Berkshire's Performance vs.the S&P 500 Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Year Berkshire Berkshire Included 8 d09 3 19 84 197 129.3 23.6 199 30 0 200 303 8m468e62015 79802 15930 1L号3 Notes:Data are for calendar years with these wer wa Berkthir were simply to ha。ned the s0 ate t ed the o in yearswh showed a negative return.Over the 2
Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500 Annual Percentage Change Year in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire in S&P 500 with Dividends Included 1965 .................................................. 23.8 49.5 10.0 1966 .................................................. 20.3 (3.4) (11.7) 1967 .................................................. 11.0 13.3 30.9 1968 .................................................. 19.0 77.8 11.0 1969 .................................................. 16.2 19.4 (8.4) 1970 .................................................. 12.0 (4.6) 3.9 1971 .................................................. 16.4 80.5 14.6 1972 .................................................. 21.7 8.1 18.9 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 (2.5) (14.8) 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 (48.7) (26.4) 1975 .................................................. 21.9 2.5 37.2 1976 .................................................. 59.3 129.3 23.6 1977 .................................................. 31.9 46.8 (7.4) 1978 .................................................. 24.0 14.5 6.4 1979 .................................................. 35.7 102.5 18.2 1980 .................................................. 19.3 32.8 32.3 1981 .................................................. 31.4 31.8 (5.0) 1982 .................................................. 40.0 38.4 21.4 1983 .................................................. 32.3 69.0 22.4 1984 .................................................. 13.6 (2.7) 6.1 1985 .................................................. 48.2 93.7 31.6 1986 .................................................. 26.1 14.2 18.6 1987 .................................................. 19.5 4.6 5.1 1988 .................................................. 20.1 59.3 16.6 1989 .................................................. 44.4 84.6 31.7 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 (23.1) (3.1) 1991 .................................................. 39.6 35.6 30.5 1992 .................................................. 20.3 29.8 7.6 1993 .................................................. 14.3 38.9 10.1 1994 .................................................. 13.9 25.0 1.3 1995 .................................................. 43.1 57.4 37.6 1996 .................................................. 31.8 6.2 23.0 1997 .................................................. 34.1 34.9 33.4 1998 .................................................. 48.3 52.2 28.6 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 (19.9) 21.0 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 26.6 (9.1) 2001 .................................................. (6.2) 6.5 (11.9) 2002 .................................................. 10.0 (3.8) (22.1) 2003 .................................................. 21.0 15.8 28.7 2004 .................................................. 10.5 4.3 10.9 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 0.8 4.9 2006 .................................................. 18.4 24.1 15.8 2007 .................................................. 11.0 28.7 5.5 2008 .................................................. (9.6) (31.8) (37.0) 2009 .................................................. 19.8 2.7 26.5 2010 .................................................. 13.0 21.4 15.1 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 (4.7) 2.1 2012 .................................................. 14.4 16.8 16.0 2013 .................................................. 18.2 32.7 32.4 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 27.0 13.7 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 (12.5) 1.4 Compounded Annual Gain – 1965-2015 ...................... 19.2% 20.8% 9.7% Overall Gain – 1964-2015 ................................. 798,981% 1,598,284% 11,355% Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial. 2
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Berkshire's gain in net worth during 2015 was $15.4 billion,which increased the per-share book value of has grown Berkshire' 's net worth was roughly equal to the number that really resources were deploved in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (ess the tax that woulded i they were to be sold).In Wall Street parlance.,our balance sheet was then in very large part our focus had changed to the outright ownership of business s,a shift that neotbaaneeahcet5.f0attomnectoccuTn value of the"losers"we own is written down,but"winners"are never revalued upwards. We've had rience with both outcomes:I've made some dumb purchas s.and the amount i paid for the economic goodwill of those companies was later written off,a move that reduced Berkshire's book value.We've also had some winners-a few of them very big-but have not written those up by a penny. o心eo2c兴西 and alue.Today. an at our ”make our hrs shou theys10%auAt that lvel.purchaseo instantly ad maningfully increase per-share intrinsic value for Berkshire's continuing shareholders. The unrecorded increase in the value of our owned businesses explains why Berkshire's aggregate market- aticalls over short perod xampeo exceeds our book-value gain.The two ndicators vary y to pploereres forteeof 3
