复旦大学：《运营管理》教学案例_7-11 Seven-Eleven Japan Co.

Kellogg KELO26 Revised february 14, 2005 SUNIL CHOPRA Seven-Eleven Japan co Established in 1973, Seven-Eleven Japan set up its first store in Koto-ku, Tokyo, in May 1974. The company was first listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in October 1979. In 2004,it was owned by the Ito-Yokado group, which also managed a chain of supermarkets in Japan and owned a majority share in Southland, the company managing Seven-Eleven in the United States Seven-Eleven Japan realized a phenomenal growth between the years of 1985 and 2003. Durin that period, the number of stores increased from 2, 299 to 10, 303, annual sales increased from 386 billion to 2, 343 billion yen, and net income increased from 9 billion to 91.5 billion yen Additionally, the company's return on equity (rOe)averaged around 14 percent between 2000 and 2004. In 2004, Seven-Eleven Japan represented Japans largest retailer in terms of operating income and number of stores. Customer visits to Seven-Eleven outlets totaled 3.6 billion that year, averaging almost 30 visits to a Seve ren-Eleven annually for every person in Japan Company History and Profile Both Ito-Yokado and Seven-Eleven Japan were founded by Mr. Masatoshi Ito. He started his etail empire after the Second world War when he joined his mother and elder brother and began ork in a small clothing store in Tokyo. By 1960, he was in sole control and the single store had grown into a $3 million company. After a trip to the United States in 1961, Ito became convinced that superstores were the wave of the future. At that time, Japan was still dominated by Mom- and-Pop stores. Ito's chain of superstores in the Tokyo area was instantly popular and soo constituted the core of Ito-Yokado's retail operations In 1972, Ito first approached the Southland Corporation about the possibility of openir Seven-Eleven convenience stores in Japan. After rejecting his initial request, Southland agreed 1973 to a licensing agreement. In exchange for 0.6 percent of total sales, Southland gave Ito exclusive rights throughout Japan. In May 1974, the first Seven-Eleven convenience store opened in Tokyo This new concept was an immediate hit in Japan, and Seven-Eleven Japan experienced tremendous growth. By 1979, there were already 591 Seven-Eleven stores in Japan, by 1984 there were 2,001. Rapid growth continued(see Exhibit 1), resulting in 10, 356 stores by 2004 On October 24, 1990, the Southland Corporation entered into bankruptcy protection Southland asked for Ito-Yokado's help, and on March 5, 1991, IYG Holding was formed by Seven-Eleven Japan(48 percent)and Ito-Yokado (52 percent). IYG acquired 70 percent of Southland's common stock for a total price of $430 million C2003 by the Kellogg School western University. This case was prepared by Professor Sunil Chopra. Cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 800-545-7685 (or 617-783-7600 outside the United States or Canada)or e-mail custservahbsp. harvard. edu. No part of this publication may be photocopying, recording, or otherwise-without the permission of the Kellogg School of Management

KEL026 Revised February 14, 2005 SUNIL CHOPRA Seven-Eleven Japan Co. Established in 1973, Seven-Eleven Japan set up its first store in Koto-ku, Tokyo, in May 1974. The company was first listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in October 1979. In 2004, it was owned by the Ito-Yokado group, which also managed a chain of supermarkets in Japan and owned a majority share in Southland, the company managing Seven-Eleven in the United States. Seven-Eleven Japan realized a phenomenal growth between the years of 1985 and 2003. During that period, the number of stores increased from 2,299 to 10,303, annual sales increased from 386 billion to 2,343 billion yen, and net income increased from 9 billion to 91.5 billion yen. Additionally, the company’s return on equity (ROE) averaged around 14 percent between 2000 and 2004. In 2004, Seven-Eleven Japan represented Japan’s largest retailer in terms of operating income and number of stores. Customer visits to Seven-Eleven outlets totaled 3.6 billion that year, averaging almost 30 visits to a Seven-Eleven annually for every person in Japan. Company History and Profile Both Ito-Yokado and Seven-Eleven Japan were founded by Mr. Masatoshi Ito. He started his retail empire after the Second World War when he joined his mother and elder brother and began work in a small clothing store in Tokyo. By 1960, he was in sole control and the single store had grown into a $3 million company. After a trip to the United States in 1961, Ito became convinced that superstores were the wave of the future. At that time, Japan was still dominated by Mom￾and-Pop stores. Ito’s chain of superstores in the Tokyo area was instantly popular and soon constituted the core of Ito-Yokado’s retail operations. In 1972, Ito first approached the Southland Corporation about the possibility of opening Seven-Eleven convenience stores in Japan. After rejecting his initial request, Southland agreed in 1973 to a licensing agreement. In exchange for 0.6 percent of total sales, Southland gave Ito exclusive rights throughout Japan. In May 1974, the first Seven-Eleven convenience store opened in Tokyo. This new concept was an immediate hit in Japan, and Seven-Eleven Japan experienced tremendous growth. By 1979, there were already 591 Seven-Eleven stores in Japan; by 1984, there were 2,001. Rapid growth continued (see Exhibit 1), resulting in 10,356 stores by 2004. On October 24, 1990, the Southland Corporation entered into bankruptcy protection. Southland asked for Ito-Yokado’s help, and on March 5, 1991, IYG Holding was formed by Seven-Eleven Japan (48 percent) and Ito-Yokado (52 percent). IYG acquired 70 percent of Southland’s common stock for a total price of $430 million. ©2003 by the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. This case was prepared by Professor Sunil Chopra. Cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 800-545-7685 (or 617-783-7600 outside the United States or Canada) or e-mail custserv@hbsp.harvard.edu. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of the Kellogg School of Management

