复旦大学：《视觉文化与社会性别》参考文献_status, property and the value on virginity.pdf_大学文库

status, property, and the value on virginity ALICE SCHLEGEL-University of Arizona One way to assess a womans autonomy is to ask whether she controls her own sexuality Thus, the prohibition on premarital sex for females is often considered a measure of mens control over women s lives. There are certain difficulties with this assumption, however. First the way a people feels about premarital sex is not necessarily consonant with its attitude toward extramarital sex, as many peoples allow premarital freedom but condemn adultery, while oth ers, such as the Lovedu(Sacks 1979), insist on premarital virginity but turn a blind eye to di creet extramarital affairs. Second, this assumption fails to recognize that in most societies, the value placed on virginity applies to adolescent girls, not to adult women with few exceptions worldwide, girls are still physically adolescent when they marry, generally within three or four years after puberty--by about 18 or younger. More important young people are generally not social adults until they marry, so that the premarital female is socially an adolescent girl. Some societies, such as our own and that of 17th-century England( Stone 1977), for example, are xceptions to this, having a stage that I call "youth"intervening between adolescence and fu adulthood. However, in most parts of the world the bride is a teenage girl who in most aspects of her life is still very much under the authority of her parents. If virginity is not, then, a very good measure of female subordination, we must look for other aspects of girls'and young women s lives that are associated with the proscription of premarital sex. One common notion is that virginity is valued when men have to""for wives by trans- ferring goods in the form of bridewealth to the women s families. This notion is based on the assumption that there is some innate preference for virgins which can be activated when men have the upper hand, so to speak, because they are paying for the bride. It must be noted, of course, that there is no universal preference for virgin brides. Such an assumption projects onto other cultures the attitudes that have developed historically in our own. moreover, the belief that when men give bridewealth they pay for virgin brides is shaken when we read in Goody (1973: 25)that dowry-giving societies, in which the bride's family pays, are generally intolerant of premarital sex for girls. Here the family pays to give, not to receive, a virgin bride. There may be some connection between marriage transactions and the value on virginity but it is not readily apparent what that connection is To illuminate this question, it is necessary to understand the varying effects that marriage transactions-the movement of goods (most usually)or services at the time of a marriage-have on the transmission or retention of property and on the social debts incurred thereby This ques- tion was addressed in Schlegel and Eloul (1987, 1988)and will be summarized here. Following This article tests and confirms the proposition that a cultural value on the virginity of girls is, in large part, a function of the form of marriage transaction. the study is based on a worldwide sample of preindustrial societies and includes an interpre- tation of the association between several forms of marriage transaction and a pre- scription of or preference for premarital female virginity. Several other explana tions for the value on virginity are also discussed. Virginity, bridewealth, dowry

status, property, and the value on virginity ALICE SCHLEGEL-University of Arizona One way to assess a woman's autonomy is to ask whether she controls her own sexuality. Thus, the prohibition on premarital sex for females is often considered a measure of men's control over women's lives. There are certain difficulties with this assumption, however. First, the way a people feels about premarital sex is not necessarily consonant with its attitude toward extramarital sex, as many peoples allow premarital freedom but condemn adultery, while others, such as the Lovedu (Sacks 1979), insist on premarital virginity but turn a blind eye to discreet extramarital affairs. Second, this assumption fails to recognize that in most societies, the value placed on virginity applies to adolescent girls, not to adult women. With few exceptions worldwide, girls are still physically adolescent when they marry, generally within three or four years after puberty-by about 18 or younger. More important, young people are generally not social adults until they marry, so that the premarital female is socially an adolescent girl. Some societies, such as our own and that of 17th-century England (Stone 1977), for example, are exceptions to this, having a stage that I call "youth" intervening between adolescence and full adulthood. However, in most parts of the world the bride is a teenage girl who in most aspects of her life is still very much under the authority of her parents.' If virginity is not, then, a very good measure of female subordination, we must look for other aspects of girls' and young women's lives that are associated with the proscription of premarital sex. One common notion is that virginity is valued when men have to "pay" for wives by transferring goods in the form of bridewealth to the women's families. This notion is based on the assumption that there is some innate preference for virgins which can be activated when men have the upper hand, so to speak, because they are paying for the bride. It must be noted, of course, that there is no universal preference for virgin brides. Such an assumption projects onto other cultures the attitudes that have developed historically in our own. Moreover, the belief that when men give bridewealth they pay for virgin brides is shaken when we read in Goody (1973:25) that dowry-giving societies, in which the bride's family pays, are generally intolerant of premarital sex for girls. Here the family pays to give, not to receive, a virgin bride. There may be some connection between marriage transactions and the value on virginity, but it is not readily apparent what that connection is. To illuminate this question, it is necessary to understand the varying effects that marriage transactions-the movement of goods (most usually) or services at the time of a marriage-have on the transmission or retention of property and on the social debts incurred thereby. This question was addressed in Schlegel and Eloul (1987, 1988) and will be summarized here. Following This article tests and confirms the proposition that a cultural value on the virginity of girls is, in large part, a function of the form of marriage transaction. The study is based on a worldwide sample of preindustrial societies and includes an interpretation of the association between several forms of marriage transaction and a prescription of or preference for premarital female virginity. Several other explanations for the value on virginity are also discussed. [virginity, bridewealth, dowry, marriage transactions] the value on virginity 719

