United Nations A3208 General assembly Distr. general 17 August 2018 Seventy-third sessio Item 18(a)of the provisional agenda* Macroeconomic policy questions International trade and development Report of the secretary-General Summary The green shoots of the recovery in global trade that began in 2017have ontinued in 2018, with trade growth outpacing the growth of global gross domestic product once again. While this would normally lead to an optimistic outlook, the ntegrity of the multilateral trading system is under threat, and with it, the prospects for sustained global trade growth and the achievement of a comprehensive development agenda. The latest trade statistics are described in the present report, as well as the ways in which a revitalized and resilient multilateral trading system will allow trade to fulfil its role as an enabler for the realization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable development and the sustainable development goals A/73/150 18-12039 IⅢⅢ旧Ⅲ Please recyele
United Nations A/73/208 General Assembly Distr.: General 17 August 2018 Original: English 18-12039 (E) 280818 *1812039* Seventy-third session Item 18 (a) of the provisional agenda* Macroeconomic policy questions International trade and development Report of the Secretary-General Summary The green shoots of the recovery in global trade that began in 2017 have continued in 2018, with trade growth outpacing the growth of global gross domestic product once again. While this would normally lead to an optimistic outlook, the integrity of the multilateral trading system is under threat, and with it, the prospects for sustained global trade growth and the achievement of a comprehensive development agenda. The latest trade statistics are described in the present report, as well as the ways in which a revitalized and resilient multilateral trading system will allow trade to fulfil its role as an enabler for the realization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals. * A/73/150
A73/208 L. Trends in trade In 2017, after two years of decline, global trade finally rebounded. It grew by 9 per cent compared with the previous year, reaching a value close to $23 trillion Despite the increase, international trade remained about $1. 2 trillion below its peak attained in 2014. According to forecasts from the World Trade Organization(WTO) and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, trade is expected to grow by about 4.5 per cent in 2018, in line with global output 2. Notwithstanding the recovery, it is worth noting that there has been a change in international trade dynamics. The steady increase in international trade that characterized most of the 1990s and 2000s has been replaced by a more erratic pattern and generalized fragility. After the strong recovery from the financial crisis of 2008, trade grew at a sluggish pace and then plunged by 12 per cent in 2015 and by 3 per cent in 2016. Two consecutive years of decline in the val ue of international trade had not been recorded since the early 1980s 3. The performance of international trade during the past five years has been at odds not only with the previous trend, but also with the overall economic environment. While international trade growth outperformed economic growth during most of the past three decades, in 2015 and 2016 global output increased while the value of international trade decreased. These dynamics are captured by one of the most commonly used indices to gauge globalization trends- the ratio of the value of world trade over global output(see figure D). This index stalled at about 62 per cent between 2011 and 2014 and then fell during 2015 and 2016-two years that are often referred to as a de-globalization period. The index picked up in 2017, but remains below its peak Figure I Economic and international trade growth: 2000-2018 050 :,H,:a -10 1 GDP(% change) 3:38:: Trade(% change Trade/Global output Source: Calculations of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)secretariat are based on data from UNCTADstat Note: Data for 2018 are projections a decrease in the value of trade during a period of economic expansion has not been recorded since 2001, although the decline in international trade at that time was marginal (not even I per cent) 2/22
A/73/208 2/22 18-12039 I. Trends in trade 1. In 2017, after two years of decline, global trade finally rebounded. It grew by 9 per cent compared with the previous year, reaching a value close to $23 trillion. Despite the increase, international trade remained about $1.2 trillion below its peak, attained in 2014. According to forecasts from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, trade is expected to grow by about 4.5 per cent in 2018, in line with global output. 