SEVEN-ELEⅤ EN JAPAN CO KELO26 In 2004, convenience store operations from Seven-Eleven Japan and Seven-Eleven Inc in the United States contributed 48.2 percent of total revenues and 90.2 percent of total consolidated operating income for the Ito Yokado group. Seven-Eleven Japan contributed 87.6 percent of the total income received from convenience stores by Ito Yokado. Effectively, Seven-Eleven Japan had become the dominant part of the Ito Yokado group The Convenience Store Industry and Seven-Eleven in Japan As in the United States, convenience stores in Japan provided customers with a variety of products carried by general retailers as well as food retailers. In Japan, the convenience store sector was one of the few business areas that continued to grow during the prolonged 1990s downturn. From 1991 to 2002, the number of convenience stores in Japan increased from 19, 603 to almost 42,000. As a percentage of all retail stores in Japan, this represented an increase from 1.2 percent to 3. 2 percent. During that period, annual sales at convenience stores more than doubled from just over 3 trillion to 6.7 trillion yen. As a percentage of all retail sales in Japan this represented an increase from 2.2 percent to 5.0 percent apans convenience store sector gradually consolidated, with larger players growing and smaller opel 90 percent of Japan's convenience stores. As the chains improved their operating s shutting down. In 2004, the top 10 convenience store chains accounted for approximat structures and better leveraged economies of scale, smaller operators found it hard to compete Seven-Eleven Japan had grown its share of the convenience store market since it opened. In 2002, Seven-Eleven was Japan's leading convenience store operator, accounting for 21.7 percent of all convenience stores and 31.5 percent of total store sales. Seven-Eleven was very effective in terms of same-store sales. In 2004, average daily sales at the four major convenience store chains excluding Seven-Eleven Japan were 484, 000 yen. Seven-Eleven stores, in contrast, had daily sales of 647,000 yenmore than 30 percent higher than the competition. In 2004, Seven Elevens operating income of 165.7 billion yen positioned it as a leader not only of the convenience store sector but also of Japan's retail industry as a whole. In terms of growth, its performance was even more impressive. In 2004, Seven-Eleven accounted for 60 percent of the total net increase in the number of stores among the top 10 convenience store chains in Japan This growth had been very carefully planned, exploiting the core strengths that Seven-Eleven Japan had developed in the areas of information systems and distribution system The Seven-Eleven Japan Franchise System Seven-Eleven Japan developed an extensive franchise network and performed a key role the daily operations of this network. The Seven-Eleven Japan network included both company owned stores and third-party-owned franchises In 2004, franchise commissions accounted for over 68 percent of revenue from operations. To ensure efficiency, Seven-Eleven Japan based it fundamental network expansion policy on a market-dominance strategy. Entry into any new market was built around a cluster of 50 to 60 stores supported by a distribution center. Such clustering gave Seven-Eleven Japan a high-density market presence and allowed it to operate an efficient distribution system. Seven-Eleven Japan, in its 1994 annual report, listed the following six advantages of the market-dominance strategy KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN CO. KEL026 In 2004, convenience store operations from Seven-Eleven Japan and Seven-Eleven Inc. in the United States contributed 48.2 percent of total revenues and 90.2 percent of total consolidated operating income for the Ito Yokado group. Seven-Eleven Japan contributed 87.6 percent of the total income received from convenience stores by Ito Yokado. Effectively, Seven-Eleven Japan had become the dominant part of the Ito Yokado group. The Convenience Store Industry and Seven-Eleven in Japan As in the United States, convenience stores in Japan provided customers with a variety of products carried by general retailers as well as food retailers. In Japan, the convenience store sector was one of the few business areas that continued to grow during the prolonged 1990s downturn. From 1991 to 2002, the number of convenience stores in Japan increased from 19,603 to almost 42,000. As a percentage of all retail stores in Japan, this represented an increase from 1.2 percent to 3.2 percent. During that period, annual sales at convenience stores more than doubled from just over 3 trillion to 6.7 trillion yen. As a percentage of all retail sales in Japan, this represented an increase from 2.2 percent to 5.0 percent. Japan’s convenience store sector gradually consolidated, with larger players growing and smaller operators shutting down. In 2004, the top 10 convenience store chains accounted for approximately 90 percent of Japan’s convenience stores. As the chains improved their operating structures and better leveraged economies of scale, smaller operators found it hard to compete. Seven-Eleven Japan had grown its share of the convenience store market since it opened. In 2002, Seven-Eleven was Japan’s leading convenience store operator, accounting for 21.7 percent of all convenience stores and 31.5 percent of total store sales. Seven-Eleven was very effective in terms of same-store sales. In 2004, average daily sales at the four major convenience store chains excluding Seven-Eleven Japan were 484,000 yen. Seven-Eleven stores, in contrast, had daily sales of 647,000 yen—more than 30 percent higher than the competition. In 2004, Seven￾Eleven’s operating income of 165.7 billion yen positioned it as a leader not only of the convenience store sector but also of Japan’s retail industry as a whole. In terms of growth, its performance was even more impressive. In 2004, Seven-Eleven accounted for 60 percent of the total net increase in the number of stores among the top 10 convenience store chains in Japan. This growth had been very carefully planned, exploiting the core strengths that Seven-Eleven Japan had developed in the areas of information systems and distribution systems. The Seven-Eleven Japan Franchise System Seven-Eleven Japan developed an extensive franchise network and performed a key role in the daily operations of this network. The Seven-Eleven Japan network included both company￾owned stores and third-party-owned franchises. In 2004, franchise commissions accounted for over 68 percent of revenue from operations. To ensure efficiency, Seven-Eleven Japan based its fundamental network expansion policy on a market-dominance strategy. Entry into any new market was built around a cluster of 50 to 60 stores supported by a distribution center. Such clustering gave Seven-Eleven Japan a high-density market presence and allowed it to operate an efficient distribution system. Seven-Eleven Japan, in its 1994 annual report, listed the following six advantages of the market-dominance strategy: 2 KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

