北京师范大学 教育研究方法讲座系列 Lecture 4 approach to Comparative-Historical Method(l Functionalism in Comparative Perspective
北京师范大学 教育研究方法讲座系列 Lecture 4 Approach to Comparative-Historical Method (1): Functionalism in Comparative Perspective
Explaining big structure and largeprocess by Comparative-Historical Method z Georg H von wrights distinction between two traditions of scientific inquiry "It is.. misleading to say that understanding versus explanation marks the diference between two types of scientific intelligibility But one could say that the intentional or nonintentional character of their objects marks the difference between two types of understanding and of explanation. (von Wright, 1971, P 135) y Two types of explanatory objects x Structures and motions are particles in naturalscience x Institutional structures, historical processes, and socialinteractions and actions in the social sciences
Explaining Big Structure and LargeProcess by Comparative-Historical Method z Georg H. von Wright’s distinction between two traditions of scientific inquiry “It is… misleading to say that understanding versus explanation marks the difference between two types of scientific intelligibility. But one could say that the intentional or nonintentional character of their objects marks the difference between two types of understanding and of explanation.” (von Wright, 1971, p.135) y Two types of explanatory objects x Structures and motions are particles in natural science x Institutional structures, historical processes, and social interactions and actions in the social sciences
Explaining big structure and largeprocess by Comparative-Historical Method z. two traditions of scientific inguiry. y Distinction between causal(nonintentional) and teleological (intentional) explanations x Causal explanation: It refers to the mode ofexplanation, which attempt to seek the sufficient andornecessary conditions (i.e. explanans which antecede the phenomenonto be explained (i.e. explanandum Causal explanations normally point to the past. This happened, because that had occurred' is the typicalformin language.(von Wright, 1971, P. 83)It seeks to verify the antecedental conditions for an observed naturalphenomenon This mode ofexplanation can further be diferentiated into Deductive-nomological explanation Inductive-probabillistic explanation
Explaining Big Structure and LargeProcess by Comparative-Historical Method z …two traditions of scientific inquiry… y Distinction between causal (nonintentional) and teleological (intentional) explanations x Causal explanation: It refers to the mode of explanation, which attempt to seek the sufficient and/or necessary conditions (i.e. explanans) which antecede the phenomenon to be explained (i.e. explanandum). Causal explanations normally point to the past. ‘This happened, because that had occurred’ is the typical form in language.” (von Wright, 1971, p. 83) It seeks to verify the antecedental conditions for an observed natural phenomenon. This mode of explanation can further be differentiated into • Deductive-nomological explanation • Inductive-probabilistic explanation
Explaining big structure and largeprocess by Comparative-Historical Method 2…, two traditions of scientific inquiry∵… Distinction between causal teleological explanations. x Teleological explanation: It refers to the mode ofexplanation, which attempt to reveal the goals and/orintentions, which generate or motivate the explanadum usually an action to be explained to take place. Teleological explanations point to the future. This happened in order that that should occur.(von Wright, 1971, p. 8) This mode of explanation can be diferentiatedinto Intentional explanation Functional explanation(Quasi-teleological explanation
Explaining Big Structure and LargeProcess by Comparative-Historical Method z …two traditions of scientific inquiry… y Distinction between causal & teleological explanations… x Teleological explanation: It refers to the mode of explanation, which attempt to reveal the goals and/or intentions, which generate or motivate the explanadum (usually an action to be explained) to take place. “Teleological explanations point to the future. ‘This happened in order that that should occur.’” (von Wright, 1971, p. 83) This mode of explanation can be differentiated into • Intentional explanation • Functional explanation (Quasi-teleological explanation)
Explaining big structure and largeprocess by Comparative-Historical Method z Two perspectives of marcohistorical explanation in comparative-historical research y Functional-equivalent explanation y New-institutional explanation
Explaining Big Structure and LargeProcess by Comparative-Historical Method z Two perspectives of marcohistorical explanation in comparative-historical research y Functional-equivalent explanation y New-institutional explanation
Functional explanation: A Debate z The features offunctional explanation y This type ofexplanation is most commonly used in biology. It takes the form of indicating one or more functions(or even dysfunctions)that a unit performs in maintaining or realizing certain traits of the system to which the unit belongs. "(Nagel, 1979, P. 23) For example, in explaining why human being has lung, the typical explanation in biology is that lung performs the function of breathing, i.e. provide oxygen to the f the proper maintenance of the system of a human body y The structure offunctional explanation: Accordingly functional explanation consist of the followings x Xperformthe function of y to the systemofz x y therefore explains the existence ofX or Z's possession ofy