that, marriage transactions and attitudes toward virginity will be analyzed to demonstrate that they form a meaningful pattern, albeit a pattern somewhat different from what one might ini tially expect. Specifically, it will be argued that the virginity of daughters protects the interests of brides' families when they use marital alliances to maintain or enhance their social status marriage transactions The form of marriage transaction that has received the most attention in the anthropological literature is bridewealth, goods given by the groom, usually with the assistance of his kin, to the family of the bride Bridewealth generally does not remain with the family that receives it it or its equivalent is used to obtain wives for brothers of the bride or an additional wife for her father. Thus, goods and women circulate and countercirculate In the large majority of bride wealth-giving societies, which are patrilocal, households end up with as many women as they have produced, by replacing daughters with daughters-in-law and sisters with wives Women exchange is also a form of replacement the exchange being direct rather than me- diated by a transfer of property. women exchange and bridewealth are most frequently found where women have economic value through their large contribution to subsistence(cf Schle- gel and Barry 1986). In each case the result is a kind of social homeostasis, both among the families through which women and goods circulate and within the household that sooner or later gains a woman to replace each one it has lost Brideservice is often considered to be analogous to bridewealth, with payment in labor rathe than goods. They differ significantly, however, in that the benefit of brideservice goes directly to the brides household and is not circulated as are bridewealth goods, Thus families with many daughters receive much free labor, while families with few get little While gift exchange, in which relatively equal amounts are exchanged between the families of the bride and groom, can occur at all levels of social complexity, it is often found in societies with important status differences in rank or wealth; it occurs most often in Asia, native North merica, and the Pacific Since residence is predominantly patrilocal in gift-exchanging soci- eties, the bride-receiving household is socially, although not economically in debt to the bride giving one. The exchange of equivalent goods is a way of ensuring that the intermarrying fam- ilies are of the same social status, as indicated by the wealth that they own or can call up from among their kin and dependents. atus is a major consideration in dowry -giving societies the bride' s dowry is sometimes matched against the grooms settlement, thus ensuring equivalence, a usual practice among European land-owning peasants or elites. Dowry can also be used to"buy"a high-status son in-law, a common practice in South Asia and one also known in Europe. Dowry or a brides anticipated inheritance can be used to attract a poor but presentable groom, a client son-in law whose allegiance will be primarily to the house into which he has married and on which is dependent. This strategy seems to have been practiced by mercantile families in Europe and Latin America. Dowry was associated historically with the Old High Culture areas like the Mediterranean(ancient Mesopotamia, Greece, and Rome)and Asia(India, China, and Japan) and was the common form throughout Europe until recently The final form of marriage transaction to be examined here is indirect dowry which contains some features of both bridewealth, in that goods are given by the grooms family, and dowry, in that the goods end up with the new conjugal couple. Sometimes the groom s kin give goods directly to the bride but more often they give goods to her father, who then gives goods to the new couple. The latter form has frequently been confused with bridewealth, as in the islamic mahr. Indirect dowry tends to be found on the fringes of the old High Culture areas and in those Old High Culture areas, like Egypt, into which it has been introduced along with con version to Islam, replacing the simple dowry of earlier times. In its classic form, it appears to 720 american ethnologist

that, marriage transactions and attitudes toward virginity will be analyzed to demonstrate that they form a meaningful pattern, albeit a pattern somewhat different from what one might initially expect. Specifically, it will be argued that the virginity of daughters protects the interests of brides' families when they use marital alliances to maintain or enhance their social status. marriage transactions The form of marriage transaction that has received the most attention in the anthropological literature is bridewealth, goods given by the groom, usually with the assistance of his kin, to the family of the bride. Bridewealth generally does not remain with the family that receives it: it or its equivalent is used to obtain wives for brothers of the bride or an additional wife for her father. Thus, goods and women circulate and countercirculate. In the large majority of bridewealth-giving societies, which are patrilocal, households end up with as many women as they have produced, by replacing daughters with daughters-in-law and sisters with wives. Women exchange is also a form of replacement, the exchange being direct rather than mediated by a transfer of property. Women exchange and bridewealth are most frequently found where women have economic value through their large contribution to subsistence (cf. Schlegel and Barry 1986). In each case the result is a kind of social homeostasis, both among the families through which women and goods circulate and within the household that sooner or later gains a woman to replace each one it has lost. Brideservice is often considered to be analogous to bridewealth, with payment in labor rather than goods. They differ significantly, however, in that the benefit of brideservice goes directly to the bride's household and is not circulated as are bridewealth goods. Thus, families with many daughters receive much free labor, while families with few get little. While gift exchange, in which relatively equal amounts are exchanged between the families of the bride and groom, can occur at all levels of social complexity, it is often found in societies with important status differences in rank or wealth; it occurs most often in Asia, native North America, and the Pacific. Since residence is predominantly patrilocal in gift-exchanging societies, the bride-receiving household is socially, although not economically, in debt