KELO26 SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN CO 1. Boosted distribution efficiency 2. Improved brand awareness 3. Increased system efficiency 4. Enhanced efficiency of franchise support services 5. Improved advertising effectiveness 6. Prevented competitors entrance into the dominant area Adhering to its dominant strategy, Seven-Eleven Japan opened the majority of its new stores in areas with existing clusters of stores. For example, the Aichi prefecture, where Seven-Eleven began opening stores in 2002, saw a large increase in 2004 with 108 new store openings. This represented over 15 percent of the new Seven-Eleven stores opened in Japan that year geographically, Seven-Eleven has a limited presence in Japan. In 2004, the company had es in about 70 percent(32 out of 47)of the prefectures within Japan. However, within fectures where they were present, stores tended to be dense. As the 2004 annual report stated Filling in the entire map of Japan is not our priority. Instead, we look for demand where Seven- Eleven stores already exist, based on our fundamental area-dominance strategy of concentrating stores in specific areas With Seven-Eleven franchises being highly sought after, less than 1 out of 100 applicants was awarded a franchise(a testament to store profitability). The franchise owner was required to put a significant amount of money up front. Half of this amount was used to prepare the store and train the owner. The rest was used to purchase the initial stock for the store. In 1994, 45 percent of profits at a store went to Seven-Eleven Japan, and the rest went to the store owner. The responsibilities of the two parties were as follows SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN RESPONSIBILITIES Develop supply and merchandise Provide the ordering s Pay for the system operation Supply accounting services Provide advertising Install and remodel facilities Pay 80 percent of utility costs FRANCHISE OWNER RESPONSIBILITIES Operate and manage store Hire and pay staff KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

KEL026 SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN CO. 1. Boosted distribution efficiency 2. Improved brand awareness 3. Increased system efficiency 4. Enhanced efficiency of franchise support services 5. Improved advertising effectiveness 6. Prevented competitors’ entrance into the dominant area Adhering to its dominant strategy, Seven-Eleven Japan opened the majority of its new stores in areas with existing clusters of stores. For example, the Aichi prefecture, where Seven-Eleven began opening stores in 2002, saw a large increase in 2004 with 108 new store openings. This represented over 15 percent of the new Seven-Eleven stores opened in Japan that year. Geographically, Seven-Eleven has a limited presence in Japan. In 2004, the company had stores in about 70 percent (32 out of 47) of the prefectures within Japan. However, within prefectures where they were present, stores tended to be dense. As the 2004 annual report stated, “Filling in the entire map of Japan is not our priority. Instead, we look for demand where Seven￾Eleven stores already exist, based on our fundamental area-dominance strategy of concentrating stores in specific areas.” With Seven-Eleven franchises being highly sought after, less than 1 out of 100 applicants was awarded a franchise (a testament to store profitability). The franchise owner was required to put a significant amount of money up front. Half of this amount was used to prepare the store and train the owner. The rest was used to purchase the initial stock for the store. In 1994, 45 percent of total gross profits at a store went to Seven-Eleven Japan, and the rest went to the store owner. The responsibilities of the two parties were as follows: SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN RESPONSIBILITIES • Develop supply and merchandise • Provide the ordering system • Pay for the system operation • Supply accounting services • Provide advertising • Install and remodel facilities • Pay 80 percent of utility costs FRANCHISE OWNER RESPONSIBILITIES • Operate and manage store • Hire and pay staff KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 3