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2015 was $15.4 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 51 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $155,501, a rate of 19.2% compounded annually.* During the first half of those years, Berkshire’s net worth was roughly equal to the number that really counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that would be incurred if they were to be sold). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part “marked to market.” By the early 1990s, however, our focus had changed to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that diminished the relevance of balance-sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules that apply to controlled companies are materially different from those used in valuing marketable securities. The carrying value of the “losers” we own is written down, but “winners” are never revalued upwards. We’ve had experience with both outcomes: I’ve made some dumb purchases, and the amount I paid for the economic goodwill of those companies was later written off, a move that reduced Berkshire’s book value. We’ve also had some winners – a few of them very big – but have not written those up by a penny. Over time, this asymmetrical accounting treatment (with which we agree) necessarily widens the gap between intrinsic value and book value. Today, the large – and growing – unrecorded gains at our “winners” make it clear that Berkshire’s intrinsic value far exceeds its book value. That’s why we would be delighted to repurchase our shares should they sell as low as 120% of book value. At that level, purchases would instantly and meaningfully increase per-share intrinsic value for Berkshire’s continuing shareholders. The unrecorded increase in the value of our owned businesses explains why Berkshire’s aggregate marketvalue gain – tabulated on the facing page – materially exceeds our book-value gain. The two indicators vary erratically over short periods. Last year, for example, book-value performance was superior. Over time, however, market-value gains should continue their historical tendency to exceed gains in book value. * All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A. 3
The Year at Berkshire ire's normalized eaming possibly,because of insurance mega-catastrophes.)In some years the normalized gains will be small;at other times they will be material.Last year was a good one.Here are the highlights: .The most important development at Berkshire during 2015 was not financial,though it led to better earnings.Af fter a poor performance in 2014,our BNSF railroad ved its service to customers last yea ain th the year in capit eprectochre Itas moneywell spent. BNSE m s about 17%of America's intercity freight (measured by revenue ton-miles).whethe ect,we are a strong number one among the ich are Canadian-based),carrying 45%more ton- is not only Ito our m ailroads.2015 wa ton-miles fell.and ea (a gain of $606 million from 2014).Matt Rose and Carl Ice,the managers of BNSF,have my thanks and deserve yours. ed $13.1 billion,increase of tprofitable non-insurance Of the five,ony Berkshire Hathaway /sin2003 paid about70%of the cost in cash and,for the remainder,issued Berkshire shares that inreased the number outstanding by 6.1%.In other words,the $12 earnings.but making sure we also in results into the Berkshire model and will substantially increase our normalized per-share eaming power. dCMark Donegan.PCC has become the world's premier supplier of aerospace of them destined to be original equipment,though spares are important to the comp me of t products that are used by major manufacturers worldwide.Each is the a Vinci of his craft PCC's products,often delivered under multi- Other industries a served as well by the company's066m lants in 13 bu Mark ha made many acquisitions and will make more.We look Throughout this letter,all eamings are stated ona pre-tax basis unless otherwise designated
The Year at Berkshire Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire’s normalized earning power to increase every year. (Actual year-to-year earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of weakness in the U.S. economy or, possibly, because of insurance mega-catastrophes.) In some years the normalized gains will be small; at other times they will be material. Last year was a good one. Here are the highlights: ‹ The most important development at Berkshire during 2015 was not financial, though it led to better earnings. After a poor performance in 2014, our BNSF railroad dramatically improved its service to customers last year. To attain that result, we invested about $5.8 billion during the year in capital expenditures, a sum far and away the record for any American railroad and nearly three times our annual depreciation charge. It was money well spent. BNSF moves about 17% of America’s intercity freight (measured by revenue ton-miles), whether transported by rail, truck, air, water or pipeline. In that respect, we are a strong number one among the seven large American railroads (two of which are Canadian-based), carrying 45% more ton-miles of freight than our closest competitor. Consequently, our maintaining first-class service is not only vital to our shippers’ welfare but also important to the smooth functioning of the U.S. economy. For most American railroads, 2015 was a disappointing year. Aggregate ton-miles fell, and earnings weakened as well. BNSF, however, maintained volume, and pre-tax income rose to a record $6.8 billion* (a gain of $606 million from 2014). Matt Rose and Carl Ice, the managers of BNSF, have my thanks and deserve yours. ‹ BNSF is the largest of our “Powerhouse Five,” a group that also includes Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Marmon, Lubrizol and IMC. Combined, these companies – our five most profitable non-insurance businesses – earned $13.1 billion in 2015, an increase of $650 million over 2014. Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning $393 million, was owned by us in 2003. Subsequently, we purchased three of the other four on an all-cash basis. In acquiring BNSF, however, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash and, for the remainder, issued Berkshire shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $12.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the twelve-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per-share results. ‹ Next year, I will be discussing the “Powerhouse Six.” The newcomer will be Precision Castparts Corp. (“PCC”), a business that we purchased a month ago for more than $32 billion of cash. PCC fits perfectly into the Berkshire model and will substantially increase our normalized per-share earning power. Under CEO Mark Donegan, PCC has become the world’s premier supplier of aerospace components (most of them destined to be original equipment, though spares are important to the company as well). Mark’s accomplishments remind me of the magic regularly performed by Jacob Harpaz at IMC, our remarkable Israeli manufacturer of cutting tools. The two men transform very ordinary raw materials into extraordinary products that are used by major manufacturers worldwide. Each is the da Vinci of his craft. PCC’s products, often delivered under multi-year contracts, are key components in most large aircraft. Other industries are served as well by the company’s 30,466 employees, who work out of 162 plants in 13 countries. In building his business, Mark has made many acquisitions and will make more. We look forward to having him deploy Berkshire’s capital. * Throughout this letter, all earnings are stated on a pre-tax basis unless otherwise designated. 4
ArmotRCmomymeaatg2ooeae A personal thank-you:The PCC aca ed without the input and assistance of 心oT时n n妆eeach hand wel.H or us With the PC America's business giants that have yet to call us.Operators are standing by of smalle surance busin rned $5 7 hillion last earned between $400 million and $700 millio n,seven that earned between $250 million and $400 million on,and e the years go by. Whe operty,plant and u the United States. I told you earlier about BNSF's record capital expenditures in 2015.At the end of every vear.our railroad's physical facilities will be improved from those existing twelve months earlier. Berkshire Hathaway Ener ("BHE")is a similar story.That company has invested S16 billion in eof te coumyind Las year.BHE made major asgom tisrelctcdboa Welin-fected nd t ca e While Charlie and I search for new bus makin subsidi of these purchases ranged from S300,000 to $143 million. Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons,if they are sensibly- riced.(Most deals offered us most definitely aren't. These purchases deploy capital in operations that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed e years
A personal thank-you: The PCC acquisition would not have happened without the input and assistance of our own Todd Combs, who brought the company to my attention a few years ago and went on to educate me about both the business and Mark. Though Todd and Ted Weschler are primarily investment managers – they each handle about $9 billion for us – both of them cheerfully and ably add major value to Berkshire in other ways as well. Hiring these two was one of my best moves. ‹ With the PCC acquisition, Berkshire will own 101⁄4 companies that would populate the Fortune 500 if they were stand-alone businesses. (Our 27% holding of Kraft Heinz is the 1⁄4.) That leaves just under 98% of America’s business giants that have yet to call us. Operators are standing by. ‹ Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $5.7 billion last year, up from $5.1 billion in 2014. Within this group, we have one company that last year earned more than $700 million, two that earned between $400 million and $700 million, seven that earned between $250 million and $400 million, six that earned between $100 million and $250 million, and eleven that earned between $50 million and $100 million. We love them all: This collection of businesses will expand both in number and earnings as the years go by. ‹ When you hear talk about America’s crumbling infrastructure, rest assured that they’re not talking about Berkshire. We invested $16 billion in property, plant and equipment last year, a full 86% of it deployed in the United States. I told you earlier about BNSF’s record capital expenditures in 2015. At the end of every year, our railroad’s physical facilities will be improved from those existing twelve months earlier. Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) is a similar story. That company has invested $16 billion in renewables and now owns 7% of the country’s wind generation and 6% of its solar generation. Indeed, the 4,423 megawatts of wind generation owned and operated by our regulated utilities is six times the generation of the runner-up utility. We’re not done. Last year, BHE made major commitments to the future development of renewables in support of the Paris Climate Change Conference. Our fulfilling those promises will make great sense, both for the environment and for Berkshire’s economics. ‹ Berkshire’s huge and growing insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2015 – that makes 13 years in a row – and increased its float. During those years, our float – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit – grew from $41 billion to $88 billion. Though neither that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in Berkshire’s earnings, float generates significant investment income because of the assets it allows us to hold. Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled $26 billion during the 13-year period, including $1.8 billion earned in 2015. Without a doubt, Berkshire’s largest unrecorded wealth lies in its insurance business. We’ve spent 48 years building this multi-faceted operation, and it can’t be replicated. ‹ While Charlie and I search for new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year we contracted for 29 bolt-ons, scheduled to cost $634 million in aggregate. The cost of these purchases ranged from $300,000 to $143 million. Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons, if they are sensibly-priced. (Most deals offered us most definitely aren’t.) These purchases deploy capital in operations that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. That means no additional work for us, yet more earnings for Berkshire, a combination we find highly appealing. We will make many dozens of bolt-on deals in future years. 5
$4.25 billion.Now we own 325.4 million shares of Kraft Heinz (about 27%)that cost us 59.8 billion.The O心oaomom thera时apn eting-bring you Though we sc Accounting Principles)required us Kraft Heinzholding carried on our balance sheet at a value many billions above our cost and many billions below its market value,an outcome only an accountant could love. Berkshire also owns Kraft Heinz preferred shares that pay us $720 million annually and are carried at $7.7 billion on our balance sheet.That holding will almost nly be redeemed for S8 32 billion in June(the sou poo(ss paujad oe Paulo and his ass however,in pursuing Thei have been extraordin ssful.is to bu ies that offer oThi ctions sificantly boost productivity.the ortunity for eliminating many unnecessar y costs and then-very prom economic growth over the past 24 0 years.Without more output of de ired goods and s per working ge Paulo and his associates. At Berkshire.we.too crave efficieney and detest bur eracy To achieve ou goals.however we follow an approach emphasizing avoidance of bloat,buying businesses such as PCC that have long been run by managers.After the purc ole is s heir mana ess and the pleasure they derive from their obs.(With this hands tyle.Iam heeding a well-known Mungerism:"If you want to guarantee yourself a lifetime of misery,be sure to marry someone with the intent of changing their behavior.") We will continue to operate with extreme-indeed,almost unheard of-decentralization at Berkshire.But we will also look for opportuni s th managers are woefully inept.In either case,directors may be blind to the problem or simply reluctant to
‹ Our Heinz partnership with Jorge Paulo Lemann, Alex Behring and Bernardo Hees more than doubled its size last year by merging with Kraft. Before this transaction, we owned about 53% of Heinz at a cost of $4.25 billion. Now we own 325.4 million shares of Kraft Heinz (about 27%) that cost us $9.8 billion. The new company has annual sales of $27 billion and can supply you Heinz ketchup or mustard to go with your Oscar Mayer hot dogs that come from the Kraft side. Add a Coke, and you will be enjoying my favorite meal. (We will have the Oscar Mayer Wienermobile at the annual meeting – bring your kids.) Though we sold no Kraft Heinz shares, “GAAP” (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) required us to record a $6.8 billion write-up of our investment upon completion of the merger. That leaves us with our Kraft Heinz holding carried on our balance sheet at a value many billions above our cost and many billions below its market value, an outcome only an accountant could love. Berkshire also owns Kraft Heinz preferred shares that pay us $720 million annually and are carried at $7.7 billion on our balance sheet. That holding will almost certainly be redeemed for $8.32 billion in June (the earliest date allowed under the preferred’s terms). That will be good news for Kraft Heinz and bad news for Berkshire. Jorge Paulo and his associates could not be better partners. We share with them a passion to buy, build and hold large businesses that satisfy basic needs and desires. We follow different paths, however, in pursuing this goal. Their method, at which they have been extraordinarily successful, is to buy companies that offer an opportunity for eliminating many unnecessary costs and then – very promptly – to make the moves that will get the job done. Their actions significantly boost productivity, the all-important factor in America’s economic growth over the past 240 years. Without more output of desired goods and services per working hour – that’s the measure of productivity gains – an economy inevitably stagnates. At much of corporate America, truly major gains in productivity are possible, a fact offering opportunities to Jorge Paulo and his associates. At Berkshire, we, too, crave efficiency and detest bureaucracy. To achieve our goals, however, we follow an approach emphasizing avoidance of bloat, buying businesses such as PCC that have long been run by cost-conscious and efficient managers. After the purchase, our role is simply to create an environment in which these CEOs – and their eventual successors, who typically are like-minded – can maximize both their managerial effectiveness and the pleasure they derive from their jobs. (With this hands-off style, I am heeding a well-known Mungerism: “If you want to guarantee yourself a lifetime of misery, be sure to marry someone with the intent of changing their behavior.”) We will continue to operate with extreme – indeed, almost unheard of – decentralization at Berkshire. But we will also look for opportunities to partner with Jorge Paulo, either as a financing partner, as was the case when his group purchased Tim Horton’s, or as a combined equity-and-financing partner, as at Heinz. We also may occasionally partner with others, as we have successfully done at Berkadia. Berkshire, however, will join only with partners making friendly acquisitions. To be sure, certain hostile offers are justified: Some CEOs forget that it is shareholders for whom they should be working, while other managers are woefully inept. In either case, directors may be blind to the problem or simply reluctant to make the change required. That’s when new faces are needed. We, though, will leave these “opportunities” for others. At Berkshire, we go only where we are welcome. 6