to the bridegiving one. The exchange of equivalent goods is a way of ensuring that the intermarrying families are of the same social status, as indicated by the wealth that they own or can call up from among their kin and dependents. Status is a major consideration in dowry-giving societies. The bride's dowry is sometimes matched against the groom's settlement, thus ensuring equivalence, a usual practice among European land-owning peasants or elites. Dowry can also be used to "buy" a high-status sonin-law, a common practice in South Asia and one also known in Europe. Dowry or a bride's anticipated inheritance can be used to attract a poor but presentable groom, a client son-inlaw whose allegiance will be primarily to the house into which he has married and on which he is dependent. This strategy seems to have been practiced by mercantile families in Europe and Latin America. Dowry was associated historically with the Old High Culture areas like the Mediterranean (ancient Mesopotamia, Greece, and Rome) and Asia (India, China, and Japan) and was the common form throughout Europe until recently. The final form of marriage transaction to be examined here is indirect dowry, which contains some features of both bridewealth, in that goods are given by the groom's family, and dowry, in that the goods end up with the new conjugal couple. Sometimes the groom's kin give goods directly to the bride, but more often they give goods to her father, who then gives goods to the new couple. The latter form has frequently been confused with bridewealth, as in the Islamic mahr. Indirect dowry tends to be found on the fringes of the Old High Culture areas and in those Old High Culture areas, like Egypt, into which it has been introduced along with conversion to Islam, replacing the simple dowry of earlier times. In its classic form, it appears to 720 american ethnologist

be a way of establishing the property rights of the conjugal couples that make up larger house holds, in anticipation of eventual fission. In addition, it allows for status negotiation without either family being put in the others economic or social debt (cf Schlegel and Eloul 1988 There are variations within these major types, and there are additional features(such as the European dower) that are secondary and limited in distribution. In complex societies, the form of transaction may vary according to region or class. In prerevolutionary China, for example the landed or mercantile elite gave dowry while the landless peasantry gave indirect dowry whereas in modern China, marriage transactions have disappeared from urban areas while bridewealth has replaced indirect dowry among peasants(Fang 1990). When the forms differ by status, the preferred form, practiced by the elite, is the one considered here. 2 marriage transactions and the value on virginity Information on attitudes toward premarital sex for females, or the value placed on virginity, comes from two sources. the primary one is the code"Attitude Toward Premarital Sex(Fe male)"in Broude and Greene(1980). Using the Standard Sample of 186 preindustrial societies Broude and greene found information on this subject for 141 societies. Their code is divided into six levels of value: (1) premarital sex expected ( 2)premarital sex tolerated; (3)premarital sex mildly disapproved of but not punished; (4) premarital sex moderately disapproved of and ightly punished; (5) premarital sex disallowed except with bridegroom; and (6)premarital sex strongly disapproved of. For the present study, the first three categories were collapsed into virginity not valued"and the second three into " virginity valued "i have made four alterations to the code based on my own reading of the ethnographic literature: I have changed the coding for the Burmese from 3 to 5(Spiro 1977), for the Tikopia from 3 to 4( Firth 1936), for the Koreans from 3 to 6(Osgood 1951), and for the yurok from 2 to 4( Kroeber 1925). The societies are The second source is a body of data collected by herbert Barry and me on adolescent so cialization in Standard Sample societies not coded by Broude and Greene. The data were col- lected on adolescent behavior, not cultural attitude; coders were asked to assess whether pre- marital sex was or was not tolerated because the code is less detailed than broude and Greene's and because it measures behavior rather than attitude, I offer information only on societies in which premarital sex is not tolerated and thus, by definition, virginity is valued Presumably, there can be cases where premarital sex is moderately disapproved of and pun- ished when discovered, but most adolescent girls take the risk and indulge anyway.)These societies are indicated in Table 1 in parentheses but have not been included in the tests, for to do so would introduce a bias toward the set of societies valuing virgil It is clear that the value on ity is not randomly distributed among societies with all types of marriage transaction. Table 2 shows the distribution, which is statistically significant: p< 0001. Even when those societies without marriage transactions are eliminated, the distribution is still statistically significant: p <0O1 Others have also found significant associations between premarital sexual permissiveness and structural or cultural features. In studies by Murdock (1964), Goethals(1971),Eckhardt (1971), Paige(1983), Barry and Schlegel (1986), and others(see Broude's [19811 summary) sexual permissiveness is shown to be associated with the simpler subsistence technologies absence of stratification smaller communities, matrilineal descent matrilocal residence ab- sence of belief in high gods, absence of bridewealth (but bear in mind that in earlier studies bridewealth has been conflated with indirect dowry), high female economic contribution, little or no property exchange at marriage and ascribed rather than achieved status. These features are all highly intercorrelated, and some correlate with types of marriage transactions(Schlegel and Eloul 1988