SEVEN-ELEⅤ EN JAPAN CO KELO26 Order supplies Maintain store appearance Provide customer service Store Information and contents Seven-Eleven had 10, 303 stores in Japan and Hawaii as of 2003. In 2004, Seven-Eleven Japan changed the standard size of new stores from 125 square meters to 150 square meters, still significantly smaller than the size of most U.S. Seven-Eleven stores. Daily sales at a store averaged 647,000 yen(about $6, 100), which was about twice the average at a U.S. store.(See Exhibit 2 for other financial data.) Seven-Eleven Japan offered its stores a choice from a set of 5,000 SKUs(stock keeping units). Each store carried on average about 3, 000 SKUs depending upon the local customer demand. Seven-Eleven emphasized regional merchandizing to cater precisely to local preferences. Each store carried food items, beverages, magazines, and consumer items such as soaps, detergents, etc. Sales across product categories from 2002 to 2004 are given in Exhibit 3 The food items were classified in four broad categories: (1) chilled items including sandwiches, delicatessen products, and milk; (2) warm items including box lunches, rice balls and fresh bread; (3) frozen items including ice cream, frozen foods, and ice cubes; and (4)room- temperature items including canned food, instant noodles, and seasonings. Processed food and fast-food items were big sellers for the stores. In 2004, processed and fast foods contributed about 60 percent of the total sales at each store. Over one billion rice balls were sold in 2004; this amounted to each Japanese citizen eating approximately eight Seven-Eleven rice balls a year. The top-selling products in the fast-food category were lunch boxes, rice balls, bread-based products, and pasta. As of February 2004, Seven-Eleven Japan had 290 dedicated manufacturing plants that only produced fast food for their stores Other products sold at Seven-Eleven stores included soft drinks, nutritional drinks, alcoholic beverages such as beer and wine, game software, music CDs, and magazines In 2004, Seven-Eleven was focused on increasing the number of original items that were only available at their stores. At that time, original items accounted for roughly 52 percent of total store sales. The company aimed to grow the percentage to 60 percent in the medium to long term Store services co, Besides products, Seven-Eleven Japan gradually added a variety of services that customers could obtain at its stores. The first service added in October 1987 was the in-store payment of Tokyo Electric Power bills. The company later expanded the set of utilities for which customers could pay their bills in the stores to include gas, insurance premiums, and telephone. With more convenient operating hours and locations than banks or other financial institutions, the bill payment service attracted millions of additional customers every year. In April 1994, Seven- Eleven Japan began accepting installment payments on behalf of credit companies. It started selling ski lift pass vouchers in November 1994. In 1995, it began to accept payment for mail- KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN CO. KEL026 • Order supplies • Maintain store appearance • Provide customer service Store Information and Contents Seven-Eleven had 10,303 stores in Japan and Hawaii as of 2003. In 2004, Seven-Eleven Japan changed the standard size of new stores from 125 square meters to 150 square meters, still significantly smaller than the size of most U.S. Seven-Eleven stores. Daily sales at a store averaged 647,000 yen (about $6,100), which was about twice the average at a U.S. store. (See Exhibit 2 for other financial data.) Seven-Eleven Japan offered its stores a choice from a set of 5,000 SKUs (stock keeping units). Each store carried on average about 3,000 SKUs depending upon the local customer demand. Seven-Eleven emphasized regional merchandizing to cater precisely to local preferences. Each store carried food items, beverages, magazines, and consumer items such as soaps, detergents, etc. Sales across product categories from 2002 to 2004 are given in Exhibit 3. The food items were classified in four broad categories: (1) chilled items including sandwiches, delicatessen products, and milk; (2) warm items including box lunches, rice balls, and fresh bread; (3) frozen items including ice cream, frozen foods, and ice cubes; and (4) room￾temperature items including canned food, instant noodles, and seasonings. Processed food and fast-food items were big sellers for the stores. In 2004, processed and fast foods contributed about 60 percent of the total sales at each store. Over one billion rice balls were sold in 2004; this amounted to each Japanese citizen eating approximately eight Seven-Eleven rice balls a year. The top-selling products in the fast-food category were lunch boxes, rice balls, bread-based products, and pasta. As of February 2004, Seven-Eleven Japan had 290 dedicated manufacturing plants that only produced fast food for their stores. Other products sold at Seven-Eleven stores included soft drinks, nutritional drinks, alcoholic beverages such as beer and wine, game software, music CDs, and magazines. In 2004, Seven-Eleven was focused on increasing the number of original items that were only available at their stores. At that time, original items accounted for roughly 52 percent of total store sales. The company aimed to grow the percentage to 60 percent in the medium to long term. Store Services Besides products, Seven-Eleven Japan gradually added a variety of services that customers could obtain at its stores. The first service added in October 1987 was the in-store payment of Tokyo Electric Power bills. The company later expanded the set of utilities for which customers could pay their bills in the stores to include gas, insurance premiums, and telephone. With more convenient operating hours and locations than banks or other financial institutions, the bill payment service attracted millions of additional customers every year. In April 1994, Seven￾Eleven Japan began accepting installment payments on behalf of credit companies. It started selling ski lift pass vouchers in November 1994. In 1995, it began to accept payment for mail- 4 KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

KELO26 SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN CO order purchases. This was expanded to include payment for Internet shopping in November 1999 In August 2000, a meal delivery service company, Seven-Meal Service Co, Ltd. was established to serve the aging Japanese population. In 2001, TY Bank Co. was established through a joint investment with Ito Yokado. By April 2004, ATMs had been installed in about 75 percent of the total store network in Japan, with the goal of achieving 100 percent ATM installation Other services offered at stores include photocopying, ticket sales using multifunctional copiers, and being a pickup location for parcel delivery companies that typically did not leave the parcel outside if the customer was not at home. The major thrust for offering these services was to make Seven-Eleven stores in Japan more convenient places to shop. Several of these services exploited the existing Total Information System(see next section)in the store InFebruary2000,seVen-elevenJapanestablished7dream.com,ane-commerce he goal was to exploit the existing distribution system and the fact that stores were easily accessible to most Japanese. Stores served as drop-off and collection points for Japanese customers. a survey by eSBook, a joint venture between Softbank, Seven-Eleven Japan Yahoo! Japan, and Tohan, a publisher, discovered that 92 percent of its customers preferred to pick up their online purchases at the local convenience store, rather than have them delivered their homes. This was understandable given the frequency with which Japanese customers visited their local convenience store. dream hoped to build on this preference along with the synergies from the existing distribution system Seven-Eleven Japan's Integrated Store Information System From its start, Seven-Eleven Japan had sought to simplify its operations by using advanced information technology. Seven-Eleven Japan attributed a significant part of its success to the Total Information System installed in every outlet and linked to headquarters, suppliers, and the Seven-Eleven distribution centers. The first online network linking the head office. stores. and vendors was established in 1979, though the company did not collect point-of-sales(POS) information at that time. In 1982, Seven-Eleven was the first company in Japan to introduce a POS system comprising POs cash registers and terminal control equipment. In 1985, the company developed, jointly with NEC, personal computers using color graphics that were installed at each store and linked to the POs cash registers. These computers were also on the network linking the store to the head office as well as the vendors. Until July 1991, head office, stores,distribution centers, and suppliers were linked only by a traditional analog network. at that point in time, an integrated services digital network(ISDN) was installed. Linking more than 5,000 stores, it became one of the worlds largest ISDN systems. Seven-Eleven Japan spent 2.4 billion yen setting up this network The two-way, high-speed online communication capability of IsDN enabled Seven-Eleven Japan to collect, process, and feed back pos data quickly. Sales data gathered in each store by 11: 00 p. m. was processed and ready for analysis the next morning. In 1997, Seven-Eleven Japan introduced its fifth generation of the Total Information System, which was still in use in 2004 The hardware system at a 1994 Seven-Eleven store included the following Graphic order terminals for placing orders were linked to the store computer Scanner terminals scanned deliveries from the distribution center KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