2. Notwithstanding the recovery, it is worth noting that there has been a change in international trade dynamics. The steady increase in international trade that characterized most of the 1990s and 2000s has been replaced by a more erratic pattern and generalized fragility. After the strong recovery from the financial crisis of 2008, trade grew at a sluggish pace and then plunged by 12 per cent in 2015 and by 3 per cent in 2016. Two consecutive years of decline in the value of international trade had not been recorded since the early 1980s. 3. The performance of international trade during the past five years has been at odds not only with the previous trend, but also with the overall economic environment. While international trade growth outperformed economic growth during most of the past three decades, in 2015 and 2016 global output increased while the value of international trade decreased.1 These dynamics are captured by one of the most commonly used indices to gauge globalization trends — the ratio of the value of world trade over global output (see figure I). This index stalled at about 62 per cent between 2011 and 2014 and then fell during 2015 and 2016 — two years that are often referred to as a de-globalization period. The index picked up in 2017, but remains below its peak. Figure I Economic and international trade growth: 2000–2018 Source: Calculations of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) secretariat are based on data from UNCTADstat. Note: Data for 2018 are projections. __________________ 1 A decrease in the value of trade during a period of economic expansion has not been recorded since 2001, although the decline in international trade at that time was marginal (not even 1 per cent). 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trade over global output (percentage) Percentage change in trade and GDP GDP (% change) Trade (% change) Trade/Global output
A73/208 4. The magnitude of the decline in the trade of goods and services observed in 015 and 2016 reflected not only cyclical factors, such as lower investments and commodity prices, but also a change in the international integration process. Many economies began focusing on a more national development path as a result of the ongoing decline in the vertical specialization process across countries. Indeed, the liance of the manufacturing sector on imported inputs(measured by the share of intermediate imports over the exports of manufacturing goods) has declined in many countries during the past decade. 2 5. The trade downturn of 2015 and 2016 was broad-based and geographically widespread. Developing countries were hit hard by the collapse in trade -in most cases, harder than developed countries(see figure n) Figure ll Export slumps and rebounds Economies in transition South asia Middle East/North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America East asia Developed countries 50%40%30%20%10%0%10%20% Decline in 2015 and 2016 Rebound in 2017 Source: UNCTAD secretariat. based on data from UNCTADstat Note Growth rates refer to the 2014 baseline 6. Although trade rebounded strongly in 2017, the value of merchandise exports in 2017 remained well below that reached in 2014 for most countries. East Asia represents the only region for which exports returned to levels comparable to those seen in 2014, largely because of more limited declines in 2015 and 2016. Thi resilience is not surprising, as East Asian manufacturing exporters are in general more diversified and competitive in international markets, which allowed them to better weather the unfavourable economic environment. Looking beyond regional averages, most countries experienced rebounds in 2017 but with different magnitudes. Among the major economies, merchandise exports rebounded by about g per cent in the European Union, 8 per cent in China and 6.5 per cent in the United States of America Emerging Asian economies fared well in general, with exports in the Republic of Korea by about 16 per cent and in India by 13 Wider diffe the magnitude of rebounds are observed in Africa, owing primarily to less diversifie export structures. Among major African economies, exports in South Africa grew by about 18.5 per cent, in Nigeria by about 15.5 per cent and in Ethiopia by about 8.5 pe In the case of China, for example, the rate of intermediate inputs over exports fell from almost 50 per cent in 2007 to about 30 per cent in 2017(UN Co 3/22
A/73/208 18-12039 3/22 4. The magnitude of the decline in the trade of goods and services observed in 2015 and 2016 reflected not only cyclical factors, such as lower investments and commodity prices, but also a change in the international integration process. Many economies began focusing on a more national development path as a result of the ongoing decline in the vertical specialization process across countries. Indeed, the reliance of the manufacturing sector on imported inputs (measured by the share of intermediate imports over the exports of manufacturing goods) has declined in many countries during the past decade.2 5. The trade downturn of 2015 and 2016 was broad-based and geographically widespread. Developing countries were hit hard by the collapse in trade — in most cases, harder than developed countries (see figure II). Figure II Export slumps and rebounds (Percentage) Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on data from UNCTADstat. Note: Growth rates refer to the 2014 baseline. 6. Although trade rebounded strongly in 2017, the value of merchandise exports in 2017 remained well below that reached in 2014 for most countries. East Asia represents the only region for which exports returned to levels comparable to those seen in 2014, largely because of more limited declines in 2015 and 2016. This resilience is not surprising, as East Asian manufacturing exporters are in general more diversified and competitive in international markets, which allowed them to better weather the unfavourable economic environment. Looking beyond regional averages, most countries experienced rebounds in 2017 but with different magnitudes. Among the major economies, merchandise exports rebounded by about 9 per cent in the European Union, 8 per cent in China and 6.5 per cent in the United States of America. Emerging Asian economies fared well in general, with exports in the Republic of Korea growing by about 16 per cent and in India by 13 per cent. Wider differences in the magnitude of rebounds are observed in Africa, owing primarily to less diversified export structures. Among major African economies, exports in South Africa grew by about 18.5 per cent, in Nigeria by about 15.5 per cent and in Ethiopia by about 8.5 per __________________ 2 In the case of China, for example, the rate of intermediate inputs over exports fell from almost 50 per cent in 2007 to about 30 per cent in 2017 (UN Comtrade). -50% -40% -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% Developed countries East Asia Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East/North Africa South Asia Economies in transition Decline in 2015 and 2016 Rebound in 2017