be a way of establishing the property rights of the conjugal couples that make up larger households, in anticipation of eventual fission. In addition, it allows for status negotiation without either family being put in the other's economic or social debt (cf. Schlegel and Eloul 1988). There are variations within these major types, and there are additional features (such as the European dower) that are secondary and limited in distribution. In complex societies, the form of transaction may vary according to region or class. In prerevolutionary China, for example, the landed or mercantile elite gave dowry while the landless peasantry gave indirect dowry, whereas in modern China, marriage transactions have disappeared from urban areas while bridewealth has replaced indirect dowry among peasants (Fang 1990). When the forms differ by status, the preferred form, practiced by the elite, is the one considered here.2 marriage transactions and the value on virginity Information on attitudes toward premarital sex for females, or the value placed on virginity, comes from two sources. The primary one is the code "Attitude Toward Premarital Sex (Female)" in Broude and Greene (1980). Using the Standard Sample of 186 preindustrial societies, Broude and Greene found information on this subject for 141 societies. Their code is divided into six levels of value: (1) premarital sex expected; (2) premarital sex tolerated; (3) premarital sex mildly disapproved of but not punished; (4) premarital sex moderately disapproved of and slightly punished; (5) premarital sex disallowed except with bridegroom; and (6) premarital sex strongly disapproved of. For the present study, the first three categories were collapsed into "virginity not valued" and the second three into "virginity valued." I have made four alterations to the code based on my own reading of the ethnographic literature: I have changed the coding for the Burmese from 3 to 5 (Spiro 1977), for the Tikopia from 3 to 4 (Firth 1936), for the Koreans from 3 to 6 (Osgood 1951), and for the Yurok from 2 to 4 (Kroeber 1925). The societies are listed in Table 1. The second source is a body of data collected by Herbert Barry and me on adolescent socialization in Standard Sample societies not coded by Broude and Greene. The data were collected on adolescent behavior, not cultural attitude; coders were asked to assess whether premarital sex was or was not tolerated. Because the code is less detailed than Broude and Greene's and because it measures behavior rather than attitude, I offer information only on societies in which premarital sex is not tolerated and thus, by definition, virginity is valued. (Presumably, there can be cases where premarital sex is moderately disapproved of and punished when discovered, but most adolescent girls take the risk and indulge anyway.) These societies are indicated in Table 1 in parentheses but have not been included in the tests, for to do so would introduce a bias toward the set of societies valuing virginity. It is clear that the value on virginity is not randomly distributed among societies with all types of marriage transaction. Table 2 shows the distribution, which is statistically significant: p < .0001. Even when those societies without marriage transactions are eliminated, the distribution is still statistically significant: p < .001. Others have also found significant associations between premarital sexual permissiveness and structural or cultural features. In studies by Murdock (1964), Goethals (1971), Eckhardt (1971), Paige (1983), Barry and Schlegel (1986), and others (see Broude's [1981] summary), sexual permissiveness is shown to be associated with the simpler subsistence technologies, absence of stratification, smaller communities, matrilineal descent, matrilocal residence, absence of belief in high gods, absence of bridewealth (but bear in mind that in earlier studies, bridewealth has been conflated with indirect dowry), high female economic contribution, little or no property exchange at marriage, and ascribed rather than achieved status. These features are all highly intercorrelated, and some correlate with types of marriage transactions (Schlegel and Eloul 1988). the value on virginity 721

argue that virginity is valued in those societies in which young men may seek to better thei hances in life by allying themselves through marriage to a wealthy or powerful family. In pre- serving a daughters virginity a family is protecting her from seduction, impregnation, and pa ternity claims on her child. This is most critical when certain kinds of property transactions are involved In societies in which dowry is given (or daughters inherit), it would be attractive to seduce a dowered daughter (or heiress), demanding her as wife along with her property. Her parents would be reluctant to refuse, since the well-being of their grandchildren would depend upon their inheritance from both of their parents, and another man would be unlikely to marry the mother if it meant that he had not only to support her children but also to make them his heirs.(The widow with children would be a different matter since these children would have received property through their father and would make no claims on their stepfather beyond support, for which in any event their labor would provide compensation. To illustrate that upward mobility through marriage with a dowered daughter or heiress i ot foreign to dowry-giving societies, let us consider a common theme of European fairy tales. a poor but honest young man goes through trials to win the hand of the princess, who inherits her fathers kingdom. Or, he wins her heart, and through the good offices of a fairy godmother or other spirit helper, they evade her wrathful father and are eventually reconciled with him This more or less legitimate means to upward mobility is not so different from the illegitimate one, by which he wins the girl through seduction This line of reasoning was familiar to the 17th- and 18th-century English. As Trumbach tells mare. For a womans property became her husband s and she took his social standing .. To steal an eiress was therefore the quickest way to make a man s fortune this was the common doctrine of the stage before 1710-and it had a special appeal to younger sons. [ 1978: 101-102 All of the dowry-giving societies in the sample value virginity except the Haitians Neverthe- less, as Herskovits, writing about Haiti, points out: "Even though pre- marital relations are com of an unmarried girl fortunate, and she is severely beaten for it by her family"(1971: 111). Their fear of her seduction suasion to give her a child and this achieved abandons her to show his contempt for the family that has formally refused to accept him as a son- in- law"(Herskovits 1971: 110). To avoid child bearing, women and girls resort to magical means of contraception and the more effective ab The majority of societies that exchange gifts and give indirect dowry also expect brides to virgins. This is particularly true in the case of gift exchange, in which a bride 's family gives quantities of property along with her receiving a more or less equivalent amount from the fam ily of the groom. As noted earlier gift exchange is a way of ensuring that the two families are of equal wealth or of equal social power. Impregnating a girl would give a boy and his family a claim on that girl and an alliance with her family, even though they would have to come up Table 2. a test of the value on virginity according to the type of marriage transaction Marriage transactiona Virginity Bride. Bride. N=125;Chi- square=27.13;p<0001 women exchange is omitted because of the small number of cases iNcludes token bride 724 american ethnologist