ased its nershin interest last vear in ea of its"Big Four” Express.Coca-CoBMd Wells Fargo.We purchascdtiohr of IBM (increasnu ownership to 84%versus .8%at yearend 2014)and Wells Fargo (going to98%from 94%).At the othe in Ars rais to 15.6%In case you think these seemingly small changes aren't important,consider this math:For the four companies in aggregate,each increase of one percentage point in our ownership raises Berkshire's portion of their annual eamings by about $500 million ssess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and qity range from exc lent to staggering.At 复steoeaaneopaaaeoEa3o If Berkshire' are used as the marker our on of the "Big Four's"2015 earning pay us-about $1.8 billion last year.But make no mistake:The ne earnings we don't report are every bit as valuable to us as the nortion Rerkshired own stock-a move that increases ture earnings wit us to lay out e retaine the h expect that the per-share eamnings of these four investees.in aggregate will grow substantially over time If gains do indeed materialize,dividends to Berkshire will increase and so,too,will our unrealized capital gains Our flexibility in capital allocation our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controllec e over companies that limit themse ves ht.In like manner-well not exactly like manner our appetite operating businesses or passive investments doubleso chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire' seyond that,having a h ho or ma securities gives us a stockpil tapped w an elephant-s ered to us It's an election year,and candidates can't stop speaking about our country's problems(which,of course. of this negative drumbeat,many Americans now believe that their children will not That view is dead wrong:The babies being bom in America today are the luckiest crop in history. American GDP per capita is now about $56,000.As I mentioned last year that-in real terms-is a boma leap far beyond the wildest dreams of my parents Americans in 1930.Rather they work far more efficiently and thereby produce far more This all erful trend i certain to continue:America's economic magic remains alive and well Some commentators hemoan owth in real GDP-and.ves.we would all like to see a higher rate.But let's do some simple math using the much-lamented2%figure.That rate,we will see.delivers astounding gains. >
‹ Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of IBM (increasing our ownership to 8.4% versus 7.8% at yearend 2014) and Wells Fargo (going to 9.8% from 9.4%). At the other two companies, Coca-Cola and American Express, stock repurchases raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.2% to 9.3%, and our interest in American Express increased from 14.8% to 15.6%. In case you think these seemingly small changes aren’t important, consider this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one percentage point in our ownership raises Berkshire’s portion of their annual earnings by about $500 million. These four investees possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. Their returns on tangible equity range from excellent to staggering. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business. It’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone. If Berkshire’s yearend holdings are used as the marker, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2015 earnings amounted to $4.7 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends they pay us – about $1.8 billion last year. But make no mistake: The nearly $3 billion of these companies’ earnings we don’t report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records. The earnings our investees retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock – a move that increases Berkshire’s share of future earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime. The retained earnings of these companies also fund business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees, in aggregate, will grow substantially over time. If gains do indeed materialize, dividends to Berkshire will increase and so, too, will our unrealized capital gains. Our flexibility in capital allocation – our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses – gives us a significant edge over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they will operate. Woody Allen once explained that the advantage of being bi-sexual is that it doubles your chance of finding a date on Saturday night. In like manner – well, not exactly like manner – our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire’s endless gusher of cash. Beyond that, having a huge portfolio of marketable securities gives us a stockpile of funds that can be tapped when an elephant-sized acquisition is offered to us. ************ It’s an election year, and candidates can’t stop speaking about our country’s problems (which, of course, only they can solve). As a result of this negative