A73/208 cent. On the other hand, exports in Egypt and Kenya grew by only I per cent. Export also rebounded strongly in most Latin American countries Exports in Brazil grew by 17.5 per cent, in Chile by 12.5 per cent and in Mexico by 9.5 per cent. An exception among the broad-based rebound in Latin American countries was Argentina, whose exports grew by only I per cent. The heterogeneity in recoveries across nations highlights the need for the nuanced and varied policy approaches required to achieve Sustainable Development Goal target 17.11, as well as the fragility of gains made in this context 7. In the past few years, the dynamics of South-South trade have also changed. As f2017, trade between developing countries accounted for about 27 per cent of global trade. While South-South trade fuelled a large part of the trade expansion during the 2000s(see figure Ill), its role as engine of global trade growth has diminished during the past five years. Of note is that about half of South-South trade involves China Excluding trade between China and other developing countries, South-South trade represents about 13 per cent of world trade. South-South trade was more affected by the trade downturn of 2015 and 2016 as well as by the rebound of 2017. This could have important implications for the ability of countries to harness trade to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals South-South trade(as percentage of global trade) 20% 200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017 South-South South-China Source: UNCTAD secretariat. based on data from UN Comtrade A. Commodities trading is critical for most developing countries 8. Commodity prices have played a substantial role both in the collapse of nternational trade and in its recovery, Given that almost two thirds of developing countries are commodity-dependent, with the proportion being about 80 per cent among least developed countries, commodities prices remain hugely influential on the export earnings of many countries. Ultimately, price movements affect the abili of developing nations to address their socioeconomic development needs and fulfil the Sustainable Development Goals. In this regard, while commodity prices increased across the board in 2016, the trends in 20 17 were more varied(see figure IV). Overall commodity prices kept increasing, as measured by the United Nations Conference on 4/22
A/73/208 4/22 18-12039 cent. On the other hand, exports in Egypt and Kenya grew by only 1 per cent. Exports also rebounded strongly in most Latin American countries. Exports in Brazil grew by 17.5 per cent, in Chile by 12.5 per cent and in Mexico by 9.5 per cent. An exception among the broad-based rebound in Latin American countries was Argentina, whose exports grew by only 1 per cent. The heterogeneity in recoveries across nations highlights the need for the nuanced and varied policy approaches required to achieve Sustainable Development Goal target 17.11, as well as the fragility of gains made in this context. 7. In the past few years, the dynamics of South-South trade have also changed. As of 2017, trade between developing countries accounted for about 27 per cent of global trade. While South-South trade fuelled a large part of the trade expansion during the 2000s (see figure III), its role as engine of global trade growth has diminished during the past five years. Of note is that about half of South-South trade involves China. Excluding trade between China and other developing countries, South-South trade represents about 13 per cent of world trade. South-South trade was more affected by the trade downturn of 2015 and 2016 as well as by the rebound of 2017. This could have important implications for the ability of countries to harness trade to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Figure III South-South trade (as percentage of global trade) Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on data from UN Comtrade. A. Commodities trading is critical for most developing countries 8. Commodity prices have played a substantial role both in the collapse of international trade and in its recovery. Given that almost two thirds of developing countries are commodity-dependent, with the proportion being about 80 per cent among least developed countries, commodities prices remain hugely influential on the export earnings of many countries. Ultimately, price movements affect the ability of developing nations to address their socioeconomic development needs and fulfil the Sustainable Development Goals. In this regard, while commodity prices increased across the board in 2016, the trends in 2017 were more varied (see figure IV). Overall commodity prices kept increasing, as measured by the United Nations Conference on 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 South-South South-China