KEL026 SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN CO. order purchases. This was expanded to include payment for Internet shopping in November 1999. In August 2000, a meal delivery service company, Seven-Meal Service Co., Ltd. was established to serve the aging Japanese population. In 2001, IYBank Co. was established through a joint investment with Ito Yokado. By April 2004, ATMs had been installed in about 75 percent of the total store network in Japan, with the goal of achieving 100 percent ATM installation. Other services offered at stores include photocopying, ticket sales using multifunctional copiers, and being a pickup location for parcel delivery companies that typically did not leave the parcel outside if the customer was not at home. The major thrust for offering these services was to make Seven-Eleven stores in Japan more convenient places to shop. Several of these services exploited the existing Total Information System (see next section) in the store. In February 2000, Seven-Eleven Japan established 7dream.com, an e-commerce company. The goal was to exploit the existing distribution system and the fact that stores were easily accessible to most Japanese. Stores served as drop-off and collection points for Japanese customers. A survey by eSBook, a joint venture between Softbank, Seven-Eleven Japan, Yahoo!Japan, and Tohan, a publisher, discovered that 92 percent of its customers preferred to pick up their online purchases at the local convenience store, rather than have them delivered to their homes. This was understandable given the frequency with which Japanese customers visited their local convenience store. 7dream hoped to build on this preference along with the synergies from the existing distribution system. Seven-Eleven Japan’s Integrated Store Information System From its start, Seven-Eleven Japan had sought to simplify its operations by using advanced information technology. Seven-Eleven Japan attributed a significant part of its success to the Total Information System installed in every outlet and linked to headquarters, suppliers, and the Seven-Eleven distribution centers. The first online network linking the head office, stores, and vendors was established in 1979, though the company did not collect point-of-sales (POS) information at that time. In 1982, Seven-Eleven was the first company in Japan to introduce a POS system comprising POS cash registers and terminal control equipment. In 1985, the company developed, jointly with NEC, personal computers using color graphics that were installed at each store and linked to the POS cash registers. These computers were also on the network linking the store to the head office as well as the vendors. Until July 1991, head office, stores, distribution centers, and suppliers were linked only by a traditional analog network. At that point in time, an integrated services digital network (ISDN) was installed. Linking more than 5,000 stores, it became one of the world’s largest ISDN systems. Seven-Eleven Japan spent 2.4 billion yen setting up this network. The two-way, high-speed online communication capability of ISDN enabled Seven-Eleven Japan to collect, process, and feed back POS data quickly. Sales data gathered in each store by 11:00 p.m. was processed and ready for analysis the next morning. In 1997, Seven-Eleven Japan introduced its fifth generation of the Total Information System, which was still in use in 2004. The hardware system at a 1994 Seven-Eleven store included the following: • Graphic order terminals for placing orders were linked to the store computer • Scanner terminals scanned deliveries from the distribution center KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 5