I argue that virginity is valued in those societies in which young men may seek to better their chances in life by allying themselves through marriage to a wealthy or powerful family. In preserving a daughter's virginity, a family is protecting her from seduction, impregnation, and paternity claims on her child. This is most critical when certain kinds of property transactions are involved. In societies in which dowry is given (or daughters inherit), it would be attractive to seduce a dowered daughter (or heiress), demanding her as wife along with her property. Her parents would be reluctant to refuse, since the well-being of their grandchildren would depend upon their inheritance from both of their parents, and another man would be unlikely to marry the mother if it meant that he had not only to support her children but also to make them his heirs. (The widow with children would be a different matter, since these children would have received property through their father and would make no claims on their stepfather beyond support, for which in any event their labor would provide compensation.) To illustrate that upward mobility through marriage with a dowered daughter or heiress is not foreign to dowry-giving societies, let us consider a common theme of European fairy tales. A poor but honest young man goes through trials to win the hand of the princess, who inherits her father's kingdom. Or, he wins her heart, and through the good offices of a fairy godmother or other spirit helper, they evade her wrathful father and are eventually reconciled with him. This more or less legitimate means to upward mobility is not so different from the illegitimate one, by which he wins the girl through seduction. This line of reasoning was familiar to the 17th- and 18th-century English. As Trumbach tells it: Stealing a son ... was not the great crime. It was, rather, the theft of a daughter that was the real nightmare. For a woman's property became her husband's and she took his social standing.... To steal an heiress was therefore the quickest way to make a man's fortune-this was the common doctrine of the stage before 1 710-and it had a special appeal to younger sons. [1978:101-102] All of the dowry-giving societies in the sample value virginity except the Haitians. Nevertheless, as Herskovits, writing about Haiti, points out: "Even though pre-marital relations are commonplace, . ... the pregnancy of an unmarried girl is regarded as both reprehensible and unfortunate, and she is severely beaten for it by her family" (1 971 :1 11). Their fear of her seduction is well founded, for if they disapprove of a suitor and reject him, the young man "uses all persuasion to give her a child and, this achieved, abandons her to show his contempt for the family that has formally refused to accept him as a son-in-law" (Herskovits 1971:1 10). To avoid childbearing, women and girls resort to magical means of contraception and the more effective abortion. The majority of societies that exchange gifts and give indirect dowry also expect brides to be virgins. This is particularly true in the case of gift exchange, in which a bride's family gives quantities of property along with her, receiving a more or less equivalent amount from the family of the groom. As noted earlier, gift exchange is a way of ensuring that the two families are of equal wealth or of equal social power. Impregnating a girl would give a boy and his family a claim on that girl and an alliance with her family, even though they would have to come up Table 2. A test of the value on virginity according to the type of marriage transaction. Marriage transactiona Dowry and Virginity Bride- Bride- Gift indirect valued None wealthb service exchange dowry Total Yes 3 16 6 9 18 52 No 26 27 10 3 7 73 N = 125; Chi-square = 27.13; p < .0001. aWomen exchange is omitted because of the small number of cases. blncludes token bridewealth. 724 american ethnologist

with something themselves for the exchange(not necessarily equivalent to what a more appro- priate suitor would give; see the case of the Omaha, discussed below). As in dowry-giving societies, an emphasis on virginity discourages a man who is tempted to jump the status barrier by claiming fatherhood of a womans child. The sample does, however, include three excep- tions to the general requirement of virginity in gift-exchanging societies, and it is instructive to Malinowski (1932)has discussed the sexual freedom of Trobriand island girls at some length However, we must recall that the trobriand islanders do not, at least ideologically, associate exual intercourse with pregnancy. Weiner(1976: 122)relates two cases in which pregnancy was attributed to magic, and her informants maintained that women could conceive without male assistance. No boy, then, can make a claim on a girl simply because he has been sleeping with her and she has become pregnant Fatherhood can only be attained after marriage, when it is socially defined mong the Omaha, virginity was not considered important for most girls(as coded in Broude and Greene [19801, but according to Fletcher and La Flesche(1911), virgins were held in greater esteem than those who had lost their virginity It was a special privilege to marry a girl ho had been tattooed with the"mark of honor, which was given to a virgin of a prominent family on the occasion of her fathers or another close relatives initiation into one of the cer emonial societies Only the marriages in prominent families involved significant gift exchange In ordinary marriages, the young husband was expected to work a year or two for his father-in law, making brideservice a more common feature than gift exchange. Thus it was in the portant marriages, accompanied by the exchange of goods of much value, that the bride was expected to be a virgin. Omaha elite families faced the danger that a daughter might be seduced by a youth who would persuade her to elope. As long as his family recognized the marriage and brought some gifts to the bride's father, the marriage was legitimate in the eyes of the com- munity, maintaining the virginity of high-status girls protected their families from unwanted nces In Samoa, similarly, girls from untitled families had sexual freedom(as coded in Broude and Greene 119801)but the daughters of titled chiefs did not Children could be affiliated to the mothers group rather than the fathers, Samoa having an ambilateral descent system If the mothers rank was higher than the father s the children s status would be elevated above their fathers. High-status families would wish to guard their daughters against potential social climb. ers, who might be tempted to improve their childrens position in life by seducing and marrying socially superior girls. It appears that only the arranged marriages, generally of high-status peo- ple, involved much gift exchange. Most marriages were of