A73/208 Trade and Development (UNCTAD) free market commodity price index, which rose by about 8.5 per cent in 2017. However, the increase in this composite index was driven mainly by fuels(up 13.5 per cent in 2017), which reached a two-year high triggered by supply cuts agreed upon by major producers of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC)and non-OPEC producers. The price index of minerals, ores and metals also increased (7 per cent in 2017), fuelled by strong demand and concerns over the limited supply of some base metals, particularly those used in the construction of electric vehicles. On the other hand, general increases in the prices of food and agricultural raw materials that had started in 2016 were reversed in 2017, a year that saw a near-record level of agricultural production. In 2017, the food price index fell by about 7 per cent and the agricultural raw materials price index fell by about 6 per cent. Preliminary statistics for the first three months of 2018 suggest a reversal in the trends of 2017, with a downward trend in the prices of fuels and metals and an upward trend in agri-food prices. However, the most recent projections(not shown in figure IV) show a possible substantial price rec overy for metals and fuels. At this stage, it is difficult to determine to what extent this price recovery will be maintained. Current trade rhetoric is expected to affect grains markets, for example, with a possible impact on food supplies and production. Given that most net food-importing countries are developing countries, they are expected to be more affected by policy shocks to international grains markets UNCTAD commodity price indices (January 2015 to March 2018)(2015=100) UNCTAD free market commodity price index All food -- Agricultural raw materials Minerals. ores and metals Source: UNCTAD secretariat. based on data from UNCTADstat 18-12039 5/22
A/73/208 18-12039 5/22 Trade and Development (UNCTAD) free market commodity price index, which rose by about 8.5 per cent in 2017. However, the increase in this composite index was driven mainly by fuels (up 13.5 per cent in 2017), which reached a two-year high triggered by supply cuts agreed upon by major producers of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC producers. The price index of minerals, ores and metals also increased (7 per cent in 2017), fuelled by strong demand and concerns over the limited supply of some base metals, particularly those used in the construction of electric vehicles. On the other hand, general increases in the prices of food and agricultural raw materials that had started in 2016 were reversed in 2017, a year that saw a near-record level of agricultural production. In 2017, the food price index fell by about 7 per cent and the agricultural raw materials price index fell by about 6 per cent. Preliminary statistics for the first thr ee months of 2018 suggest a reversal in the trends of 2017, with a downward trend in the prices of fuels and metals and an upward trend in agri-food prices. However, the most recent projections (not shown in figure IV) show a possible substantial price recovery for metals and fuels. At this stage, it is difficult to determine to what extent this price recovery will be maintained. Current trade rhetoric is expected to affect grains markets, for example, with a possible impact on food supplies and production. Given that most net food-importing countries are developing countries, they are expected to be more affected by policy shocks to international grains markets. Figure IV UNCTAD commodity price indices (January 2015 to March 2018) (2015 = 100) Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on data from UNCTADstat. 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 UNCTAD Free Market Commodity Price Index All food Agricultural raw materials Minerals, ores and metals Fuels free market commodity price index
A73/208 B. Trade in services: an area of opportunity for developing countries F Exports of services and 2005-2017(2005=100) 260 2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017 Goods in developed economies -g- Services in developed economies -Goods in developing economies -. Services in developing economies Source UNCTAD secretariat. based on data from UNCTADstat 9. Although trade in services is still dominated by developed countries, developing countries have been catching up. As shown in figure V, over the past decade exports of services have grown more than exports of goods, and have grown more in developing countries than in developed countries. Exports of services have also been more resilient than exports of goods, as shown by the much lower declines in the services exports, both in the 2009 global economic and financial crisis and in the 2015 trade downturn. 3 10. The developing economies share in global exports of services increased from 23 per cent in 2005 to 30 per cent in 2017. Among developing regions, Asia registered he fastest growth in exports of services between 2005 and 2017, and Africa the slowest. Despite the focus on transport and travel in the export profiles of developing conomies,between 2005 and 2017, telecommunications, computer and information services, financial services and other business services ranked among the fastest growing categories of services exported from developing economies. These services experienced annual growth rates of 12 per cent, ll per cent and 9 per cent respectively. Although for least developed countries, exports of services remain very low relative to global exports of services, about 0. 