting functions of an individual neuron. Now, would such a system be conscious? Intuitively one may be inclined to say obviously not. Some, notably functionalists, bite the bullet and answer yes. However, the argument does not depend on assuming that the homunculus-head would not be conscious. It depends only on the assumption that its not being conscious is conceivable — which many people find reasonable. In Chalmers's words, all that matters here is that when we say the system might lack consciousness, ‘a meaningful possibility is being expressed, and it is an open question whether consciousness arises or not’ (1996, p. 97). If he is right, then the system is not conscious. In that case it is already very much like a zombie, the only difference being that it has little people where a zombie has neurons