the"elopement"type and were much less expensive than the arranged ones (Shore 1981). thus as in the case of the omaha intracultural comparison demonstrates a correlation between the type of marriage transaction and the value on virginity As the tables show, the value on virginity is statistically associated with the type of marriage transaction, and this has been examined for dowry-giving and gift-exchanging societies. It is clear that when no property accompanies the marriage, ity is of little interest. If the groom gives goods or labor, the picture is mixed, but fewer societies are restrictive than permissive In societies in which the brides side gives considerable property, as with gift exchange, dowry nd, in many cases, indirect dowry, virginity is most likely to be valued thus, there is an as- sociation between the giving of property, particularly from the bride's side and control of the girl's sexuality I have interpreted this as a means by which the families of girls prevent thei ing seduced by ineligible boys, resulting in alliances that could be an embarrassment. This is particularly the case when status negotiation is a prominent feature of marital alliances, in those societies in which families use the marriages of their daughters to maintain or enhance eir social position. Such considerations are likely to be found only in rank or class societi the value on virginity 725

with something themselves for the exchange (not necessarily equivalent to what a more appropriate suitor would give; see the case of the Omaha, discussed below). As in dowry-giving societies, an emphasis on virginity discourages a man who is tempted to jump the status barrier by claiming fatherhood of a woman's child. The sample does, however, include three exceptions to the general requirement of virginity in gift-exchanging societies, and it is instructive to examine these deviant cases. Malinowski (1932) has discussed the sexual freedom of Trobriand Island girls at some length. However, we must recall that the Trobriand Islanders do not, at least ideologically, associate sexual intercourse with pregnancy. Weiner (1976:122) relates two cases in which pregnancy was attributed to magic, and her informants maintained that women could conceive without male assistance. No boy, then, can make a claim on a girl simply because he has been sleeping with her and she has become pregnant. Fatherhood can only be attained after marriage, when it is socially defined. Among the Omaha, virginity was not considered important for most girls (as coded in Broude and Greene [19801), but according to Fletcher and La Flesche (1911), virgins were held in greater esteem than those who had lost their virginity. It was a special privilege to marry a girl who had been tattooed with the "mark of honor," which was given to a virgin of a prominent family on the occasion of her father's or another close relative's initiation into one of the ceremonial societies. Only the marriages in prominent families involved significant gift exchange. In ordinary marriages, the young husband was expected to work a year or two for his father-inlaw, making brideservice a more common feature than gift exchange. Thus, it was in the important marriages, accompanied by the exchange of goods of much value, that the bride was expected to be a virgin. Omaha elite families faced the danger that a daughter might be seduced by a youth who would persuade her to elope. As long as his family recognized the marriage and brought some gifts to the bride's father, the marriage was legitimate in the eyes of the community. Maintaining the virginity of high-status girls protected their families from unwanted alliances. In Samoa, similarly, girls from untitled families had sexual freedom (as coded in Broude and Greene [1980]) but the daughters of titled chiefs did not. Children could be affiliated to the mother's group rather than the father's, Samoa having an ambilateral descent system. If the mother's rank was higher than the father's, the children's status would be elevated above their father's. High-status families would wish to guard their daughters against potential social climbers, who might be tempted to improve their children's position in life by seducing and marrying socially superior girls. It appears that only the arranged marriages, generally of high-status people, involved much gift exchange. Most marriages were of the "elopement" type and were much less expensive than the arranged ones (Shore 1981). Thus, as in the case of the Omaha, intracultural comparison demonstrates a correlation between the type of marriage transaction and the value on virginity. As the tables show, the value on virginity is statistically associated with the type of marriage transaction, and this has been examined for dowry-giving and gift-exchanging societies. It is clear that when no property accompanies the marriage, virginity is of little interest. If the groom gives goods or labor, the picture is mixed, but fewer societies are restrictive than permissive. In societies in which the bride's side gives considerable property, as with gift exchange, dowry, and, in many cases, indirect dowry, virginity is most likely to be valued. Thus, there is an association between the giving of property, particularly from the bride's side, and control of the girl's sexuality. I have interpreted this as a means by which the families of girls prevent their being seduced by ineligible boys, resulting in alliances that could be an embarrassment. This is particularly the case when status negotiation is a prominent feature of marital alliances, in those societies in which families use the marriages of their daughters to maintain or enhance their social position. Such considerations are likely to be found only in rank or class societies. the value on virginity 725

We must, however, consider alternative explanations for the value on virginity whiting, Bur bank, and Ratner(1986) have proposed that premarital permissiveness or restrictiveness is re- lated to the age at which girls marry reasoning that restrictiveness reflects a concern with preg nancy more than with virginity per se. Given the well-recognized biological phenomenon of adolescent subfecundity as a result of which a pregnancy is rather unlikely in the first year or so after menarche, they claim that societies in which girls marry relatively late prohibit pre marital sexual relations in order to ensure that no pregnancy occurs, whiting and his collal rators support their argument by selecting 50 societies from the Standard Sample and rating them forduration of maidenhood, the period between menarche and marriage and for sex- ual permissiveness versus restrictiveness(see Table 3). They find that those societies with more than four years of maidenhood are restrictive, those with a maidenhood of about three years are permissive and those with shorter