7 per cent in 2017, they are rapidly increasing, accounting for 19 per cent of the total exports from least developed countries. This underscores the potential role of exports of services in achieving Sustainable Development Goal target 17.11 11. The contribution of services to development can be enhanced by allowing access to international markets, which provide for more competition and relevant inputs and factors that support national services. This idea is supported by the higher 3 These trends are based on national accounts statistics. which often exclude certain categorizations(such as mode 3 and mode 4 of the WTo modes of supply) and the added value of services incorporated into the exports of goods and of services activities within manufacturing firms. Therefore such trends underestimate the contribution of services to trade 6/22
A/73/208 6/22 18-12039 B. Trade in services: an area of opportunity for developing countries Figure V Exports of services and goods, 2005–2017 (2005 = 100) Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on data from UNCTADstat. 9. Although trade in services is still dominated by developed countries, developing countries have been catching up. As shown in figure V, over the past decade exports of services have grown more than exports of goods, and have grown more in developing countries than in developed countries. Exports of services have also been more resilient than exports of goods, as shown by the much lower declines in the services exports, both in the 2009 global economic and financial crisis and in the 2015 trade downturn.3 10. The developing economies’ share in global exports of services increased from 23 per cent in 2005 to 30 per cent in 2017. Among developing regions, Asia registered the fastest growth in exports of services between 2005 and 2017, and Africa the slowest. Despite the focus on transport and travel in the export profiles of developing economies, between 2005 and 2017, telecommunications, computer and information services, financial services and other business services ranked among the fastestgrowing categories of services exported from developing economies. These services experienced annual growth rates of 12 per cent, 11 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively. Although for least developed countries, exports of services remain ver y low relative to global exports of services, about 0.7 per cent in 2017, they are rapidly increasing, accounting for 19 per cent of the total exports from least developed countries. This underscores the potential role of exports of services in achieving Sustainable Development Goal target 17.11. 11. The contribution of services to development can be enhanced by allowing access to international markets, which provide for more competition and relevant inputs and factors that support national services. This idea is supported by the higher __________________ 3 These trends are based on national accounts statistics, which often exclude certain categorizations (such as mode 3 and mode 4 of the WTO modes of supply) and the added value of services incorporated into the exports of goods and of services activities within manufacturing firms. Therefore, such trends underestimate the contribution of services to trade. 100 140 180 220 260 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Developed economies Goods Developed economies Services Developing economies Goods Developing economies Services
A73/208 productivity of service-exporting firms than of non-service-exporting firms in low income countries. 4 Still restrictiveness continues to be relevant in the services trade especially in professional services and transport. while some countries are reducing restrictions, particularly in mode 3 of the WTo modes of supply, trade in servi through the temporary movement of people remains with tight restrictions, such as quotas, labour market tests and durations of stay, ' restrictive visa and work permit rules and no recognition of qualifications and licences. Considering that trade costs for services are high and declining more slowly than trade costs for goods, addressing such restrictions should be a critical component of trade policy 12. International trade both in goods and services is increasingly facilitated by e-commerce channels. Although most e-commerce involves business-to-business transactions, the diffusion of information and communications technologies (ICTs among consumers has increased the importance of business-to-consumer e-commerce ransactions UNCTAD valued the total business-to-consumer e-commerce at nearly $3 trillion. Most of those transactions remain within the national economy. Cross border business-to-consumer e-commerce is still relatively low. UNCTAD estimates that cross-border business-to-consumer e-commerce was worth about $189 billion in 2015, which corresponded to 7 per cent of total business-to-consumer e-commerce China, the United States and the European Union are the leaders in cross-border business-to-consumer e-commerce, accounting for about $40 billion each. Cross border business-to-consumer transactions are expected to grow substantially in the coming years, owing mainly to the further diffusion of ICTs. This is likely to have several implications for both trade and the development agenda, including, but not limited to, the development of infrastructure serving business-to-consumer transactions C. An elusive goal: the least developed countries export challenge 13. As a group, least developed countries moved further away from