drumbeat, many Americans now believe that their children will not live as well as they themselves do. That view is dead wrong: The babies being born in America today are the luckiest crop in history. American GDP per capita is now about $56,000. As I mentioned last year that – in real terms – is a staggering six times the amount in 1930, the year I was born, a leap far beyond the wildest dreams of my parents or their contemporaries. U.S. citizens are not intrinsically more intelligent today, nor do they work harder than did Americans in 1930. Rather, they work far more efficiently and thereby produce far more. This all-powerful trend is certain to continue: America’s economic magic remains alive and well. Some commentators bemoan our current 2% per year growth in real GDP – and, yes, we would all like to see a higher rate. But let’s do some simple math using the much-lamented 2% figure. That rate, we will see, delivers astounding gains. 7
(Compound n tun percentage that would result by simply multiplying 25x 1.2% pro ce a staggering y need not shed tears for tomorrow's children. niddle-clas 尚 regularly e 's,how it will be divided and services between those people in their productiverand retirees between the healthy and the inrm between the inheritors and the Horatio Algers,between investors and workers and,in particular,between those with are va nighly by the ma ce and the equ ly dece orking Americans who lack battlefield:money and votes will be the weapons.Lobbying will remain a growth industry. as the roods and services in the future than they have in the will also dramatically improve.Nothing rivals the market system in producing what pe so,in de id what ole want don t ye now they want.N y p 15 hen young,cou not er For 240 vears it's been a terrible mistake to bet against America.and now is no time to start.America's golden goose of commerce and innovation will continue to lay more and larger l be hored ad prap me regeeround.Americv far berer he merica's social securty Considering this favorable tailwind.Bershr (dbebusineses)will ams e mana rs who succeed lie and me w share intrinsi (2)further their ca (4)repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value;and (5)ma
America’s population is growing about .8% per year (.5% from births minus deaths and .3% from net migration). Thus 2% of overall growth produces about 1.2% of per capita growth. That may not sound impressive. But in a single generation of, say, 25 years, that rate of growth leads to a gain of 34.4% in real GDP per capita. (Compounding’s effects produce the excess over the percentage that would result by simply multiplying 25 x 1.2%.) In turn, that 34.4% gain will produce a staggering $19,000 increase in real GDP per capita for the next generation. Were that to be distributed equally, the gain would be $76,000 annually for a family of four. Today’s politicians need not shed tears for tomorrow’s children. Indeed, most of today’s children are doing well. All families in my upper middle-class neighborhood regularly enjoy a living standard better than that achieved by John D. Rockefeller Sr. at the time of my birth. His unparalleled fortune couldn’t buy what we now take for granted, whether the field is – to name just a few – transportation, entertainment, communication or medical services. Rockefeller certainly had power and fame; he could not, however, live as well as my neighbors now do. Though the pie to be shared by the next generation will be far larger than today’s, how it will be divided will remain fiercely contentious. Just as is now the case, there will be struggles for the increased output of goods and services between those people in their productive years and retirees, between the healthy and the infirm, between the inheritors and the Horatio Algers, between investors and workers and, in particular, between those with talents that are valued highly by the marketplace and the equally decent hard-working Americans who lack the skills the market prizes. Clashes of that sort have forever been with us – and will forever continue. Congress will be the battlefield; money and votes will be the weapons. Lobbying will remain a growth industry. The good news, however, is that even members of the “losing” sides will almost certainly enjoy – as they should – far more goods and services in the future than they have in the past. The quality of their increased bounty will also dramatically improve. Nothing rivals the market system in producing what people want – nor, even more so, in delivering what people don’t yet know they want. My parents, when young, could not envision a television set, nor did I, in my 50s, think I needed a personal computer. Both products, once people saw what they could do, quickly revolutionized their lives. I now spend ten hours a week playing bridge online. And, as I write this letter, “search” is invaluable to me. (I’m not ready for Tinder, however.) For 240 years it’s been a terrible mistake to bet against America, and now is no time to start. America’s golden goose of commerce and innovation will continue to lay more and larger eggs. America’s social security promises will be honored and perhaps made more generous. And, yes, America’s kids will live far better than their parents did. ************ Considering this favorable tailwind, Berkshire (and, to be sure, a great many other businesses) will almost certainly prosper. The managers who succeed Charlie and me will build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by following our simple blueprint of: (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. Management will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares. 8