maidenhoods are mixed with 13 restricting and 17 per- mitting sexual relations. They estimate that if sex is permitted, the probability of a pregnancy about 30 percent when maidenhood lasts from one to two years, somewhat less than 50 percent hen it lasts from two to three years, and about 60 percent when it lasts longer than three years Whiting et al. 1986: 278). They relate both age of marriage and attitude toward premarital sex to concerns about fertility and control over it rearranging their subsample into categories de- fined by marriage transaction, we see that these societies follow a pattern similar to that of the larger sample from which they are drawn(Table 4). The exception is the gift-exchange category, where by chance the researchers have selected the three permissive societies that exchange gifts: Trobriand Islands, Omaha, and Samoa The most problematic category for the Whiting et al. hypothesis is the group of societies in which maidenhood is short, with 13 societies that value virginity and 17 that do not (see Table 3). Their hypothesis does not account for the 13 restrictive societies, 43 percent of this cluster It should also be noted that four of the six societies with long periods of maidenhood, all of which value virginity, are dowry-giving. It was impossible to test the distribution in this cluster of 30 societies with short maidenhood because one of the categories had no representatives and neither the Chi-square nor Fishers Exact tests allow for an empty cell. However, the dis- tribution follows that for the larger subsample and for the entire sample(see Table Preindustrial Europe is the world area best known for long-delayed marriage(Stone 1977), and virginity has been of concern in European cultures until very recently. Against this, how Table 3. The value on virginity according to the duration of maidenhood Medium ource: Whiting et al. (1986). Positive where coded as sex prohibited or restricted negative where coded as sex permitted or encour- Table 4. virginity and marriage transactions for the subsamp Bride. Bride. ed None wealth service exchangeexchange Dowry dowry Source of subsample: Whiting et al. (1986) 726 american ethnologist

We must, however, consider alternative explanations for the value on virginity. Whiting, Burbank, and Ratner (1986) have proposed that premarital permissiveness or restrictiveness is related to the age at which girls marry, reasoning that restrictiveness reflects a concern with pregnancy more than with virginity per se. Given the well-recognized biological phenomenon of adolescent subfecundity, as a result of which a pregnancy is rather unlikely in the first year or so after menarche, they claim that societies in which girls marry relatively late prohibit premarital sexual relations in order to ensure that no pregnancy occurs. Whiting and his collaborators support their argument by selecting 50 societies from the Standard Sample and rating them for "duration of maidenhood," the period between menarche and marriage, and for sexual permissiveness versus restrictiveness (see Table 3). They find that those societies with more than four years of maidenhood are restrictive, those with a maidenhood of about three years are permissive, and those with shorter maidenhoods are mixed, with 13 restricting and 17 permitting sexual relations. They estimate that if sex is permitted, the probability of a pregnancy is about 30 percent when maidenhood lasts from one to two years, somewhat less than 50 percent when it lasts from two to three years, and about 60 percent when it lasts longer than three years (Whiting et al. 1986:278). They relate both age of marriage and attitude toward premarital sex to concerns about fertility and control over it. Rearranging their subsample into categories defined by marriage transaction, we see that these societies follow a pattern similar to that of the larger sample from which they are drawn (Table 4). The exception is the gift-exchange category, where by chance the researchers have selected the three permissive societies that exchange gifts: Trobriand Islands, Omaha, and Samoa. The most problematic category for the Whiting et al. hypothesis is the group of societies in which maidenhood is short, with 13 societies that value virginity and 17 that do not (see Table 3). Their hypothesis does not account for the 13 restrictive societies, 43 percent of this cluster. It should also be noted that four of the six societies with long periods of maidenhood, all of which value virginity, are dowry-giving. It was impossible to test the distribution in this cluster of 30 societies with short maidenhood because one of the categories had no representatives and neither the Chi-square nor Fisher's Exact tests allow for an empty cell. However, the distribution follows that for the larger subsample and for the entire sample (see Table 5). Preindustrial Europe is the world area best known for long-delayed marriage (Stone 1977), and virginity has been of concern in European cultures until very recently. Against this, howTable 3. The value on virginity according to the duration of maidenhood. Virginity Duration of maidenhoodb valueda Long Medium Short Yes 6 0 13 No 0 14 17 Source: Whiting et al. (1986). aPositive where coded as sex prohibited or restricted; negative where coded as sex permitted or encouraged. bLong where Whiting et al. coded the duration of maidenhood as long or very long; medium where they coded it as medium; short where they coded it as short or absent. Table 4. Virginity and marriage transactions for the subsample. Marriage transaction Virginity Bride- Bride- Gift Women Indirect valued None wealtha service exchange exchange Dowry dowry Total Yes 1 7 2 0 0 4 3 17 No 8 9 8 3 2 0 3 33 Source of subsample: Whiting et al. (1986). aIncludes token bridewealth. 726 american ethnologist

Table 5. Marriage transactions and the value on virginity when maidenhood is short Virginity brides familys contribution contributes Does not contribute ift exchange and indirect dowry (no cases of dowry among these 30 societies) bAll other forms, including absenc ce of transactions ever, we can pose Southeast Asia, known from historical records to have been a region of later marriage(that is, the late teens and early twenties)before Islam became established and, more recently, in areas outside islam s range In the philippines in the 1820s the mean age of a wom an s first marriage was about 20.5; in Hindu Bali in the 1940s, it was 18, as against 14 in Muslim Java( Reid 1988: 158-160). Southeast Asia has also been a region of sexual perr before and beyond Islamic practice, a fact amply documented by observers of all sorts since the 1 6th century. If a girl became pregnant, the couple married; failing that, in some areas infanticide was practiced or the fetus was aborted. Abortion is reported to have been quite common in the 