attaining target 17 11 in 2017. Since 2014, their share in global exports has declined, largely as a result of a drop in exports of natural resources. As of 2017, least developed countries represented 0.93 per cent of global exports. For least developed countries to achieve target 17.11, this share would need to increase by about 33 per cent per year (see figure Vi). A coherent policy approach is needed to foster structural ransformation and attain sustainable export growth 4 UNCTAD, Services and Structural Transformation for Development(New York and Geneva, 017) 5 International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and WTo, Making Trade an Engine of Growth for All: The Case for Trade and for Policies to Facilitate Adjustment(2017) Information Economy Report 2017: Digitalization, Trade and Development( United Nations publication, Sales No. E. 17. IL D 8). 18-12039 722
A/73/208 18-12039 7/22 productivity of service-exporting firms than of non-service-exporting firms in lowincome countries.4 Still, restrictiveness continues to be relevant in the services trade, especially in professional services and transport. While some countries are reducing restrictions, particularly in mode 3 of the WTO modes of supply, trade in services through the temporary movement of people remains with tight restrictions, such as quotas, labour market tests and durations of stay, 5 restrictive visa and work permit rules and no recognition of qualifications and licences. Considering that trade costs for services are high and declining more slowly than trade costs for goods, addressing such restrictions should be a critical component of trade policy. 12. International trade both in goods and services is increasingly facilitated by e-commerce channels. Although most e-commerce involves business-to-business transactions, the diffusion of information and communications technologies (ICTs) among consumers has increased the importance of business-to-consumer e-commerce transactions. UNCTAD valued the total business-to-consumer e-commerce at nearly $3 trillion.6 Most of those transactions remain within the national economy. Crossborder business-to-consumer e-commerce is still relatively low. UNCTAD estimates that cross-border business-to-consumer e-commerce was worth about $189 billion in 2015, which corresponded to 7 per cent of total business-to-consumer e-commerce. China, the United States and the European Union are the leaders in cross-border business-to-consumer e-commerce, accounting for about $40 billion each. Crossborder business-to-consumer transactions are expected to grow substantially in the coming years, owing mainly to the further diffusion of ICTs. This is likely to have several implications for both trade and the development agenda, including, but not limited to, the development of infrastructure serving business-to-consumer transactions. C. An elusive goal: the least developed countries export challenge 13. As a group, least developed countries moved further away from attaining target 17.11 in 2017. Since 2014, their share in global exports has declined, largely as a result of a drop in exports of natural resources. As of 2017, least developed countries represented 0.93 per cent of global exports. For least developed countries to achieve target 17.11, this share would need to increase by about 33 per cent per year (see figure VI). A coherent policy approach is needed to foster structural transformation and attain sustainable export growth. __________________ 4 UNCTAD, Services and Structural Transformation for Development (New York and Geneva, 2017). 5 International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and WTO, Making Trade an Engine of Growth for All: The Case for Trade and for Policies to Facilitate Adjustment (2017). 6 Information Economy Report 2017: Digitalization, Trade and Development (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.17.II.D.8)
A73/208 Figure VI Share of least developed countries in global goods export values 2010 2015 2020 2025 Source: UNCTADstat 14. While that challenge is significant for least developed countries as a group, there is considerable heterogeneity among them. Seven least developed countries, situated in Africa and Asia, had already achieved target 17.11 as of 2017 or can be expected to achieve it by 2020 given their current export growth. Another 1l countries have achieved significant growth but stayed below the levels required to double their share by 2020. Of the remaining countries, 6 conserved their 2011 share in global exports rowth 15. An important constraint on exports of least developed countries has been the countries reliance on natural resources. The export value of these goods has declined for all exporters in recent years owing to depressed external demand and falling prices. The exports of commodity-dependent least developed countries have been hit particularly hard by this evolution(see figure Vin). Agricultural exports and the least developed countries' share in such exports have grown modestly. Textiles and apparel were key drivers of progress towards target 17.11: least developed countries increased not only the export value of textiles and apparel, but also their share in global exports, and are on good track to double that share by 2020 Data for three least developed countries(Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Timor-Leste)were unavailable at the time of reporting. 8/22