SEVEN-ELEⅤ EN JAPAN CO KELO26 Store computers were linked to the Isdn network POS registers were linked to the store computer Each piece of hardware had a role Graphic Order Terminal. This was a handheld device with a wide-screen graphic display, used by the store owner/manager to place orders. The items were recorded and brought up in the order in which they were arranged on the shelves. The store manager/owner walked down the aisles and placed orders by item. When placing an order, the store manager had access(from the store computer )to detailed analysis of PoS data related to the particular item. (Exhibit 4 gives an overview of the results of the analysis provided by the store computer. The store manager used this information when placing the order, which was directly entered into the terminal. Once all the orders were placed, the terminal was returned to its slot, at which point the orders were relayed by the store computer to both the appropriate vendor and the Seven-Eleven distribution cente Scanner Terminal. These scanners read bar codes and recorded inventory. They were used to receive product coming in from a distribution center. This was then automatically checked against a previously placed order and the two were reconciled. Before the scanner terminals were introduced, truck drivers waited in the store until the delivery was checked After they were introduced, the driver simply dropped the delivery in the store, and a store clerk received it at a suitable time when there were few customers The scanner terminals were also used when examining inventory at stores Store Computer:. This linked to the ISDN network, the POs register, the graphic order terminal, and the scanner terminal. It communicated between the various input sources, tracked store inventory and sales, placed orders, provided detailed analysis of POs data, and maintained and regulated store equipment POS Register. To better understand the functioning of this information network, one needs to consider a sampling of daily operations. As soon as a customer purchased an item and paid at the POS register, the item information was retrieved from the store computer and the time of sale was automatically recorded. In addition, the cashier recorded the age and sex of the customer. To do this, the cashier used five register keys for the categories: under 13, 13-19, 20-29, 30-49, and 50 and over. This Pos data was automatically transmitted online to a host computer. All sales data ollected by 11: 00 p. m. was organized and ready for analysis by the next morning. The data was evaluated on a company-wide, district, and store basis The analyzed and updated data was then sent back to the Seven-Eleven Japan stores via th network. Each store computer automatically updated its product master file to analyze its recent sales and stock movements. The main objective of the analysis was to improve the ordering process. All this information was available on the graphic order terminal used for order The information system allowed Seven-Eleven stores to better match supply with demand Store staff could adjust the merchandising mix on the shelves according to consumption patterns throughout the day. For example, popular breakfast items were stocked earlier during the day while popular dinner items were stocked later in the evening. The identification of slow and non moving items allowed a store to convert shelf space to introduce new items. More than 50 percent of the items sold at a Seven-Eleven store changed in the course of a year. Part of this related to KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN CO. KEL026 • Store computers were linked to the ISDN network • POS registers were linked to the store computer Each piece of hardware had a role. Graphic Order Terminal. This was a handheld device with a wide-screen graphic display, used by the store owner/manager to place orders. The items were recorded and brought up in the order in which they were arranged on the shelves. The store manager/owner walked down the aisles and placed orders by item. When placing an order, the store manager had access (from the store computer) to detailed analysis of POS data related to the particular item. (Exhibit 4 gives an overview of the results of the analysis provided by the store computer.) The store manager used this information when placing the order, which was directly entered into the terminal. Once all the orders were placed, the terminal was returned to its slot, at which point the orders were relayed by the store computer to both the appropriate vendor and the Seven-Eleven distribution center. Scanner Terminal. These scanners read bar codes and recorded inventory. They were used to receive product coming in from a distribution center. This was then automatically checked against a previously placed order and the two were reconciled. Before the scanner terminals were introduced, truck drivers waited in the store until the delivery was checked. After they were introduced, the driver simply dropped the delivery in the store, and a store clerk received it at a suitable time when there were few customers. The scanner terminals were also used when examining inventory at stores. Store Computer. This linked to the ISDN network, the POS register, the graphic order terminal, and the scanner terminal. It communicated between the various input sources, tracked store inventory and sales, placed orders, provided detailed analysis of POS data, and maintained and regulated store equipment. POS Register. To better understand the functioning of this information network, one needs to consider a sampling of daily operations. As soon as a customer purchased an item and paid at the POS register, the item information was retrieved from the store computer and the time of sale was automatically recorded. In addition, the cashier recorded the age and sex of the customer. To do this, the cashier used five register keys for the categories: under 13, 13–19, 20–29, 30–49, and 50 and over. This POS data was automatically transmitted online to a host computer. All sales data collected by 11:00 p.m. was organized and ready for analysis by the next morning. The data was evaluated on a company-wide, district, and store basis. The analyzed and updated data was then sent back to the Seven-Eleven Japan stores via the network. Each store computer automatically updated its product master file to analyze its recent sales and stock movements. The main objective of the analysis was to improve the ordering process. All this information was available on the graphic order terminal used for order placement. The information system allowed Seven-Eleven stores to better match supply with demand. Store staff could adjust the merchandising mix on the shelves according to consumption patterns throughout the day. For example, popular breakfast items were stocked earlier during the day, while popular dinner items were stocked later in the evening. The identification of slow and non￾moving items allowed a store to convert shelf space to introduce new items. More than 50 percent of the items sold at a Seven-Eleven store changed in the course of a year. Part of this related to 6 KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

KELO SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN CO seasonal demand and part to new products. When a new product was introduced, the decision whether to continue stocking it was made within the first three weeks. Each item on the shelf contributed to sales and margin and did not waste valuable shelf space Seven-Eleven's distribution System The Seven-Eleven distribution system tightly linked the entire supply chain for all product categories. The Seven-Eleven distribution centers and the information network played a key role in that regard. The major objective was to carefully track sales of items and offer short eplenishment cycle times. This allowed a store manager to accurately forecast sales corresponding to each order Since March 1987, Seven-Eleven had offered three-times-daily store delivery of all rice dishes(which comprised most of the fast-food items sold ). Bread and other fresh food were delivered twice a day. The distribution system was flexible enough to alter delivery schedules depending on customer demand For example, ice cream was delivered daily during the summer but only three times a week at other times. The replenishment cycle time for fresh and fast-food items had been shortened to less than 12 hours. a store order for rice balls by 10: 00 a.m. was delivered before the dinner rush As discussed earlier, the store manager used a graphic order terminal to place an order. Al tores were given cut-off times for breakfast, lunch, and dinner ordering. When a store placed an order, it was immediately transmitted to the supplier as well as the distribution center. The supplier received orders from all Seven-Eleven stores and started production to fill the orders The supplier then sent the orders by truck to the distribution center. Each store order was separated so the distribution center could easily assign it to the appropriate store truck using the order information it already had. The key to store delivery was what Seven-Eleven called the combined delivery system. At the distribution center, delivery of like products from different suppliers(for example, milk and sandwiches) was directed into a single temperature-controlled truck. There were four categories of temperature-controlled trucks: frozen foods, chilled foods room-temperature processed foods, and warm foods. Each truck made deliveries to multiple retail stores. The number of stores per truck depended on the sales volume. all deliveries were made during off-peak hours and were received using the scanner terminals. The system worked on trust and did not require the delivery person to be present when the store personnel scanned in the delivery. That reduced the delivery time spent at each store This distribution system enabled Seven-Eleven to reduce the number of vehicles required for daily delivery service to each store, even though the delivery frequency of each item was quite high. In 1974, 70 vehicles visited each store every day. In 1994, only ll were necessary. This dramatically reduced delivery costs and enabled rapid delivery of a variety of fresh foods As of February 2004, Seven-Eleven Japan had a total of 290 dedicated manufacturing plants throughout the country that only produced fast food for Seven-Eleven stores. These items were distributed through 293 dedicated distribution centers(DCs)that ensured rapid, reliable delivery None of these DCs carried any inventory; they merely transferred inventory from supplier trucks to Seven-Eleven distribution trucks. The transportation was provided by transfleet Ltd,a company set up by Mitsui and Co. for the exclusive use of Seven-Eleven Japan. The outline of the combined distribution system is shown in Exhibit 5 KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