Functional explanation: A Debate z The features of functional explanation: y This type of explanation is most commonly used in biology. It "takes the form of indicating one or more functions (or even dysfunctions) that a unit performs in maintaining or realizing certain traits of the system to which the unit belongs." (Nagel, 1979, p. 23) For example, in explaining why human being has lung, the typical explanation in biology is that lung performs the function of breathing, i.e. provide oxygen to the of the proper maintenance of the system of a human body. y The structure of functional explanation: Accordingly functional explanation consist of the followings x X perform the function of Y to the system of Z x Y therefore explains the existence of X or Z's possession of Y
Functional explanation: A Debate z A logical critique: There is a basic logical setback in this functional-explanatory structure. That is, since X performs Y, therefore X must be an antecedent of Y. However in the cause-effect explanatory structure, the existence of an effect(y could not have anteceded that of its cause(). Therefore, Y could not have been the cause ofX
Functional explanation: A Debate z A logical critique: There is a basic logical setback in this functional-explanatory structure. That is, since X performs Y, therefore X must be an antecedent of Y. However in the cause-effect explanatory structure, the existence of an effect (Y) could not have anteceded that of its cause (X). Therefore, Y could not have been the cause of X
Functional explanation: A Debate z Darwinist functionalism in biology: In biology and with Darwin's evolutionism the logical setback offunctional explanation can be resolved with the mechanism of natural selection in the theory of evolution. That is, the seemingly temporal ordering mismatch between X and r can be accounted for within the much longer timeline in the survival-of-the-fittest process of species within the ecological system of the planet earth. G.A. Cohen has called this requirement in functional explanation consequence lawor consequence generalization ( Cohen, 1978, Pp. 249-278, see also Elster, 1983, Pp 49 68)
Functional explanation: A Debate z Darwinist functionalism in biology: In biology and with Darwin’s evolutionism the logical setback of functional explanation can be resolved with the mechanism of natural selection in the theory of evolution. That is, the seemingly temporal ordering mismatch between X and Y can be accounted for within the much longer timeline in the survival-of-the-fittest process of species within the ecological system of the planet earth. G.A. Cohen has called this requirement in functional explanation "consequence law" or “consequence generalization (Cohen, 1978, Pp.249-278; see also Elster, 1983, Pp.49- 68)
Functional explanation: A Debate z Debate on functional explanation in the social sciences y Jon Elster's critique on functional explanation in social science: Jon Elster emphasizes that " there is no place for functional explanation in the social sciences. (Elster, 1984, viii The focal point of Elster's criticism is that there is no commonly accepted "consequence generalization and law available in social system, which can universally and exhaustively explain the existing status quo of a given social phenomenon, Unless we accept the thesis of social Darwinism that there is natural selection principle at work in social world, otherwise we may have to accept Jon ester suggestion that functional explanation is not applicable in social science
Functional explanation: A Debate z Debate on functional explanation in the social sciences y Jon Elster’s critique on functional explanation in social science: Jon Elster emphasizes that “there is no place for functional explanation in the social sciences.” (Elster, 1984, viii) The focal point of Elster’s criticism is that there is no commonly accepted "consequence generalization and law" available in social system, which can universally and exhaustively explain the existing status quo of a given social phenomenon. Unless we accept the thesis of social Darwinism that there is natural selection principle at work in social world, otherwise we may have to accept Jon Ester suggestion that functional explanation is not applicable in social science
Functional explanation: A Debate z Debate on functional explanation in the social sciences y Assumption of institutional resilience and persistence in social system: One resolution or qualification offered by Philip pettit(2002) and harold Kincaid(2007 is that instead of tracing all the way back to the origins of species and assuming that there is the evolutionism at work as biologists do. social scientists could restrain themselves relate functional explanation to the origins of social institutions and instead simply applying functional explanation to account for the resilient patterns or persistent regularities in social world
Functional explanation: A Debate z Debate on functional explanation in the social sciences y Assumption of institutional resilience and persistence in social system: One resolution or qualification offered by Philip Pettit (2002) and Harold Kincaid (2007) is that instead of tracing all the way back to the origins of species and assuming that there is the evolutionism at work as biologists do, social scientists could restrain themselves relate functional explanation to the origins of social institutions and instead simply applying functional explanation to account for the resilient patterns or persistent regularities in social world. …