A/73/208 8/22 18-12039 Figure VI Share of least developed countries in global goods export values Source: UNCTADstat. 14. While that challenge is significant for least developed countries as a group, there is considerable heterogeneity among them. Seven least developed countries, situated in Africa and Asia, had already achieved target 17.11 as of 2017 or can be expected to achieve it by 2020 given their current export growth. Another 11 countries have achieved significant growth but stayed below the levels required to double their share by 2020. Of the remaining countries, 6 conserved their 2011 share in global exports and 20 had significant negative growth. 7 15. An important constraint on exports of least developed countries has been the countries’ reliance on natural resources. The export value of these goods has declined for all exporters in recent years owing to depressed external demand and falling prices. The exports of commodity-dependent least developed countries have been hit particularly hard by this evolution (see figure VII). Agricultural exports and the least developed countries’ share in such exports have grown modestly. Textiles and apparel were key drivers of progress towards target 17.11: least developed countries increased not only the export value of textiles and apparel, but also their share in global exports, and are on good track to double that share by 2020. __________________ 7 Data for three least developed countries (Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Timor-Leste) were unavailable at the time of reporting. 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 Percentage
A73/208 Figure vil Share of least developed countries in goods export values, by sector 1995 2005 2025 Natural resources -Animals and agriculture Apparel and textiles- Manufactures and other Source UNCTAD Note: Four major product sectors were chosen, given their importance for exports in least developed countries Classification revision 3 / ary commodities except agricultural commodities(Standard International Trade commodities and animals (SITC 3 codes 0, 1, 21, 22, 24, 26, 29, 4); apparel and textiles include leather goods, textiles, clothing and footwear(SItC 3 codes 61, 65, 83, 84, 85); and manufactures and other include all other good 16. Structural transformation and productive capacity are essential to reducing the vulnerability of commodity-dependent exporting least developed countries to external price and demand shocks. However, effective market access also continues to o present a barrier to increasing exports of least developed countries. Sustainable Development Goal target 17 12 calls for duty-free and quota-free market access for all least developed countries and transparent and simple rules of origin. In addition n its research. 8,% UNcTad has shown that issues such as non-tariff measures logistics, connectivity and trade facilitation can represent more significant barriers to exports than tariffs. To ensure that least developed countries increase their export share until 2020 and beyond, coherence among different policy areas is needed and multilateral trading system an essential public good. lo erships should be supported by strengthened global partnerships, which makes the alessandro Nicita and Julia Seiermann, G20 Policies and Export Performance of Least Developed Countries, Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities, Study Series No. 75 (Geneva, UNCTAD, 2016) 9 UNCTAD, "Trade facilitation and development; driving trade competitiveness, border agency effectiveness and strengthened governance", Transport and Trade Facilitation Series No. 7(2016) to Mukhisa Kituyi, "How to ensure the continued participation of least developed countries in th multilateraltradingsystem?"UnctaD,3February2016.AVailableathttp:/unctad.org/en /pages/newsdetails. aspx?Original VersionlD=1196 18-12039 922
A/73/208 18-12039 9/22 Figure VII Share of least developed countries in goods export values, by sector Source: UNCTAD. Note: Four major product sectors were chosen, given their importance for exports in least developed countries: natural resources include primary commodities except agricultural commodities (Standard International Trade Classification revision 3 (SITC 3) codes 27, 28, 3, 68, 667, 971); animals and agriculture include agricultural commodities and animals (SITC 3 codes 0, 1, 21, 22, 24, 26, 29, 4); apparel and textiles include leather goods, textiles, clothing and footwear (SITC 3 codes 61, 65, 83, 84, 85); and manufactures and other include all other goods. 16. Structural transformation and productive capacity are essential to reducing the vulnerability of commodity-dependent exporting least developed countries to external price and demand shocks. However, effective market access also continues to represent a barrier to increasing exports of least developed countries. Sustainable Development Goal target 17.12 calls for duty-free and quota-free market access for all least developed countries and transparent and simple rules of origin. In addition, in its research, 8 , 9 UNCTAD has shown that issues such as non-tariff measures, logistics, connectivity and trade facilitation can represent more significant barriers to exports than tariffs. To ensure that least developed countries increase their export share until 2020 and beyond, coherence among different policy areas is needed and should be supported by strengthened global partnerships, which makes the multilateral trading system an essential public good. 10 __________________ 8 Allessandro Nicita and Julia Seiermann, G20 Policies and Export Performance of Least Developed Countries, Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities, Study Series No. 75 (Geneva, UNCTAD, 2016). 9 UNCTAD, “Trade facilitation and development: driving trade competitiveness, border agency effectiveness and strengthened governance”, Transport and Trade Facilitation Series No. 7 (2016). 10 Mukhisa Kituyi, “How to ensure the continued participation of least developed countries in the multilateral trading system?”, UNCTAD, 3 February 2016. Available at http://unctad.org/en /pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1196. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 Percentage Natural resources Natural resources Animals and agriculture Animals & agriculture Apparel & textiles Apparel and textiles Manufactures & other Manufactures and other