Intrinsic Business Value is for Rer 2010 annual r port we laid out the three elementsone of them qualitative that we believe are the kevs to an estimation of Berkshire's intrinsic value.That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 113-114. Here is an update of the two quantitative factors:In 2015 our per-share cash and investments increased 8.3%to $159,794 (with our Kraft Heinz shares stated at market value),and earnings from our many businesses- nce unde 0%toS12,304 per share.We exclude in th cond factor of value.In arriving at our earnings figure.we deduct all corporate overhead.interest.depreciation.amortization and minority interests.Income taxes,though,are not deducted.That is,the earnings are pre-tax. h above because we are for the first time including insurance underwriting nbusiness eamings.We did not do that when we initially introduced Berkshire's two quantitative pillasof ce results ere then h ove ages.If th wind didn over time and ignored any of its gains or losses in our annual calculation of the second factor of value. Today,our insurance results are likely to be more stable than was the case a decade or two ago because we have deemphasized cntributed S1,118 per share to the srad-and-butter lines of bus of business.Last year g inc me e S12,304 per share of earnin renced in the se t vears.You should re well be unprofitable,perhaps substantially so. Since 1970.our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 18 9%compounded annually.and ou earings (including the underwriting results in both the initial and terminal year)have grown at a23.7%clip.It isno to that o camnings Now,let's examine the four major sectors of our operations.Each has vastly diff rent balance sheet and gh the ant and a n present them intent is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed,with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders.(Don't get excited:this is not a switch we are considering.) Insurance Let's look first at ins D9)1 ch of that indu .tha Nationa mnity is the largest property-casualty by net worth. s carried on our
Intrinsic Business Value As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). It is possible, however, to make a sensible estimate. In our 2010 annual report we laid out the three elements – one of them qualitative – that we believe are the keys to an estimation of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 113-114. Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2015 our per-share cash and investments increased 8.3% to $159,794 (with our Kraft Heinz shares stated at market value), and earnings from our many businesses – including insurance underwriting income – increased 2.1% to $12,304 per share. We exclude in the second factor the dividends and interest from the investments we hold because including them would produce a double-counting of value. In arriving at our earnings figure, we deduct all corporate overhead, interest, depreciation, amortization and minority interests. Income taxes, though, are not deducted. That is, the earnings are pre-tax. I used the italics in the paragraph above because we are for the first time including insurance underwriting income in business earnings. We did not do that when we initially introduced Berkshire’s two quantitative pillars of valuation because our insurance results were then heavily influenced by catastrophe coverages. If the wind didn’t blow and the earth didn’t shake, we made large profits. But a mega-catastrophe would produce red ink. In order to be conservative then in stating our business earnings, we consistently assumed that underwriting would break even over time and ignored any of its gains or losses in our annual calculation of the second factor of value. Today, our insurance results are likely to be more stable than was the case a decade or two ago because we have deemphasized catastrophe coverages and greatly expanded our bread-and-butter lines of business. Last year, our underwriting income contributed $1,118 per share to the $12,304 per share of earnings referenced in the second paragraph of this section. Over the past decade, annual underwriting income has averaged $1,434 per share, and we anticipate being profitable in most years. You should recognize, however, that underwriting in any given year could well be unprofitable, perhaps substantially so. Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 18.9% compounded annually, and our earnings (including the underwriting results in both the initial and terminal year) have grown at a 23.7% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the ensuing 45 years has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but our main goal is to build operating earnings. ************ Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring economic advantages to having them all under one roof). Our intent is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (Don’t get excited; this is not a switch we are considering.) Insurance Let’s look first at insurance. The property-casualty (“P/C”) branch of that industry has been the engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property-casualty company in the world, as measured by net worth. Moreover, its intrinsic value is far in excess of the value at which it is carried on our books. 9