KEL026 SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN CO. seasonal demand and part to new products. When a new product was introduced, the decision whether to continue stocking it was made within the first three weeks. Each item on the shelf contributed to sales and margin and did not waste valuable shelf space. Seven-Eleven’s Distribution System The Seven-Eleven distribution system tightly linked the entire supply chain for all product categories. The Seven-Eleven distribution centers and the information network played a key role in that regard. The major objective was to carefully track sales of items and offer short replenishment cycle times. This allowed a store manager to accurately forecast sales corresponding to each order. Since March 1987, Seven-Eleven had offered three-times-daily store delivery of all rice dishes (which comprised most of the fast-food items sold). Bread and other fresh food were delivered twice a day. The distribution system was flexible enough to alter delivery schedules depending on customer demand. For example, ice cream was delivered daily during the summer but only three times a week at other times. The replenishment cycle time for fresh and fast-food items had been shortened to less than 12 hours. A store order for rice balls by 10:00 a.m. was delivered before the dinner rush. As discussed earlier, the store manager used a graphic order terminal to place an order. All stores were given cut-off times for breakfast, lunch, and dinner ordering. When a store placed an order, it was immediately transmitted to the supplier as well as the distribution center. The supplier received orders from all Seven-Eleven stores and started production to fill the orders. The supplier then sent the orders by truck to the distribution center. Each store order was separated so the distribution center could easily assign it to the appropriate store truck using the order information it already had. The key to store delivery was what Seven-Eleven called the combined delivery system. At the distribution center, delivery of like products from different suppliers (for example, milk and sandwiches) was directed into a single temperature-controlled truck. There were four categories of temperature-controlled trucks: frozen foods, chilled foods, room-temperature processed foods, and warm foods. Each truck made deliveries to multiple retail stores. The number of stores per truck depended on the sales volume. All deliveries were made during off-peak hours and were received using the scanner terminals. The system worked on trust and did not require the delivery person to be present when the store personnel scanned in the delivery. That reduced the delivery time spent at each store. This distribution system enabled Seven-Eleven to reduce the number of vehicles required for daily delivery service to each store, even though the delivery frequency of each item was quite high. In 1974, 70 vehicles visited each store every day. In 1994, only 11 were necessary. This dramatically reduced delivery costs and enabled rapid delivery of a variety of fresh foods. As of February 2004, Seven-Eleven Japan had a total of 290 dedicated manufacturing plants throughout the country that only produced fast food for Seven-Eleven stores. These items were distributed through 293 dedicated distribution centers (DCs) that ensured rapid, reliable delivery. None of these DCs carried any inventory; they merely transferred inventory from supplier trucks to Seven-Eleven distribution trucks. The transportation was provided by Transfleet Ltd., a company set up by Mitsui and Co. for the exclusive use of Seven-Eleven Japan. The outline of the combined distribution system is shown in Exhibit 5. KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 7

SEVEN-ELEⅤ EN JAPAN CO KELO26 Seven-Eleven in the United states Seven-Eleven has expanded rapidly around the world(see Exhibit 6). The major growth has been in Asia, though the United States continues to be the second-largest market for Seven- Eleven. Once Seven-Eleven Japan acquired Southland Corporation, it set about improving operations in the United States. In the initial years, several Seven-Eleven stores in the United States were shut down. The number of stores started to grow beginning in 1998. Historically, the distribution structure in the United States was completely different from that of Japan. Stores in the United States were replenished using direct store delivery(DSD) by some manufacturers, which accounted for about half the total volume. The remaining products were delivered by wholesalers With the goal of introducing"fresh"products, Seven-Eleven introduced the concept of combined distribution centers(CDC)around 2000. By 2003, Seven-Eleven had 23 CDCs located throughout North America supporting about 80 percent of the store network CDCs delivered esh items such as sandwiches, bakery products, bread, produce, and other perishables once a day. a variety of fresh-food suppliers sent product to the CdC throughout the day where they were sorted for delivery to stores at night. Fresh-food sales in North America exceeded $450 million in 2003. During this period, dSd by manufacturers and wholesaler delivery to stores also In 2003, revenue in the United States and Canada totaled $10.9 billion with about 69 percent coming from merchandise and the rest from the sale of gasoline. The North American inventory turnover rate in 2003 was about 17 compared to over 50 in Japan. This performance, however represented a significant improvement in North American performance helong ORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN CO. KEL026 Seven-Eleven in the United States Seven-Eleven has expanded rapidly around the world (see Exhibit 6). The major growth has been in Asia, though the United States continues to be the second-largest market for Seven￾Eleven. Once Seven-Eleven Japan acquired Southland Corporation, it set about improving operations in the United States. In the initial years, several Seven-Eleven stores in the United States were shut down. The number of stores started to grow beginning in 1998. Historically, the distribution structure in the United States was completely different from that of Japan. Stores in the United States were replenished using direct store delivery (DSD) by some manufacturers, which accounted for about half the total volume. The remaining products were delivered by wholesalers. With the goal of introducing “fresh” products, Seven-Eleven introduced the concept of combined distribution centers (CDC) around 2000. By 2003, Seven-Eleven had 23 CDCs located throughout North America supporting about 80 percent of the store network. CDCs delivered fresh items such as sandwiches, bakery products, bread, produce, and other perishables once a day. A variety of fresh-food suppliers sent product to the CDC throughout the day where they were sorted for delivery to stores at night. Fresh-food sales in North America exceeded $450 million in 2003. During this period, DSD by manufacturers and wholesaler delivery to stores also continued. In 2003, revenue in the United States and Canada totaled $10.9 billion with about 69 percent coming from merchandise and the rest from the sale of gasoline. The North American inventory turnover rate in 2003 was about 17 compared to over 50 in Japan. This performance, however, represented a significant improvement in North American performance. 8 KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