16th-century Philippines, and it is referred to in a 17th-century malay epic as The elite, however, were sexually restrictive even before the advent of islam and in non Islamic countries like Thailand. Speaking of the wealthy urban class, Reid(1988: 157)notes that daughters were guarded"because their marriages involved both property and status. The vast displays of goods in the gift exchanges of the landed and mercantile elite were a far cry from the simple prestations of the peasantry, among whom choice of son-in-law was not a matter of state or commerce. Thus, while the"long maidenhood"explanation holds for Europ does not fit the facts of Southeast Asia, whereas the property and status"explanation applies to both regions. Another explanation for the prescription of virginity, this time one limited to the pastoral belt from North Africa into Central Asia, is grounded in ecological concerns (Schneider 1971) Schneider relates men's control over female sexuality to their general competitiveness in pas- toral regions, where ecological resources are limited and unpredictable, and to the difficulties involved in keeping related men linked to one another in common-interest groups, groups that re vulnerable to fragmentation into self-centered families. In such societies, Schneider asserts women become a kind of resource whose disposal rests with those who dominate them and they are only available to other men through their fathers, brothers, and other male kin. Com mon concern over female kin provides a focus for male kin bonding In many pastoral societies the virginity of daughters and sisters(like the chastity of wives)is marker of the integrity of individual men and of lineages. But whether pastoralism per se is a determining factor in the value on virginity may be questioned. The Standard Sample contains 17 societies for which pastoralism is the major subsistence technique, and we have information on the value on virginity for all but one of them: nine value it, seven do not while the dist irginity practice indirect dowry or gift exchange (Three societies practicing one or mom? bution according to marriage transactions is not significant, seven of the nine societies valuing of these forms do not value virginity. ) These seven societies are all engaged in commercial- as distinct from subsistence--pastoralism, and they inhabit the fringes of the Old High Culture areas of the Mediterranean and East Asia. The societies Schneider discusses may all be pastoral but in my view pastoralism is less instrumental than are characteristics of property relations One important feature of property relations is the disbursement of property; I argue that the consequences of disbursing property through dowry, indirect dowry, or gift exchange are likely make it desirable for parents of daughters to guard their virginity he value on virginity

Table 5. Marriage transactions and the value on virginity when maidenhood is short. Transaction according to Virginity bride's family's contribution valued Contributesa Does not contribute' Yes 5 8 No 0 17 aGift exchange and indirect dowry (no cases of dowry among these 30 societies). bAll other forms, including absence of transactions. ever, we can pose Southeast Asia, known from historical records to have been a region of later marriage (that is, the late teens and early twenties) before Islam became established and, more recently, in areas outside Islam's range. In the Philippines in the 1820s, the mean age of a woman's first marriage was about 20.5; in Hindu Bali in the 1940s, itwas 18, as against 14 in Muslim Java (Reid 1988:158-160). Southeast Asia has also been a region of sexual permissiveness, before and beyond Islamic practice, a fact amply documented by observers of all sorts since the 16th century. If a girl became pregnant, the couple married; failing that, in some areas infanticide was practiced or the fetus was aborted. Abortion is reported to have been quite common in the 16th-century Philippines, and it is referred to in a 17th-century Malay epic as a normal occurrence (Reid 1988). The elite, however, were sexually restrictive even before the advent of Islam and in nonIslamic countries like Thailand. Speaking of the wealthy urban class, Reid (1988:157) notes that daughters were guarded "because their marriages involved both property and status." The vast displays of goods in the gift exchanges of the landed and mercantile elite were a far cry from the simple prestations of the peasantry, among whom choice of son-in-law was not a matter of state or commerce. Thus, while the "long maidenhood" explanation holds for Europe, it does not fit the facts of Southeast Asia, whereas the "property and status" explanation applies to both regions. Another explanation for the prescription of virginity, this time one limited to the pastoral belt from North Africa into Central Asia, is grounded in ecological concerns (Schneider 1971). Schneider relates men's control over female sexuality to their general competitiveness in pastoral regions, where ecological resources are limited and unpredictable, and to the difficulties involved in keeping related men linked to one another in common-interest groups, groups that are vulnerable to fragmentation into self-centered families. In such societies, Schneider asserts, women become a kind of resource whose disposal rests with those who dominate them, and they are only available to other men through their fathers, brothers, and other male kin. Common concern over female kin provides a focus for male kin bonding. In many pastoral societies the virginity of daughters and sisters (like the chastity of wives) is a marker of the integrity of individual men and of lineages. But whether pastoralism per se is a determining factor in the value on virginity may be questioned. The Standard Sample contains 1 7 societies for which pastoralism is the major subsistence technique, and we have information on the value on virginity for all but one of them: nine value it, seven do not. While the distribution according to marriage transactions is not significant, seven of the nine societies valuing virginity practice indirect dowry or gift exchange. (Three societies practicing one or the other of these forms do not value virginity.) These seven societies are all engaged in commercialas distinct from subsistence-pastoralism, and they inhabit the fringes of the Old High Culture areas of the Mediterranean and East Asia. The societies Schneider discusses may all be pastoral, but in my view pastoralism is less instrumental than are characteristics of property relations. One important feature of property relations is the disbursement of property; I argue that the consequences of disbursing property through dowry, indirect dowry, or gift exchange are likely to make it desirable for parents of daughters to guard their virginity. the value on virginity 727