A73/208 D. Trade imbalances 17. Currently, trade imbalances are an important topic in public de bate and on the policymaking agenda. After peaking during the mid-2000s, global trade imbalances have stabilized at about 2 per cent of global output(see figure vill). Not surprisingly, large economies are the ones contributing most to global imbalances. As of 2017, the current account surplus of Germany was about $300 billion and that of China about 180 billion. On the other hand. the current account deficit of the United States was about $450 billion in 2017. Whether imbalances are sustainable or not depends more on their size in relation to gross domestic product(GDP)than on their absolute value In that regard, the current account positions of many economies have become closer to more sustainable levels. In particular, the current account surplus of China decreased from more than 8 per cent of its GDP in 2008 to about 2 per cent in 2017 Figure vIll Global trade imbalances 3.5 825 2002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017 Global imbalances(left axis Developed (right axis eveloping (right axis Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on UNCTADstat and financial statistics from the International Monetary Fund Note: Global imbalances are calculated as the sum of the absolute values of current account balances across all countries divided by two E. Challenges to market access 8. In relation to trade policy, tariffs have remained stable at low levels during the past few years. However, the ongoing tension between leading trading nations could alter this trend. In 2017, the average most-favoured-nation tariff applied nternational trade was about 3 per cent, while the effectively applied rate (considering preferential trade agreements) was about 2 per cent(see figure IX) Beyond averages, tariff protection currently remains a critical factor only in certain sectors and in a limited number of markets. Tariffs tend to be higher in sensitive sectors such as agriculture and apparel, textiles and leather products. Tariffs also remain substantial for most South-South trade(the effectively applied rate is almost 5 per cent), especially regarding South Asian and sub-Saharan African imports. These substantial tariff rates are due principally to the reliance of many countries in those regions on border taxes to finance government budgets 10/22
A/73/208 10/22 18-12039 D. Trade imbalances 17. Currently, trade imbalances are an important topic in public debate and on the policymaking agenda. After peaking during the mid-2000s, global trade imbalances have stabilized at about 2 per cent of global output (see figure VIII). Not surprisingly, large economies are the ones contributing most to global imbalances. As of 2017, the current account surplus of Germany was about $300 billion and that of China about $180 billion. On the other hand, the current account deficit of the United States was about $450 billion in 2017. Whether imbalances are sustainable or not depends more on their size in relation to gross domestic product (GDP) than on their absolute value. In that regard, the current account positions of many economies have become closer to more sustainable levels. In particular, the current account surplus of China decreased from more than 8 per cent of its GDP in 2008 to about 2 per cent in 2017. Figure VIII Global trade imbalances Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on UNCTADstat and financial statistics from the International Monetary Fund. Note: Global imbalances are calculated as the sum of the absolute values of current account balances across all countries divided by two. E. Challenges to market access 18. In relation to trade policy, tariffs have remained stable at low levels during the past few years. However, the ongoing tension between leading trading nations could alter this trend. In 2017, the average most-favoured-nation tariff applied in international trade was about 3 per cent, while the effectively applied rate (considering preferential trade agreements) was about 2 per cent (see figure IX). Beyond averages, tariff protection currently remains a critical factor only in certain sectors and in a limited number of markets. Tariffs tend to be higher in sensitive sectors such as agriculture and apparel, textiles and leather products. Tariffs also remain substantial for most South-South trade (the effectively applied rate is almost 5 per cent), especially regarding South Asian and sub-Saharan African imports. These substantial tariff rates are due principally to the reliance of many countries in those regions on border taxes to finance government budgets. -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Percentage of GDP Percentage of global output Global imbalances (left axis) Developed (right axis) Developing (right axis)