characteristics:P/C insurers receive 网ehog可杰is clle y we call "float that will eventually go to othe Though individual policies and come al daheanmeontofaoatninsurerhol sequently,as our And how we have grown.as the following table shows: ess grows,so Year Float (in millions) 1000 163 2000 27.871 2010 65,83 2015 87,722 Further gains in float will be tough to achieve.On the plus side,GEICO and several of our specialized operations re alm st certain to grow at a goo lip.Natic Inde nity s reinsurance divi on,hov dforholdingL in effect,is what the industry pays to hold its float.Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insuranc industry,despite the float income all its comp anies enjoy,will continue its dismal record of aming subnorma 00 er Am or erest rate that to come,ther by exacerbating the profit problems of insurers.It'sa good bet that industry results over the next ten wall short of those recorded in the past decade,particularly for those companies that specialize in As noted e early in on that whil n he deriting reuAll insrergive that message lip serviceAt Berkshire t is religion,Testa So how does our float affect intrinsic value?When Berkshire's book value is calculated,the fill amount of 0rtnoatisdkduct d as a fiability,Just as a lia a revol float
One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows: Year Float (in millions) 1970 $ 39 1980 237 1990 1,632 2000 27,871 2010 65,832 2015 87,722 Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and several of our specialized operations are almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a decline in float, it will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. This structure is by design and is a key component in the strength of Berkshire’s economic fortress. It will never be compromised. If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. The prolonged period of low interest rates the world is now dealing with also virtually guarantees that earnings on float will steadily decrease for many years to come, thereby exacerbating the profit problems of insurers. It’s a good bet that industry results over the next ten years will fall short of those recorded in the past decade, particularly for those companies that specialize in reinsurance. As noted early in this report, Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 13 consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $26.2 billion. That’s no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style. So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect. It should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses – a huge $24.5 billion to more than six million claimants in 2015 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business that will soon generate its own claims, adding to float. 10
If o volving float is hoth costless nduring which i believe it will be the value of thi liability is rmcless than the accounting liability.Owing$I that in effect will never leave the premises- A partial offset to this overstated liability is a15.5 billion"goodwill"asset that we incurred in buying our companies and th odwill.h its true value.For example,if an insurance com asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless,whatever its original cost. Fortunately,that does not describe Berkshire.Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill what we would happily pay for float of simild we to purchase nng it -to be Jar in excess of its h float.Its value today is one reason-a huge reason-why we believe Berkshire's intrinsic business valu substantially exceeds its book value. 市幸市市率来率市市率中号 Berkshire srunning ital to take on His most important,brains in a manner unique in the insurance business.Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources Indeed,Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers.For example,if the from some mega-catastrophe ss about triple anything ain awash in cash and be looki rtunities to write business in an insurance market that might well be in disarray.Meanwhile,other major insurers and reinsurers would be swimming in red ink,if not facing insolvency. When Ajit entered Berkshire's office on a Saturday in 1986,he did not have a day's experience in the insurance business.Neverthe ess,Mike erg,then We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re,managed by Tad Montross. At bottom,a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines.It must (1)understand all e and oper ting re appropr premium can't be obtained
If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing $1 that in effect will never leave the premises – because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute – is worlds different from owing $1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities, however, are treated as equals under GAAP. A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that increases book value. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost. Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Indeed, almost the entire $15.5 billion we carry for goodwill in our insurance business was already on our books in 2000. Yet we subsequently tripled our float. Its value today is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value. ************ Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units. First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. We would also remain awash in cash and be looking for large opportunities to write business in an insurance market that might well be in disarray. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be swimming in red ink, if not facing insolvency. When Ajit entered Berkshire’s office on a Saturday in 1986, he did not have a day’s experience in the insurance business. Nevertheless, Mike Goldberg, then our manager of insurance, handed him the keys to our reinsurance business. With that move, Mike achieved sainthood: Since then, Ajit has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire shareholders. ************ We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross. At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained. 11