KELO26 SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN CO Study Questions 1. A convenience store chain attempts to be responsive and provide customers what they when they need it, where they need it. What are some different ways that a convenience se supply chain can be responsive? What are some risks in each case? Seven-Eleven's supply chain strategy in Japan can be described as attempting to micro-match supply and demand using rapid replenishment. What are some risks associated with this choice? 3. What has Seven-Eleven done in its choice of facility location, inventory management transportation, and information infrastructure to develop capabilities that support its supply chain strategy in Japan? 4. Seven-Eleven does not allow direct store delivery in Japan with all products flowing through direct store delivery more appropriate? es Seven-Eleven derive from this policy? When is its distribution center. What benefit do 5. What do you think about the 7dream concept for Seven-Eleven Japan? From a supply chain perspective, is it likely to be more successful in Japan or the United States?Wmy uppl 6. Seven-Eleven is attempting to duplicate the supply chain structure that has succeeded in Japan in the United States with the introduction of CDCs. What are the pros and cons of this approach? Keep in mind that stores are also replenished by wholesalers and dsd by manufacturers 7. The United States has food service distributors like McLane that also replenish convenience stores. What are the pros and cons to having a distributor replenish convenience stores versus a company like Seven-Eleven managing its own distribution function? KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

KEL026 SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN CO. Study Questions 1. A convenience store chain attempts to be responsive and provide customers what they need, when they need it, where they need it. What are some different ways that a convenience store supply chain can be responsive? What are some risks in each case? 2. Seven-Eleven’s supply chain strategy in Japan can be described as attempting to micro-match supply and demand using rapid replenishment. What are some risks associated with this choice? 3. What has Seven-Eleven done in its choice of facility location, inventory management, transportation, and information infrastructure to develop capabilities that support its supply chain strategy in Japan? 4. Seven-Eleven does not allow direct store delivery in Japan with all products flowing through its distribution center. What benefit does Seven-Eleven derive from this policy? When is direct store delivery more appropriate? 5. What do you think about the 7dream concept for Seven-Eleven Japan? From a supply chain perspective, is it likely to be more successful in Japan or the United States? Why? 6. Seven-Eleven is attempting to duplicate the supply chain structure that has succeeded in Japan in the United States with the introduction of CDCs. What are the pros and cons of this approach? Keep in mind that stores are also replenished by wholesalers and DSD by manufacturers. 7. The United States has food service distributors like McLane that also replenish convenience stores. What are the pros and cons to having a distributor replenish convenience stores versus a company like Seven-Eleven managing its own distribution function? KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 9

SEVEN-ELEⅤ EN JAPAN CO KELO2 Exhibit 1: Stores and Annual Sales for Seven-Eleven Japan Annual s Number of Stores C in bilic G in billions) 48 1990 4270 931.9 1991 1977 398 5.058 1.194.9 1978 1,2819 109.8 1,3923 153.6 1.6090 256.5 1997 1,7409 319.0 1998 7.732 1.848.1 1984 2,299 386.7 1,9639 4536 2000 2,964 521.9 2001 9060 2,114.0 599.1 9690 213.2 1988 6863 10,303 2,3432 Exhibit 2: Financial Figures for Seven-Eleven Japan(2000-2004) For Fiscal Years Ended February 28/29 Net Sales( in billions) 1,9640 2,046.6 2.114.0 2.213.3 2,3432 Ordinary Income in billions) 140.2 1472 53.8 1596 168.9 Net Income( in billions 68 86.5 Number of store 8.602 9.060 9.690 10,303 KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

S 10 EVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN CO. KEL026 KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT Exhibit 1: Stores and Annual Sales for Seven-Eleven Japan Year Number of Stores Annual Sales (¥ in billions) Year Number of Stores Annual Sales (¥ in billions) 1974 15 0.7 1989 3,954 780.3 1975 69 4.8 1990 4,270 931.9 1976 199 17.4 1991 4,629 1,081.8 1977 375 39.8 1992 5,058 1,194.9 1978 591 72.5 1993 5,475 1,281.9 1979 801 109.8 1994 5,905 1,392.3 1980 1,040 153.6 1995 6,373 1,477.1 1981 1,306 202.1 1996 6,875 1,609.0 1982 1,643 256.5 1997 7,314 1,740.9 1983 2,001 319.0 1998 7,732 1,848.1 1984 2,299 386.7 1999 8,153 1,963.9 1985 2,651 453.6 2000 8,602 2,046.6 1986 2,964 521.9 2001 9,060 2,114.0 1987 3,304 599.1 2002 9,690 2,213.2 1988 3,653 686.3 2003 10,303 2,343.2 Exhibit 2: Financial Figures for Seven-Eleven Japan (2000–2004) For Fiscal Years Ended February 28/29 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Net Sales (¥ in billions) 1,964.0 2,046.6 2,114.0 2,213.3 2,343.2 Revenue (¥ in billions) 327.0 346.9 365.9 400.7 445.4 Ordinary Income (¥ in billions) 140.2 147.2 153.8 159.6 168.9 Net Income (¥ in billions) 68.2 78.4 83.2 86.5 91.5 Number of Stores 8,153 8,602 9,060 9,690 10,303